The spillover of negative mood or affect from the workplace to family and vice versa has been well documented. Negative spillover is associated with problem drinking (Grzywacz \& Marks 2000), negative well-being and increased stress (Grzywacz 2000), decreased marital quality (Barnett 1994; Boger et al. 1989; Thompson \& Bolger 1999) and marital strain (Stevens \& Riley 2006). Increases in women's labor force participation and couples' greater reliance on two wages imply that the number of individuals facing negative work-family spillover is higher now than ever before. Researchers have identified several job and family characteristics (Shieman et al. 2003; Bromet et al. 1990; Maume \& Houston 2001; Roehling et al. 2003) as well as macro policy structures (Crompton \& Lyonette 2006) that affect work-family spillover. Building on previous research, we analyze whether individuals experience less negative work-family spillover if they live in countries with policies aimed at alleviating work and family conflict.

This study uses the 2002 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on family and changing gender roles using a cross-national sample, and includes questions on workfamily spillover. To measure variation among countries' family-policy, we use Meyers, Gornick, and Ross' (1999) typology of policy support for mothers' continuous labor force participation. Coupling Meyers, Gornick, and Ross's (1999) measure of work-family policy with the 2002 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data, we analyze the extent to which a country's work-family policy does, in fact, alleviate spillover between work and family for men and women in ten nations.

Table 1 shows that men living in strong work-family policy countries report greater spillover than men living in weak work-family policy countries but women living in strong work-family policy countries report less spillover than women in weak supporting countries ( $\mathrm{p}<0.010$ ). In the moderate work-family policy countries, both men ( $\mathrm{p}<0.010$ ) and women ( $\mathrm{p}<0.001$ ) report less spillover than their weak policy counterparts. Norwegian women report significantly less spillover than women in weak work-family policy countries ( $\mathrm{p}<0.001$ ) but policy environment is not significant for Norwegian men. These findings suggests that a strong work-family policy environment alleviates some of the work-family spillover for women probably through women off-loading some of their household responsibilities to men, a process which decreases women's spillover and increases that of men.

In Table 2 the relationship between gender and negative work-family spillover provides one of the most striking results. Model 1 shows that in strong and weak workfamily policy environments, gender is significantly correlated with spillover ( $\mathrm{p}<0.050$ ) as men report significantly less spillover than women but gender is not statistically significant in moderate policy countries. With the addition of job characteristics to Model 2 , the relationship between gender and spillover becomes statistically stronger in the strong and weak policy countries ( $\mathrm{p}<0.001$ ) and becomes statistically significant in the moderate work-family policy countries ( $\mathrm{p}<0.050$ ). Gender is no longer statistically significant in strong and moderate policy countries when home factors, including respondent's housework hours, home stress and dissatisfaction are added to Model 3 but the effect remains significant in weak work-family policy countries ( $\mathrm{p}<0.001$ ). As women remain largely responsible for the household responsibilities, household factors are likely to increase women's reports of spillover. Once these household characteristics are controlled for, women and men report equivalent levels of negative spillover in strong and moderate work-family policy countries. In weak policy countries, however, gender
remains statistically significant in the final model. These findings suggest gender differences in sources of work and family spillover in strong and moderate work-family policy and depict women's spillover disadvantage in weak work-family policy countries. The results of this study highlight the importance of gender in the relationship between spillover and policy.

Table 1: Regression Results for Negative Spillover for Men and Women in Ten Countries

|  | Men | Women |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coefficient | Coefficient |
| Constant | 1.152*** | 0.957*** |
| Work-Family Policy Environment |  |  |
| Strong Work-Family Policy Countries | 0.075** | -0.081** |
| Moderate Work-Family Policy Countries | -0.099** | -0.201*** |
| Outlier | -0.001 | -0.194*** |
| Job Characteristics |  |  |
| Respondent's Weekly Work Hours | $0.006^{* * *}$ | $0.012^{* * *}$ |
| Employment Sector |  |  |
| Government | -0.053 | 0.008 |
| Public or Private Firm | -0.047 | -0.024 |
| Supervisor Position | 0.038 | 0.043 |
| Job Stress | 0.125*** | 0.099*** |
| Job Dissatisfaction | 0.067*** | $0.074^{* * *}$ |
| Home Characteristics |  |  |
| Respondent's Housework Hours | 0.004** | 0.004** |
| Home Stress | 0.048*** | 0.090*** |
| Home-life Dissatisfaction | 0.116*** | $0.098 * * *$ |
| Controls |  |  |
| Children aged up to 6 present | 0.037 | 0.026 |
| Children aged 6 to 17 present | -0.018 | -0.003 |
| Gender Role Ideology | $-0.106 * * *$ | -0.105*** |
| Respondent's Level of Education | 0.019* | 0.020* |
| Family Income | -7.87E-08 | -1.08E-07* |
| Age | $-0.008 * * *$ | -0.003** |
| Marital Status |  |  |
| Married | 0.030 | -0.082 |
| Single | -0.080 | -0.113* |
| Adjusted R-Square | 0.257*** | 0.290*** |
| N | 2205 | 2304 |


