

**WHITE FLIGHT REVISITED:
A MULTIETHNIC PERSPECTIVE ON NEIGHBORHOOD
OUT-MIGRATION**

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ABSTRACT

Using geo-linked data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and decennial census, we compare probabilities of neighborhood out-migration for Anglos, blacks, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans by varying ethno-racial neighborhood compositions. Analyses for Latinos are disaggregated by nativity status. The results indicate that Anglos have a higher likelihood of moving when they have many minority neighbors but there is no difference whether minority neighbors are black or Latino. Among minorities there is some evidence of “minority flight” from whiter neighborhoods. Cubans, especially foreign-born Cubans, demonstrate the strongest propensity to flee neighborhoods with large black populations, whereas the probability of moving out decreases for Puerto Ricans when their neighbors are more likely to be black. The pattern of out-migration for Mexicans indicates an inclination for ethno-racially integrated neighborhoods and/or an aversion to majority-white and majority-black neighborhoods. Ethno-racial neighborhood composition least affects blacks’ decision to leave their neighborhood.

Keywords: Ethnicity; Neighborhoods; Race; Residential mobility; Segregation.

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The reluctance of whites to remain in neighborhoods with large and growing black populations has long been thought to contribute to the creation and maintenance of racially segregated neighborhoods (Birch 1977; Crowder 2000; Duncan and Duncan 1957; Glaster 1990; Krysan 2002; Massey and Denton 1993; Schelling 1971, 1972; Taeuber and Taeuber 1965). However, “white flight” as a primary mechanism of neighborhood change has come into recent question (Ellen 2000). In part, the relevance of “white flight” is suspected to be declining because North American cities are becoming increasingly multiethnic and because the proportion of non-Hispanic white populations in major U.S. cities has decreased. In this context it is often argued that to understand residential settlements in ethno-racially diverse cities, minority locational choices should also be considered (Charles 2003; Clark 1992; Denton and Massey 1991; Fong and Shibuya 2005; Iceland 2004; Maly 2005). Yet, despite this emerging reality, there is a dearth of studies addressing how inter-minority relations shape contemporary urban neighborhoods. Only recently have scholars responded to this limitation and, even then, only for specific cities like Los Angeles (Charles 2006) and Chicago (Wilson and Taub 2006). Here we add to this line of research by asking not only how Anglo households respond to the neighborhood presence of minorities, but also how the residential moves of minorities are affected by having Anglos and other minorities as neighbors.

This study draws from research on neighborhood preferences in order to explain how the racial and ethnic composition of neighborhoods affects moving decisions for Anglo households and minority households. Prior research on race and ethnic neighborhood preferences posits favoritism for in-group members (Clark 1992, 2007) and a hierarchy where by white neighbors

are the most preferred ethno-racial out-group and black neighbors are the least preferred ethno-racial out-group (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Charles 2000; 2001, 2003, 2006; Bobo 2001; Harris 2001). The latter aspect is of interest here because whether or not minorities respond to out-group neighbors in a manner similar to Anglos is unknown. By determining the migratory reaction of minorities to their racial and ethnic neighborhood makeup we will gather further insight into the structural constraints and social mechanisms that help maintain racial and ethnic residential segregation.

To ascertain whether patterns of neighborhood out-migration have direct racial and ethnic influences or are simply byproducts of different demographic characteristics and socioeconomic resources, we use individual level longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) geo-linked to tract level census data. With the PSID data, multiethnic comparisons of neighborhood out-migration are made to assess whether ethno-racial neighborhood preferences correspond to actual moving decisions. We estimate a series of multivariate logistic regression models that predict the probability of moving from the neighborhood of origin under varying ethno-racial neighborhood compositions. The analysis is done for non-Hispanic whites (i.e. Anglos), non-Hispanic blacks (i.e. blacks), Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans. We also distinguish between native-born and foreign-born Latinos.

Revisiting White Flight

The continued salience of white flight as a mechanism of neighborhood change is being contested for social and demographic reasons. At the societal level peoples' publicly expressed views about race have changed. Opinion surveys given since the 1950s show a trend of increasing tolerance among Anglos for minority neighbors (Farley et al 1994; Schuman et al. 1997). According to the Gallup Poll Social Audit (1997), 80 percent of whites in 1958 said they

would leave if blacks moved in great numbers to their neighborhood, but this percentage dropped precipitously to 18 percent by 1997. This social trend suggest that white flight may not be as prominent today as during a time when bigoted behavior was openly accepted by individuals and institutions (cf. Massey and Denton 1993).

Moreover, the ethno-racial composition of metropolitan areas has become increasingly more diverse over the last thirty years. The share of non-Hispanic white population in U.S. metropolitan areas declined from 78 percent in 1980 to 73 percent in 1990 and as of 2000 Anglos make-up roughly 66 percent of urban America (*U.S. Census 2000*, author's calculations). This demographic trend is also reflected in the numerical decline of all-Anglo neighborhoods (Alba et al. 1995; Denton and Massey 1991; Ellen 2000; Maly 2005). These developments suggest that white flight may not be as frequent now as during the post World War II period when the mass construction of suburban housing gave Anglos incentive and opportunity to flee growing minority neighborhoods (cf. Massey and Denton 1993).

Yet, in the face of increasing racial tolerance and growing ethno-racial diversity scholars are perplexed over the persistence of segregated neighborhoods. As a result different insights are being developed. One new approach focuses on Anglo avoidance of minority neighborhoods in their relocation decisions (Ellen 2000; Quillian 2002, South and Crowder 1998). This argument posits that Anglos are reluctant to move into large minority neighborhoods because neighborhoods with high concentrations of minorities are perceived to be less safe, more disorganized, have fewer amenities, and less effective schools. This viewpoint is captured by Ellen's (2000) "race-based neighborhood stereotyping hypothesis." She asserts that white avoidance of minority neighborhoods is avoidance of poverty and not racial prejudice per se (also see Frey 1979). This perspective relegates white flight to a lesser role in the residential

separation of whites from minorities while still maintaining the center of focus on the migration behavior of Anglos.