|  | STRONG WORK-FAMILY POLICY COUNTRIES |  |  |  | MODERATE WORK-FAMILY COUNTRIES |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Model 1 <br> Coefficient | Model 2 <br> Coefficient | Model 3 <br> Coefficient | Model 4 Coefficient | Model 1 <br> Coefficient | Model 2 <br> Coefficient | Model 3 <br> Coefficient | Model 4 <br> Coefficient |
| Constant | 1.889*** | 0.680*** | $0.228^{* *}$ | 0.909*** | 1.714** | 0.953*** | $0.733^{* * *}$ | 0.807*** |
| Male Dummy | -0.044* | -0.091*** | -0.017*** | -0.013 | 0.023 | -0.068* | -0.048 | -0.072 |
| Job Characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Respondent's Weekly Work Hours |  | 0.012*** | 0.013 | 0.012*** |  | 0.006*** | 0.007*** | 0.008*** |
| Employment Sector |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Government |  | -0.030 | -0.007 | 0.028 |  | 0.034 | 0.012 | -0.016 |
| Public or Private Firm |  | -0.025 | 0.008 | 0.011 |  | -0.041 | -0.042 | -0.071 |
| Supervisor Position |  | 0.032 | 0.036 | 0.062** |  | 0.017 | 0.011 | -0.003 |
| Job Stress |  | 0.132*** | 0.117*** | 0.111*** |  | 0.078** | 0.049** | 0.062** |
| Job Dissatisfaction |  | 0.109*** | 0.078*** | $0.066^{* * *}$ |  | 0.111*** | $0.093^{* * *}$ | 0.080*** |
| Home Characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Respondent's Housework Hours |  |  | 0.006*** | 0.005** |  |  | -0.005 | -0.004 |
| Home Stress |  |  | 0.077*** | 0.078*** |  |  | 0.067*** | 0.056** |
| Home-life Dissatisfaction |  |  | 0.105*** | 0.101*** |  |  | 0.093*** | 0.096*** |
| Controls |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Children aged up to 6 present |  |  |  | 0.003 |  |  |  | 0.080 |
| Children aged 6 to 17 present |  |  |  | -0.004 |  |  |  | -0.005 |
| Gender Role Ideology |  |  |  | -0.105 |  |  |  | -0.054 |
| Respondent's Level of Education |  |  |  | 0.014 |  |  |  | 0.022 |
| Family Income |  |  |  | -1.640E-07*** |  |  |  | 1.240E-06* |
| Age |  |  |  | $-0.007^{* * *}$ |  |  |  | -. 001 |
| Marital Status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Married |  |  |  | -0.078 |  |  |  | -0.006 |
| Single |  |  |  | 0.048 |  |  |  | 0.088 |
| Adjusted R-Square | 0.001* | 0.187*** | 0.276*** | 0.313*** | 0.000 | 0.099*** | 0.139*** | 0.146*** |
| N | 3598 | 3084 | 2278 | 2145 | 1461 | 1253 | 901 | 754 |

Table 2 Continued: Regression Results for Nested Models of Spillover by Policy Environment

|  | WEAK WORK-FAMILY COUNTRIES |  |  |  | OUTLIER |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Model 1 <br> Coefficient | Model 2 Coefficient | Model 3 <br> Coefficient | Model 4 <br> Coefficient | Model 1 <br> Coefficient | Model 2 <br> Coefficient | Model 3 <br> Coefficient | Model 4 Coefficient |
| Constant | 1.938*** | 0.983*** | 0.501*** | 1.238*** | 1.716*** | 0.666*** | 0.255* | 0.765*** |
| Male Dummy | -0.068* | -0.142*** | $-0.127^{* * *}$ | -0.154*** | 0.037 | 0.001 | 0.043 | 0.055 |
| Job Characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Respondent's Weekly Work Hours |  | $0.006^{* * *}$ | $0.009^{* * *}$ | 0.009*** |  | 0.005*** | 0.005*** | 0.005** |
| Employment Sector |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Government |  | 0.005 | 0.044 | 0.025 |  | -0.075 | -0.083 | -0.144* |
| Public or Private Firm |  | 0.015 | 0.037 | 0.006 |  | -0.089 | -0.070 | -0.125 |
| Supervisor Position |  | 0.045 | 0.011 | 0.029 |  | 0.086** | 0.063 | 0.065 |
| Job Stress |  | $0.120^{* * *}$ | 0.102*** | 0.114*** |  | $0.206 * * *$ | 0.178*** | $0.173^{* * *}$ |
| Job Dissatisfaction |  | $0.108^{* * *}$ | 0.100*** | 0.090*** |  | $0.067^{* * *}$ | 0.039* | 0.036 |
| Home Characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Respondent's Housework Hours |  |  | 0.006 | 0.007*** |  |  | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Home Stress |  |  | 0.062*** | 0.052** |  |  | 0.091*** | 0.091*** |
| Home-life Dissatisfaction |  |  | 0.101*** | 0.110*** |  |  | 0.125*** | $0.145^{* * *}$ |
| Controls |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Children aged up to 6 present |  |  |  | 0.085** |  |  |  | -0.006 |
| Children aged 6 to 17 present |  |  |  | -0.030 |  |  |  | -0.038 |
| Gender Role Ideology |  |  |  | $-0.117^{* * *}$ |  |  |  | $-0.061^{* * *}$ |
| Respondent's Level of Education |  |  |  | -0.003 |  |  |  | 0.038* |
| Family Income |  |  |  | $4.030 \mathrm{E}-08$ |  |  |  | $5.880 \mathrm{E}-08$ |
| Age |  |  |  | -0.004* |  |  |  | -0.006 |
| Marital Status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Married |  |  |  | $-0.167^{* * *}$ |  |  |  | -0.136 |
| Single |  |  |  | -0.086 |  |  |  | -0.249** |
| Adjusted R-Square | 0.002* | $0.151^{* * *}$ | 0.223*** | 0.250*** | 0.000 | 0.184*** | 0.249*** | 0.280 *** |
| N | 1862 | 1629 | 1028 | 967 | 992 | 897 | 695 | 642 |