Despite these social, demographic, and analytic shifts, however, it is difficult to dismiss entirely the existence of white flight. Even when numerous other considerations are taken into account whites are still more likely to prefer fewer rather than more minority neighbors (Charles 2006; Farley et al. 1978, 1994; Harris 2001; Krysan and Farley 2002; Krysan 2002), and the ethno-racial composition of their neighborhoods remains tied to their migration behavior. For example, Birch and colleagues (1977) find that whites in mixed-race neighborhoods are generally more inclined to move than whites in homogeneous neighborhoods, and when Anglos do move they are likely to move to neighborhoods with fewer minorities. Galster (1990) finds that Anglo neighborhoods in Cleveland experienced rapid white population loss after only a few black households arrived. More recently, Crowder (2000) finds that the likelihood of leaving a neighborhood for whites increases both with the size of the minority population and when multiple minority groups are present, net of other important demographic and socioeconomic predictors of residential mobility. *Therefore, in classic white flight fashion, we expect that larger minority presence will increase the propensity for neighborhood out-migration among Anglos.*

Is “White Flight” Just for Whites?

Unlike whites, minorities often face discriminatory barriers to attaining and maintaining residence in predominately white neighborhoods (Fischer and Massey 2004; Massey and Denton 1993; Massey and Lundy 2001; Turner, Ross, Galster and Yinger 2002; Yinger 1995). The historical record documents the hostile reaction of whites towards new black neighbors during the Great Migration of southern blacks into northern cities (Massey and Denton 1993). More

recently, Green and colleagues (1998) find support for the “defended neighborhood hypothesis.” The defended neighborhood hypothesis holds that white residents fear neighborhood change and are often proactive in their efforts to ward-off newcomers of different ethno-racial origins. Specifically, they find that anti-minority crime is more common in neighborhoods where the Anglo population is large and the minority population is small but growing.

Although outright physical hostility will likely drive minorities from Anglo neighborhoods, subtler mechanisms may also be at work. Urban renewal and the gentrification of older metropolitan neighborhoods are known to displace minorities (Zukin 1987). Often the places designated for urban renewal are proximate to whiter urban neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993), and these government subsidized projects increase property taxes and raise rents causing minorities to flee neighborhoods that are becoming wealthier and whiter (Logan and Molotch 1988).

Furthermore, anti-minority hostility need not be violent or institutionalized to be effective. A more prevalent form of the hostility minorities experience from whites is during mundane day-to-day interactions, in which social status is exchanged, conferred, or denied—a form of hostility that Feagin (1991) describes as common for middle-class blacks in public places. Cumulatively, this actual or perceived hostility can make minorities apprehensive about living with large Anglo populations (Charles 2006; Patterson 1997). Therefore, compared to whites’ disinclination to share neighborhoods with minorities, minorities migratory response to having white neighbors is likely to be less volitional and less driven by prejudice. But the demographic implications are similar: minorities’ out-migration from neighborhoods with large Anglo populations will tend to increase levels of racial/ethnic residential segregation. *Thus, we*

hypothesize that larger Anglo presence will increase the propensity for neighborhood out-migration among minorities.

Do Minorities Flee Other Minorities?

Reports from several U.S. cities indicate that there are frequent tensions between Latinos and African Americans (Mindiola et. al. 2002; Stepick and Grenier 1993) that may surpass conflict between Anglos, on the one hand, and both Latinos and blacks, on the other. Both blacks and Latinos often hold negative stereotypes about, and perceive competition from, the other group (Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Moreover, Latinos and Anglos equally view predominantly black neighborhoods as undesirable (Charles 2006). Evidence also suggests that these racial preferences are coming to the fore in other areas as well. For example, Fairlie (2002) finds “Latino flight” from public to private schools to be more likely as the population of black students increases. Hence, Latinos may be as indisposed as Anglos, or even more so, to comparatively large shares of black neighbors. *Therefore, we expect Latinos to be more likely to move from neighborhoods with large black populations.*

On the other hand, the reaction of African Americans to large and growing Latino populations may be qualitatively different for several reasons. In Chicago, for instance, Wilson and Taub (2006) find that in the black working and middle-class neighborhood of “Groveland,” black residents *do not* perceive a threat from the rapidly emerging Latino populations (as do white residents in other Chicago neighborhoods). Wilson and Taub argue that the residents of Groveland are the least ethno-racially antagonistic because the residents do not expect their neighborhood to be subjected to ethno-racial change, and therefore, newcomer Latinos do not trigger negative reactions in black working-class neighborhoods in the same fashion as they do for Anglos that have remained in declining white-ethnic neighborhoods. The same general

conclusion is reached by Morenoff and Tienda (1997) in Chicago by studying neighborhood transitions. Morenoff and Tienda find that older white middle-class neighborhoods are subject to Latino succession, whereas Latino succession does not hold for black neighborhoods. If these observations are generalizable, *we would expect that neighborhood out-migration for blacks will be unaffected by the size of the Latino population.*

Incorporating Latino Nativity Status

When considering the neighborhood preferences and residential mobility of Latinos it is important to account for national origins and nativity status. Differences in neighborhood contexts exist among Latinos of Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban heritage (the three largest Latino groups in the U.S.) because they have come to the U.S. under varied circumstances. These different conditions include refugee status of Cubans, limited access to citizenship for Mexicans, and in the case of subpopulations of Puerto Ricans and Mexicans, the intention of returning to their homelands. These different situations could influence both their neighborhood preferences and moving decisions.

Moreover, it is expected that among the native-born some convergence with neighborhood preferences and migration behavior will have occurred. Assimilation processes suggest that foreign-born Latinos (island-born for Puerto Ricans) are more likely than native-born Latinos (or mainland-born Puerto Ricans) to desire Latinos as neighbors, mostly because of common language and attachments to the home country. More discomfoting, however, is that foreign-born Latinos tend to be especially averse to black neighbors. For example, Charles (2006) reports that as many as 38 percent of foreign-born Latinos in Los Angles desire no black neighbors at all, while only 19 percent of native-born Latinos and 20 percent of Anglos desire no

black neighbors. *This suggests that foreign-born Latinos will be more likely than native-born Latinos to move from neighborhoods with large black populations.*

DATA AND METHODS

To test the hypotheses developed above, we use longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the period 1990-1995, in conjunction with census tract data from the decennial census. We use census tracts to represent neighborhoods. Attaching census data that reports tract-level percentages for the total minority population (this includes all those that are not non-Hispanic white), non-Hispanic black population, and Latino population at each annual PSID interview allows us to determine which PSID respondents move out of neighborhoods of a given racial and ethnic composition.

Begun in 1968 with approximately 5,000 families, the PSID sample has been interviewed continuously, and new families have been added to the sample as children leave home to form new households (Hill 1992). Because prior to 1990, the PSID had no mechanism for incorporating immigrants into the sampling frame, a limitation of the original PSID sample is that it severely under represents Latino residents of the U.S. In 1990 the PSID attempted to remedy this limitation by adding to the database a sample of Latinos. This sample of 2,043 Latino families was originally drawn as part of the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS) (de la Garza et al. 1998). Beginning in 1990 and continuing through the 1995 round of interviews, the PSID interviewed on an annual basis the members of those households and, as with the PSID core sample, followed those members who left the original household. Our analysis uses the original PSID sample merged with the LNPS sample.

Sample Selection: To examine residential moves made by Latino, black, and Anglo households, our sample includes respondents who were classified as heads of the household

either at the beginning *or* at the end of an annual mobility interval. To align our results more closely with prior studies of white flight, we restrict the sample to PSID household heads who began and ended a mobility interval in a metropolitan area. Applying these selection criteria results in a sample of 9,605 PSID respondents.

Analyses are conducted for five ethno-racial groups: non-Hispanic whites (i.e. Anglos), non-Hispanic blacks (i.e. blacks), Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Latinos. We further distinguish between the foreign-born and native-born members of the three Latino groups because neighborhood preference data posits differences between immigrants and native-born Latinos.¹ Our effective sample includes 4,325 Anglos, 3,134 blacks, 1,183 Mexicans, 419 Puerto Ricans, and 544 Cubans.

Dependent Variable: Our dependent variable is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent moved out of the census tract of origin between consecutive PSID interviews, scored 1 for movers and 0 for nonmovers.

Independent Variables: The three main independent variables of interest are the percentage of the origin tract that is minority, the percentage of the origin tract population that is non-Hispanic black, and the percentage of the origin tract that is Latino. Tract-level census data are drawn from the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB) in which census tract boundaries have been normalized across censuses. We use linear interpolation to describe the racial and ethnic composition of census tracts (and metropolitan areas) during intercensal years. We interact these tract level compositional variables with the respondent's ethno-racial identification

¹ Although island-born Puerto Ricans are technically internal migrants rather than immigrants, we consider them immigrants in this analysis in order to draw comparisons with foreign-born Mexicans and Cubans. Latinos of other origins, members of racial groups other than black or white, and foreign-born whites and blacks are represented in too few numbers in the PSID to sustain analysis.

to test hypotheses regarding the impact of neighborhood racial and ethnic composition on the propensity to move out of the neighborhood of origin between successive PSID interviews.

Control Variables: Numerous factors are known to influence a household's decision to move. Residential moves are often related to the changes that occur during the life-course, for instance, new housing needs resulting from social partnerships, births, and aging, as well as, employment transitions and increases to a household's income and wealth. Residential choices are also associated with housing supply, neighborhood amenities (such as schools and parks), and overall affordability (Clark 1996; Harris 1999; South and Crowder 1997, 1998). Our analysis includes several control variables that are known to be associated with residential mobility.

Age is measured in years, and its squared value is included to capture nonlinear effects on the propensity to migrate. Sex and marital status are captured by dummy variables (0 for males, 1 for females; 0 for not married, 1 for married). The presence of children is measured by the total number of children in the household. Family income refers to the total taxable income of husband and wife, measured in thousands of constant 1990 dollars. Education is measured by years of school completed. Home ownership is a dummy variable scored 0 for renters and 1 for owners. Residents of public housing are distinguished from residents of private sector housing by a dummy variable. Household crowding is measured by the number of persons per room. Dummy variables indicate whether a respondent became employed or became unemployed (including retirement), and whether a marital union formed or dissolved, between successive PSID interviews. We control for the percentage of the population that is minority in the metropolitan area of origin to account for the effect of larger local minority populations (i.e. increased potential for neighborhood destabilization) on increasing rates of white out-migration (Massey and Gross 1991). Controlling for the mean annual household income of the origin

neighborhood in constant 1990 dollars should attenuate racial disparities in neighborhood quality that result from socioeconomic factors (cf. Clark and Ledwith 2007; Ellen 2000). All of these variables except for respondent's sex and race are measured annually at the beginning of each migration interval and are treated as time-varying covariates.

Analytical Strategy: Because we are able to identify the PSID respondents' census tract at each annual interview, it is possible to observe more than one residential move for each respondent between 1990 and 1995. To fully exploit this information, we structure the data file in "person-year" format, each observation pertaining to the year between annual consecutive interviews. Each PSID respondent in our sample could contribute a maximum of 5 person-years to the analysis. The 9,605 PSID respondents in our sample contributed 32,867 person-year observations to the analysis.

We use logistic regression to examine the effects of the explanatory variables on the likelihood that respondents will move out of their origin tract between successive PSID interviews. Because the same PSID respondent can contribute more than one person-year to the analysis, and because inter-neighborhood mobility is a repeatable event, the usual assumption of the stochastic independence of error terms underlying tests of statistical significance is violated. We correct for this non-independence of observations by computing robust standard errors using the cluster command in Stata (Wooldridge 2002; StataCorp 2005).

RESULTS

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses of neighborhood out-migration. Over the study period (1990 to 1995), an average of 17 percent of household heads moved out of their neighborhoods annually. Out-migration was slightly higher for blacks (21 percent) and the lowest for Puerto Ricans and Cubans (11 and 12 percent, respectively). These

differential rates of mobility are matched with distinctive demographic profiles for each ethno-racial group. For example, Cubans tend to be older on average than the rest of the sample. Blacks and Puerto Ricans have roughly half of their households headed by women, while only 24 percent of Anglo households have female heads, with Cubans and Mexicans falling in-between. The number of children living at home is highest for Mexicans and Puerto Ricans and lowest for Cubans, and this difference mirrors the average number of people per room in the home.

[Table 1 about here]

There are also pronounced socioeconomic differences among these groups. Anglo households, on average, net nearly twice the income as the other ethno-racial groups. The lowest net family income is for Puerto Ricans with an average of thirteen-thousand dollars yearly (in 1990 dollars). Average education for Anglos exceeds high school and is lowest for Mexicans. Rates of homeownership range from 66 percent for Anglos to 19 percent for Puerto Ricans. Other notable differences include utilizing public housing and employment transitions. Residence in public housing is the least common for Anglos and Mexicans and more than twice as prevalent for Puerto Ricans as for blacks. For employment changes, Latinos are the most likely to transition into employment, while Anglos are the most likely transition into unemployment/retirement. These different group characteristics likely affect the propensity for residential mobility and are thus controlled for in the regression analyses.

Table 1 also illustrates the descriptive statistics for the neighborhood characteristics of interest. First, we consider differences in the social class status of respondents' neighborhoods. The average household income for neighborhoods in which Anglos live is nearly fifty thousand dollars, while the average neighborhood household income for blacks and Latinos are clustered

in the low to mid thirties, with Cubans living in slightly higher income neighborhoods and Puerto Ricans slightly lower.²

Turning to the main independent variables of ethno-racial neighborhood composition—as indicated by percent minority, percent non-Hispanic black, and percent Latino in a respondent’s census tract of origin—several observations are relevant. Not surprising, members of each ethno-racial group tend to live in neighborhoods with a greater representation of co-ethnics than of out-group members, although variation in the extent of co-ethnic neighborhood representation is noteworthy. For example, Cubans live in neighborhoods that on average are 72 percent Latino; and blacks on average live in neighborhoods that are roughly 65 percent black. Mexicans and Puerto Ricans also live in neighborhoods that have far greater Hispanic representation than their population share at large would suggest (55 and 50 percent, respectively). Overall, the average metropolitan neighborhood consists of roughly 48 percent minority (i.e. not non-Hispanic white), and there are large differences between the average minority neighborhood composition for blacks and Latinos and the average minority neighborhood composition for Anglos. There are relatively small differences (9 percent at most) among blacks, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans in their average minority neighborhood composition.

However, by examining neighborhood compositions with greater detail the differences between minority groups in their neighborhood ethno-racial composition becomes more revealing. Foremost, there is little overall neighborhood integration between blacks and Latinos. For example, blacks live in neighborhoods with only slightly more Latinos than do Anglos (7.10 percent for blacks versus 7.05 for Anglos), and Cubans live in neighborhoods that are slightly

² Tract-level household income includes income earned for all residents 15 years and older in the housing unit. Individual-level family income includes income earned for just family members in the household that are 15 years and older.

less black than the neighborhoods in which Anglos live (roughly 4 percent black for Cubans and 6 percent black for Anglos). Puerto Ricans are the only Latino group to live in neighborhoods where the share of black neighbors (22 percent) is greater than would be expected given the overall size of the non-Hispanic black population. Partial explanation for these initial differences in neighborhood composition are regional clustering of Latinos, similarities and differences in socioeconomic status, and the legacy of a racialized housing-market. What remains unanswered is whether these neighborhood ethno-racial compositions influence neighborhood out-migration for these groups once demographic and socioeconomic factors are taken into account.

Table 2 presents the results of a multivariate logistic regression analysis of neighborhood out-migration. The findings presented in model 1 are similar to prior research where demographic and socioeconomic characteristics are shown to be associated with residential mobility (Crowder 2000, South and Crowder 1997, 1998). The curvilinear relationship between age and out-migration indicates that the likelihood of moving from the tract of origin declines with age, but at a decreasing rate. Being married, having more children at home, and becoming unemployed reduce the odds of neighborhood out-migration. Forming or dissolving a marital union and living in more crowded household conditions increase the likelihood of moving. Education slightly increases the propensity to move while residing in public housing suppresses residential mobility. Homeownership has a large negative effect on neighborhood out-migration. Again, these correlates are consistent with prior research on residential mobility.

[Table 2 about here]

Model 1 also illustrates the differences in the propensity for neighborhood out-migration among Anglos, blacks, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans. Controlling for other factors, the odds of Mexicans moving are 14 percent lower $[(e^{-.156}-1) * 100]$ than that of Anglos, and for

Puerto Ricans the odds are 50 percent lower $[(e^{-.691}-1) * 100]$ than Anglos. The propensities of blacks and Cubans to leave their neighborhood do not differ significantly from Anglos once other factors are controlled. The likelihood of leaving the neighborhood for blacks is significantly greater than for comparable Mexicans and Puerto Ricans (significant tests not shown). Overall, accounting for influential factors related to neighborhood out-migration only modestly changed the initial group differences presented in Table 1. Anglos, blacks and Cubans converge on their propensities for out-migration, while Puerto Ricans remain the least likely to move out of their neighborhood.

Multivariate Analysis of White and Minority Flight

To address the hypothesis concerning the relevance of white flight, we introduce interaction terms into the regression model. The interaction terms are the products of the neighborhood percent minority and the respondent's ethno-racial identification. Model 2, of Table 2 reports the results. Percent minority in the origin tract has a positive and significant effect ($b=.003$, $p < .05$) on Anglo out-migration. An increase in the size of the minority population of one standard deviation (17 percentage points) increases the odds of whites leaving their neighborhood by 5.2 percent $[(e^{(.003*17)}-1)*100]$, net of other influential factors. This finding reaffirms that white flight is a contributor to the residential separation of Anglos from minorities.

In addition to whites being averse to large minority populations, we also hypothesized that minorities are likely to flee largely Anglo neighborhoods (albeit for potentially different reasons). By taking the inverse of the coefficients for percent minority in Model 2, in conjunction with the coefficients for the interaction terms, we can assess the relationship of non-Hispanic white population size on neighborhood out-migration. The net effects of Anglo population size on neighborhood out-migration for blacks ($b=.005 - .003 = .002$), Mexicans

($b = .008 - .003 = .005$), Puerto Ricans ($b = .012 - .003 = .009$) and Cubans ($b = .004 - .003 = .001$) are all positive, indicating a tendency for blacks and Latinos to flee “whiter” neighborhoods. The coefficients, however, are not significant from zero for blacks and Cubans (significant test not shown). For Mexicans and Puerto Ricans the interaction effect is significant and is larger in absolute value than the effect for Anglos (.005 and .009 versus .003, respectively).

The findings in Model 2 are presented in Figure 1, where we graph the predicted annual probabilities of neighborhood out-migration under increasing shares of minority neighbors (Figure 1a), and alternatively, increasing shares of non-Hispanic white neighbors (Figure 1b). The calculations for the predicted probabilities are derived by holding all non-relevant covariates at their group specific means. For Anglos the predicted annual probability of out-migration is .17 when the neighborhood minority population is 10 percent compared to .21 when the neighborhood minority population is 90 percent, a fairly modest .04 net difference annually in the probability of neighborhood out-migration, controlling for socioeconomic and demographic determinants. Anglos are the only ethno-racial group represented in the analysis to demonstrate greater levels of out-migration when there are larger shares of minority neighbors.

In Figure 1b the focus turns to minorities’ propensity for out-migration when their neighbors are increasingly white. As noted above, the reaction of blacks and Cubans to increasing Anglo neighborhood presence is statistically negligible, and this is reflected in the relatively flat slopes for blacks and Cubans. In fact, the predicted annual probability for Cubans is roughly .13 whether they live in neighborhoods that are 10 percent white or 90 percent white. Among blacks, the predicted annual probability of out-migration is .17 when the neighborhood is 10 percent white and .19 when the neighborhood is 90 percent white, a modest effect for blacks that does not attain significance.

Among Mexicans and Puerto Ricans the relationship between neighborhood percent Anglo and neighborhood out-migration is substantially stronger. In fact, the slopes for percent Anglo neighbors are steeper for Mexicans and Puerto Ricans than is the Anglo slope under increasing shares of minority neighbors. The annual predicted probability for Mexicans is .15 when Anglos represent 10 percent of the neighborhood population compared to .20 when Anglos represent 90 percent of the neighborhood population, a .05 net difference annually in the predicted probability of out-migration. The effect of Anglo neighborhood population size is even stronger among Puerto Ricans: in 10 percent Anglo neighborhoods Puerto Ricans' probability of out-migration is .08 compared to .15 at 90 percent Anglo, a .07 net difference annually in the predicted probability of neighborhood out-migration. That Mexicans and Puerto Ricans are found to be more likely to move from whiter neighborhoods is a previously unrecognized factor associated with the persistence of residential segregation.

Multiethnic Comparisons of Neighborhood Out-Migration

While Anglo verses minority comparisons illustrate important societal and demographic trends, there is growing concern in multiethnic cities that inter-minority relations shape neighborhood demographic change. To examine this possibility we decompose the minority composition of neighborhoods into percent non-Hispanic black and percent Latino. The results are presented in Model 3 and Model 4 of Table 2. For Model 3, the only notable finding that differs from Model 1 is that the neighborhood-level variable for percent black is significantly related to out-migration. For the sample as a whole, the odds of moving decline by .2 percent for a one point increase in the percentage of the origin tract population that is black.

As shown in Model 4, Anglos respond similarly to neighborhood percent black ($b=.003$) and neighborhood percent Latino ($b=.003$), though neither coefficient attains significance. The

size of the coefficients representing the effect of neighborhood composition on neighborhood out-migration for Anglos in Model 4 are the same as for percent minority population in Model 2 ($b=.003$), but the variance around the point estimates has increased and thus it is more difficult to be confident of an effect on Anglo out-migration.

[Figure 2 about here]

Figure 2, illustrates these neighborhood out-migration patterns under varying levels of black and Latino neighborhood compositions. Again, the slopes represent predicted annual probabilities of neighborhood out-migration and are calculated by holding all covariates at their group specific means except for the neighborhood percent black (Figure 2a) and neighborhood percent Latino (Figure 2b). Looking at the slopes for Anglo, we see a slight gradual increase in the probability of neighborhood out-migration as the relative sizes of the black and Latino populations grow larger. This finding generally supports the expectation that Anglo households will be increasingly more likely to exit a neighborhood when the representation of black and Latino neighbors is greater, but as noted above the independent effects of these variables are modest and not statistically significant. Perhaps more interesting is that the Anglo slope for black neighbors is identical to the Anglo slope for Latino neighbors. This suggests that Anglos, on average, are no more or less averse to large shares of Latino neighbors than they are to large shares of black neighbors.

In Model 4 of Table 2 we compare the reaction of Latinos to black neighbors while controlling for Latino neighborhood composition and other determinants of neighborhood out-migration. The interaction terms indicate that the effect of neighborhood percent black is significantly different from Anglos for only Mexicans ($b=.003-.012= -.009$) and blacks ($b -.003 -.005= -.002$). Surprisingly, the odds of neighborhood out-migration for Mexicans decrease by

12 percent for a one standard deviation increase of neighborhood population that is black $[(e^{-.003 \cdot .012 \cdot 11} - 1) \cdot 100]$. Among blacks the odds of neighborhood out-migration decline only slightly with larger shares of black population in the tract.

Figure 2a illustrates the corresponding findings for Latinos. Mexicans appear to be retained in neighborhoods with comparatively large black populations, as indicated by the steep decline in the probability of out-migration. The trajectory for Puerto Ricans is similar to Mexicans, but to a slightly lesser degree. Cubans, on the other hand, appear averse to large shares of black neighbors, exhibiting a slope that is steeper than that of Anglos, although not significantly different from Anglos. The slope for Cubans is, however, significantly different from the other three minority groups. For Cubans the predicated annual probabilities of neighborhood out-migration is .12 when their neighborhood is 10 percent black compared to .22 when the neighborhood is 90 percent black, a .10 net annual difference in predicted probability of out-migration. This trajectory for Cubans is what we would expect given a generalized notion of Latino neighborhood preferences and reports of inter-minority tension. The only evidence thus far we find of “Latino flight” from blacks neighbors is for Cuban residents.

Turning to how minority household heads respond to the presence of Latinos, the interactions between neighborhood percent Latino and ethno-racial group membership show that Mexicans and Puerto Ricans are less likely to flee Latino neighborhoods than comparable Anglos (Table 2, Model 4). As the relative size of the Latino population increases, the log-odds of moving from their neighborhood of origin decline by .003 for Mexicans and .011 for Puerto Ricans. The effect of Latino neighbors on Cubans is not statistically different from Anglos, with all other variables held constant.

Comparing the reaction of blacks to Latino population we find no evidence of aversion to Latino neighbors. Among blacks, the effect of neighborhood percent Latino on out-migration is not statistically different from zero, Anglos, or any of the Latino subgroups. Figure 2b illustrates this finding: the flat slope for blacks indicates that there is no net effect of Latino neighborhood population size on the probability that blacks will exit the neighborhood of origin. This finding is constant with Wilson and Taub's (2006) observation that blacks do not consider Latinos to be a great threat to the quality or stability of their neighborhoods.

Nativity Status and the Effect of Ethno-Racially Diverse Neighborhoods

Table 3 examines the differences between native and foreign-born Latinos in the likelihood of moving from their neighborhoods at varying percentages of Latino and black neighbors. Also, in this section we test for the possibility that the effect of black and Latino populations on neighborhood out-migration is non-linear. That is, it is possible that ethno-racially diverse neighborhoods are more preferable than neighborhoods that consist entirely of members from another ethno-racial group (Charles 2006, Ellen 2000, Maly 2005). Therefore, to examine this possibility we need to specify the correct functional form of the regression slope (Gujarati 2003:175). If preference for integration has an effect, we would expect that under very low representations of blacks and Latinos and very high representations of blacks and Latinos the likelihood of neighborhood out-migration will be greater than at moderate percentages of black and Latino neighbors. The significant coefficients from this analysis are presented in Table 3, Model 3a, and are illustrated in Figure 3.

[Table 3 about here]

Only for Mexicans does the effect of neighborhood percent black diverge significantly from linearity (Table 3, Model 1a). Supplementary analysis (not shown here) demonstrates that

for Anglos, blacks, Puerto Ricans and Cubans the linear prediction is the proper specification of the effect of neighborhood percent black and neighborhood percent Latino on neighborhood out-migration. For Mexicans the linear prediction is correctly specified for percent Latino neighbors. However, the best fitting slope for the effect of neighborhood percent black among Mexicans is cubic, as the linear and quadratic slopes alone failed to reach statistical significance in alternative estimations of Model 1a (not shown).

Figure 3 illustrates the cubic prediction of neighborhood out-migration for Mexicans under percent black neighbors. For Mexicans in a 10 percent black neighborhood their predicted probability of out-migration is .12 compared to .06 for those in a 40 percent black neighborhood. Mexicans living in 40 percent black neighborhoods have a probability of moving that is .06 lower annually than those living in 10 percent black neighborhoods, all else equal. On the other hand, going from a 40 percent black neighborhood to 70 percent black neighborhood increases the predicted annual probability of out-migration for Mexicans from .06 to .14. This finding suggests that Mexicans in neighborhoods with moderate shares of African Americans are less likely to move out than are Mexicans in neighborhoods with many less or many more blacks.

[Figure 3 about here]

In Table 3 (Models 1b, 2b, and 3b), the interactions between neighborhood racial and ethnic composition and foreign-born status attain statistical significance only for Cubans (Model 3b). Among native-born Cubans the odds of leaving their neighborhood decrease by 17 percent for a one standard deviation (11 percentage points) increase in black neighbors $[(e^{-.017*11} - 1)*100]$. In contrast, among foreign-born Cubans the odds of leaving a neighborhood increase by 44 percent for a one standard deviation (11 percentage point) increase in black neighbors $[(e^{-.017+.035*11} - 1)*100]$. Thus, the odds of out-migration are 3.5 percent greater for foreign-born Cubans

relative to similarly situated native-born Cubans for each addition percentage of neighbors that are black. Of the groups considered here foreign-born Cubans appear the most likely to exit African American neighborhoods.

CONCLUSION

When studying the causes of neighborhood segregation along ethno-racial lines, it is important to consider patterns of residential mobility. For decades a major focus of segregation research has been on the exiting decisions of whites from large minority—particularly black—neighborhoods. Here we revisit this issue by suggesting that “white flight” is just one of several migration behaviors that generate ethno-racial neighborhood change. More specifically, we explore the possibility that the decision to move for minority households are just as affected by their ethno-racial neighborhood composition as it is for Anglo households. In order to evaluate this possibility, we compare the propensity for neighborhood out-migration among blacks, Anglos, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans under varying race and ethnic neighborhood compositions. The results provide several key insights that call for a broader reflection on the social constraints and mechanisms that sustain residential segregation and generate ethno-racial neighborhood change.

First, with regards to classic understandings of white-flight as a trigger to neighborhood change, we find only modest support for this claim during the study period. Although an increase in percent black and percent Latino neighbors did equally produce a greater likelihood of Anglo neighborhood out-migration, the effect is only statistically significant when minority neighbors are not decomposed into their respective ethno-racial groups. This finding is not unexpected given the proportional decline of white populations in major U.S. cities and what we know about liberalizing Anglo attitudes towards minority neighbors.

However, a possible limitation to this finding is that the study's time frame is not recent enough to capture the effect of increasing dispersion of foreign-born populations and the mass politicizing of immigration, and hence, the potential heightened awareness and xenophobic reaction of whites. If this is the case we may find in a more recent assessment, as Van Hook and Snyder (2007) find for white school children in California, and Wilson and Taub (2006) find in an earlier period for Chicago, that whites are feeling increasingly uncomfortable with foreign-born groups as neighbors, many of which are Latino. In the case of whites reacting to African American neighbors, this limitation holds less weight. Arguably, much of the neighborhood sorting over the years between blacks and Anglos have crystallized the boundaries of segregation, and it is less common for white and black neighborhood boundaries to be challenged and renegotiated. On this matter we follow Ellen (2000) and Quillian (2002) by positing that a more significant factor in the maintenance and persistence of white/black neighborhood segregation than white flight is Anglo reluctance to move *into* minority neighborhoods when Anglo households do move.

Second, when we assess out-migration under percent Anglo neighbors we find a greater likelihood of out-migration from whiter neighborhoods for blacks, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans. Given the established hierarchy of neighborhood preferences that favor whiter neighborhoods for their resources and advantages (Charles 2006) this finding is telling. We have suggested that a legacy of racial discrimination leaves minorities apprehensive about being among the few minorities in Anglo neighborhoods because of real or perceived hostility. Future research would be wise to identify in more detail the specific mechanisms that are producing "minority flight" from Anglo neighborhoods. Outright physical threats and the political economy of urban development are suspects, but we have also suggested a "softer" explanation that looks beyond

housing discrimination to the fabric of contemporary race relations in day-to-day interaction (Feagin 1991) which does not preclude the effect of minorities seeking in-group members as neighbors (Clark 1992, 2007).

A third key finding is that the out-migration patterns for Latino groups under varying levels of black neighborhood representation are quite varied. Cubans conform the closest to our expectation that Latinos will be as likely, if not more likely, than Anglos to move from neighborhoods containing large shares of black residents, and this holds especially true for foreign-born Cubans. On the other hand, the trend for Puerto Ricans is counter to what we would expect given what we know broadly about Latino neighborhood preferences. The finding that Puerto Ricans are less likely to move when their neighbors are more likely to be black may reflect a growing affinity between these two ethno-racial groups. Among Mexicans we find some inclination for ethno-racially mixed neighborhoods. In the literature on neighborhood preferences, all ethno-racial groups expressed some desire for meaningful levels of neighborhood diversity (Charles 2006), and at least for Mexicans there is an indication that this expressed preference is not simply lip-service to a politically correct audience. However, a stronger tendency may be the aversion of homogeneous out-group neighborhoods, particularly majority-white and majority-black neighborhoods, rather than the retention of diversity per se. More work is needed before firm conclusions are drawn about the demand for ethno-racially integrated neighborhoods.

Lastly, we find that among blacks the propensity for out-migration is the least affected by neighborhood ethno-racial composition. On the one hand, this could mean, as Wilson and Taub (2006) find, that the African American community does not perceive Latinos to be a threat to their neighborhood quality and stability. On the other hand, the inability of blacks and other

minorities to actualize their neighborhood preference can be seen as a cause for concern. For instance, it could be that housing discrimination for blacks limits their ability to react to the presence of other minorities even when ethno-racial antagonisms are high. This possible discord between people's residential wishes and the opportunities to actualize those wishes may feedback to amplify urban racial and ethnic tension. Accordingly, further research on how minorities' migration behavior responds to the relative number of both majority group members and the members of other minority groups is warranted.

Future research might benefit by extending these analyses in several directions. First, although we were unable to include Asian ethnicities into the analysis, they are certainly an important part of today's urban fabric. The uniqueness of Asian subgroups should not be overlooked, and their migratory responses to other minorities hold perhaps the greatest potential to develop further theoretical insight. Secondly, we were also unable to evaluate the relationship between the foreign-born composition of neighborhoods and neighborhood out-migration. Exploring the migratory reaction of native-born residents to different groups of recent immigrants is a research project worth pursuing. And finally, research showing how patterns of neighborhood out-migration respond to changes in the social and demographic structure of neighborhoods will likely enhance our understanding of how inter-neighborhood migration contributes to ethnic and racial residential segregation.

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**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis of Neighborhood Out-Migration, by Race and Ethnicity:
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1990-1995.**

Dependent Variable	Metric		Full Sample		Anglos		Blacks		Mexicans		Puerto Ricans		Cubans	
	Min	Max	Mean	(S.D.)	Mean	(S.D.)	Mean	(S.D.)	Mean	(S.D.)	Mean	(S.D.)	Mean	(S.D.)
Moved from origin neighborhood	0	1	.17	(.37)	.16	(.36)	.21	(.40)	.15	(.36)	.11	(.31)	.12	(.33)
Independent Variables														
<i>Demographic Characteristics</i>														
Age	15	104	44.01	(16.48)	44.64	(16.83)	42.01	(15.71)	42.29	(15.50)	44.83	(16.29)	52.84	(16.64)
Female	0	1	.34	(.47)	.24	(.43)	.48	(.50)	.27	(.44)	.49	(.50)	.30	(.46)
Married	0	1	.54	(.50)	.64	(.48)	.36	(.48)	.63	(.48)	.40	(.49)	.59	(.49)
Number of Children	0	9	.98	(1.25)	.78	(1.09)	1.09	(1.32)	1.49	(1.48)	1.17	(1.35)	.61	(.93)
Family Income (in \$1,000s)	-809	4451	28.23	(45.13)	40.55	(60.83)	17.91	(21.39)	19.81	(21.95)	13.13	(18.20)	20.54	(23.78)
Education (years)	1	20	11.98	(3.30)	13.29	(2.61)	11.66	(2.66)	9.50	(4.08)	9.69	(3.96)	10.93	(3.81)
Homeowner	0	1	.50	(.50)	.66	(.47)	.34	(.47)	.49	(.50)	.19	(.39)	.51	(.50)
Persons per room	0	8	.60	(.40)	.49	(.26)	.62	(.40)	.87	(.58)	.74	(.43)	.66	(.38)
Public housing resident	0	1	.08	(.27)	.02	(.14)	.14	(.35)	.06	(.24)	.30	(.46)	.08	(.27)
Became employed (t-1 to t)	0	1	.08	(.27)	.04	(.19)	.06	(.24)	.20	(.40)	.15	(.35)	.18	(.38)
Became unemployed (t-1 to t)	0	1	.17	(.38)	.18	(.39)	.17	(.38)	.15	(.35)	.10	(.31)	.14	(.34)
Change in marriage status (t-1 to t)	0	1	.08	(.27)	.08	(.27)	.09	(.28)	.08	(.27)	.07	(.25)	.07	(.25)
Foreign-born	0	1	.15	(.36)	na	na	na	na	.49	(.50)	.74	(.44)	.87	(.34)
MSA percent minority	1	95	33.53	(17.78)	25.13	(14.71)	33.52	(11.60)	45.57	(17.97)	44.15	(16.28)	61.98	(17.45)
<i>Neighborhood Characteristics</i>														
Mean neighborhood income (in \$1,000s)	1	214	39.63	(19.69)	49.57	(21.61)	31.12	(13.35)	31.72	(11.03)	29.88	(16.08)	34.96	(15.21)
Neighborhood percent minority	0	100	48.09	(36.92)	16.86	(18.81)	73.86	(28.88)	68.67	(27.05)	77.39	(24.31)	77.65	(20.22)
Neighborhood percent black	0	100	25.51	(34.17)	6.08	(11.17)	64.64	(32.69)	7.22	(11.23)	22.23	(20.57)	4.27	(11.28)
Neighborhood percent Latino	0	99	19.15	(28.27)	7.05	(12.96)	7.10	(13.64)	55.41	(29.45)	50.10	(23.22)	72.01	(24.21)
Total person-years			32867		14705		10482		4192		1468		2020	
Total persons			9605		4325		3134		1183		419		544	

Table 2: Logistic Regression Analysis of Neighborhood Out-Migration: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1990-1995.

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)
<u>Race and Ethnicity:</u>								
Anglo (ref.)	--		--		--		--	
Non-Hispanic black	.054	(.057)	.190*	(.087)	.089	(.062)	.171*	(.083)
Mexican	-.156*	(.073)	.146	(.129)	-.164*	(.079)	.075	(.118)
Puerto Rican	-.691***	(.114)	-.044	(.271)	-.690***	(.117)	-.119	(.247)
Cuban	.100	(.107)	.145	(.280)	.099	(.115)	.113	(.263)
<u>Demographic Characteristics:</u>								
Age	-.129***	(.006)	-.129***	(.006)	-.129***	(.006)	-.129***	(.006)
Age squared	.001***	(.000)	.001***	(.000)	.001***	(.000)	.001***	(.000)
Female	.005	(.049)	.004	(.049)	.005	(.049)	.006	(.049)
Married	-.327***	(.051)	-.331***	(.051)	-.329***	(.051)	-.332***	(.051)
Number of Children	-.096***	(.018)	-.096***	(.018)	-.095***	(.018)	-.096***	(.018)
Family Income (in \$1,000s)	.001	(.001)	.001	(.001)	.001	(.001)	.001	(.001)
Education (years)	.019*	(.008)	.018*	(.008)	.018*	(.008)	.018*	(.008)
Homeowner	-1.114***	(.044)	-1.100***	(.044)	-1.112***	(.044)	-1.100***	(.044)
Persons per room	.337***	(.050)	.343***	(.050)	.337***	(.050)	.341***	(.050)
Public housing resident	-.402***	(.064)	-.395***	(.064)	-.400***	(.064)	-.402***	(.064)
Became employed (t-1 to t)	-.010	(.059)	-.015	(.059)	-.010	(.059)	-.014	(.059)
Became unemployed (t-1 to t)	-.199***	(.045)	-.207***	(.045)	-.200***	(.045)	-.208***	(.045)
Change in marriage status (t-1 to t)	.924***	(.054)	.924***	(.054)	.924***	(.054)	.922***	(.054)
MSA percent minority	-.003	(.001)	-.003	(.002)	-.003	(.002)	-.003	(.002)
<u>Neighborhood Characteristics:</u>								
Mean neighborhood income (in \$1,000s)	-.001	(.001)	-.001	(.001)	-.001	(.001)	-.001	(.001)
Neighborhood percent minority	-.002	(.001)	.003*	(.001)	-.002*	(.001)	.003	(.002)
Neighborhood percent black					-.001	(.001)	.003	(.002)
Neighborhood percent Latino					-.001	(.001)	.003	(.002)

[Table 2 continued]

<i>Interactions</i>		<i>Neighborhood percent minority x:</i>		<i>Neighborhood percent black x:</i>		<i>Neighborhood percent Latino x:</i>	
Black							
Mexican							
Puerto Rican							
Cuban							
Black							
Mexican							
Puerto Rican							
Cuban							
Black							
Mexican							
Puerto Rican							
Cuban							
Constant							
Wald χ^2 (df)							
Pseudo-R ²							
N person -years							

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Table 3: Logistic Regression Analysis of Neighborhood Out-Migration, by Latino Origin: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1990-1995.

Independent Variables	Mexican		Puerto Rican		Cuban		Mexican		Puerto Rican		Cuban	
	Model 1a	(s.e.)	Model 2a	(s.e.)	Model 3a	(s.e.)	Model 1b	(s.e.)	Model 2b	(s.e.)	Model 3b	(s.e.)
<i>Demographic Characteristics</i>												
Age	-.153***	(.020)	-.186***	(.032)	-.090**	(.031)	-.152***	(.020)	-.187***	(.032)	-.093**	(.031)
Age squared	.001***	(.000)	.001***	(.000)	.001	(.000)	.001***	(.000)	.001***	(.000)	.001	(.000)
Female	.008	(.148)	-.046	(.254)	-.017	(.227)	.000	(.148)	-.030	(.252)	-.055	(.224)
Married	-.421**	(.140)	.175	(.292)	-.467*	(.224)	-.437**	(.141)	.179	(.289)	-.471*	(.223)
Number of Children	.026	(.043)	-.275**	(.095)	-.263**	(.095)	.025	(.043)	-.278**	(.096)	-.236*	(.095)
Family Income (in \$1,000s)	.002	(.003)	.000	(.006)	.001	(.004)	.002	(.003)	.000	(.006)	.001	(.004)
Education (years)	-.006	(.018)	-.051	(.037)	.013	(.029)	-.008	(.018)	-.054	(.037)	.014	(.030)
Homeowner	-.802***	(.115)	-.875*	(.349)	-1.065***	(.188)	-.791***	(.116)	-.840*	(.352)	-1.073***	(.192)
Persons per room	.145	(.092)	.438	(.253)	.576*	(.246)	.155	(.092)	.461	(.254)	.594*	(.252)
Public housing resident	-.507*	(.219)	-.391	(.230)	-.564	(.333)	-.489*	(.219)	-.378	(.230)	-.511	(.337)
Became employed (t-1 to t)	-.138	(.116)	.015	(.280)	-.343	(.202)	-.147	(.116)	.017	(.280)	-.335	(.202)
Became unemployed (t-1 to t)	-.481**	(.154)	-.199	(.299)	-.360	(.244)	-.485**	(.154)	-.178	(.300)	-.365	(.243)
Change in marriage status (t-1 to t)	.994***	(.156)	.545	(.279)	1.145***	(.246)	.989***	(.156)	.544	(.282)	1.103***	(.241)
Foreign-born	-.223	(.118)	.048	(.226)	.027	(.239)	-.675*	(.278)	-.442	(.510)	-1.117*	(.531)
MSA percent minority	-.001	(.004)	-.001	(.007)	-.007	(.007)	-.001	(.004)	-.001	(.007)	-.008	(.008)
<i>Neighborhood Characteristics</i>												
Mean neighborhood income (in \$1,000s)	.006	(.006)	-.008	(.010)	.002	(.007)	.005	(.007)	-.007	(.010)	.003	(.008)
Neighborhood percent black	.046*	(.020)	-.007	(.006)	.010	(.008)	.015	(.028)	-.011	(.008)	-.017	(.017)
Neighborhood percent black squared	-.003**	(.001)	na	na	na	na	-.001	(.001)	na	na	na	na
Neighborhood percent black cubed ¹	.030**	(.000)	na	na	na	na	.015	(.000)	na	na	na	na
Neighborhood percent Latino	-.001	(.003)	-.014*	(.006)	.001	(.006)	-.004	(.004)	-.018*	(.008)	-.009	(.008)
<i>Interaction of Foreign-Born Status x:</i>												
Neighborhood percent black					.058	(.040)	.008	(.040)	.008	(.010)	.035 [†]	(.018)
Neighborhood percent black squared					-.003	(.002)	na	(.002)	na	na	na	na
Neighborhood percent black cubed ¹					.027	(.000)	na	(.000)	na	na	na	na
Neighborhood percent Latino					.006	(.004)	.007	(.004)	.007	(.009)	.015*	(.007)


[Table 3 continued]

Constant	2.583***	(.526)	4.390***	(.962)	1.636	(.902)	2.841***	(.543)	4.673***	(1.020)	2.447***	(.970)
Wald χ^2 (df)	493.22	(20)	154.93	(18)	192.70	(18)	508.67	(24)	155.61	(20)	191.59	(20)
Pseudo-R ²	.17		.15		.16		.17		.15		.16	
N person-years	4192		1468		2020		4192		1468		2020	

† p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001


1) Coefficients for cubic share non-Hispanic black in origin neighborhood are multiplied by 1000.

Figure 1: Predicted Annual Probabilities of Neighborhood Out-Migration, by Percent Minority Neighbors and Percent Anglo Neighbors¹




1) All probabilities are calculated using the coefficients from Table 2, Model 2 holding non-relevant covariates constant at their group specific means.

Figure 2: Predicted Annual Probabilities of Neighborhood Out-Migration, by Percent Black and Percent Latino Neighbors¹



1) All probabilities are calculated using the coefficients from Table 2, Model 4 holding non-relevant covariates constant at their group specific means.

Figure 3: Predicted Annual Probabilities of Neighborhood Out-Migration for Mexicans, by Percent Black Neighbors ¹



1) Probabilities calculated using the coefficients from Table 3, Model 1a, holding non-relevant covariates constant at their means for Mexican respondents.