

Domestic and International Migration from China: the Impact of Migration Networks and Rural Political Economy*

(draft)

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*Paper draft submitted to annual meetings of the Population Association of America, New Orleans, April, 2008. This project is supported by grants from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (1 R01 HD39720-01), the National Science Foundation (SES-0138016), and the Ford Foundation (1025-1056).

Abstract

This paper tests a new strategy to study domestic and international migration simultaneously. Theoretical discussion draws on ideas from migration networks theory and the market transition debate. Data collection is modeled on the success of Mexican Migration Project. The paper estimated three sets of discrete time event history models: model of international migration treating internal and international migration as competing events, model of international migration treating internal migration as a covariate; and model of internal migration treating internal and international migrations as competing events. One finding is that education is more important in initiation of internal migration than international migration. Second, migration networks at the family level shows a different pattern compared to the case of Mexico-US migration. Third, there is evidence that internal and international migrations “deter” each other. Finally, consistent with market transition theory, individuals with cadres in the family are less likely to make internal migration.

Introduction

The 21st century is perhaps the best of the times to study migration, both domestic and international. For the first time in human history over half of the world population lives in urban places, mainly due to the flow of rural to urban migration. Likewise on the international migration front, driven by forces of globalization, integration, formation of transnational migration networks, and changing economy of migrant-sending countries, international migration promises to increase as well (Castles and Miller, 2003). Students of migration have tackled many issues concerning the causes and consequences of migration. The field of migration studies has seen major advancement in data availability, methodology, and theoretical innovations. However, with few exceptions (see Davis et al. (2002) and Lindstrom (2001)), it is often the case that scholarly research tends to focus on either internal migration or international migration separately. Theoretical formulations often go in separate directions as well. There are a large number of studies on internal migration that is based on orientation of neoclassical economic tradition. In contrast, the field of international migration has taken advantages of perspectives from multiple disciplines (demography, sociology, economics, anthropology to name but a few). This is reflected in both data collection and application of theoretical perspectives. In data collection, researchers tend to conduct separate surveys for internal migration and international migration. In theoretical understanding of migration processes, much of the recent innovative perspectives have been used in the context of international migration, such as the ideas of cumulative causation, transnationalism, segmented labor market but not much in the context of internal migration. This divorce of internal and international migration may be justifiable at a time when international migration was not an option for individuals in a society, but it is not longer the case in many countries in the world today. Thus fundamental changes in contemporary world provide renewed impetus for migration researchers to consider internal and international migration simultaneously. Such an approach is likely to integrate the field together and at the same time advance the understanding of both internal and international migration behaviors. In other words, the two sub-fields can benefit from each other in terms of theoretical perspectives, data collection methods, innovative data analysis techniques, and comparison of substantive issues (such as the issue of second generation and remittances in both internal and international migration context).

This paper makes one of the first attempts in this direction by placing both domestic and international in the same context and asks the question of how individuals make decisions when facing three choices: move within a country, move to another country, or stay put. Specifically, our paper invokes two lines of theoretical discussion: one is from the idea of migration networks and the other is from the market transition debate. In both cases, we derive hypotheses regarding how different individuals will act facing the choices of migration. Our research design allows us to simultaneously consider impact of various socio-economic characteristics and migration networks on the probability of making either internal or international migration. Empirical analysis draws on authors' recent survey conducted in China and the United States (Liang et al., 2007).

Background

Network Theory of Migration

Our study draws on two theoretical perspectives: migration networks theory from the migration literature and market transition debate. A significant amount of research efforts have been devoted to demonstrating the role of expansion of migration networks on the probability and perpetuation of migration. The idea of cumulative causation has been tested extensively by Massey and his colleagues over the past two decades or so (Fussell and Massey, 2004; Massey et al., 1994b, Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Polloni et al., 2001).

A central idea underlying many of the studies by Massey and his colleagues is the powerful role played by migration networks that link migrants in destinations and potential migrants in migrant-sending communities. The role of migration networks in the process of migration is often manifested in the form of having a family member who is a migrant and/or having a friend from the same community who is a migrant. These networks reduce the costs of migration by providing aspiring migrants with information about the migration process and about job availability and housing in the destinations. According to Fussell and Massey (2004), “other things being equal, people who come from communities from which migration is prevalent are more likely to migrate than people who come from places from which migration is rare (P. 152).” What is powerful about this process is the tendency for migration to alter community structures in such ways that promote additional migration, thus leading to the logic of cumulative causation of migration. Much of this discussion in the literature has been placed in the context of international migration. We argue the same logic should apply in the case of internal migration as well.

Although the idea of migration networks is not new, there have been major innovative approaches/models to apply and validate the role of migration in the context of international migration from Mexico to the United States (Massey et al., 1994, Polloni et al., 2004). For example, Massey and his colleagues developed an innovative measure of migration networks, i.e. migration prevalence ratio at the village level. For example, aside from migration networks derived from family migrant members, migration networks can also be measured at the village level. Not only that, the migration network measure can reflect changes in the prevalence of migration over time. Using this measure, Massey and colleagues were able to show how migration selectivity changes as level of migration prevalence ratio in different migrant-sending communities. Following Massey et al.’s earlier work, we plan to replicate this measure of migrant prevalence ratio, not only for international migration but for internal migration as well. We make another innovation in terms of measuring the impact of migration networks by introducing time-varying effect of migration networks (at the individual level).

Migration Opportunities and Market Transition Debate

The recent rise in international migration from China’s Fujian province is clearly linked to China’s transition to a market oriented economy since the late 1970s. Here we discuss some recent studies that examine how market transition changes the order of social stratification in China and elucidate its relevance for the study of international migration. In fact, Fujian province is especially relevant to the market transition debate because Victor Nee (1989)

initiated the debate on the consequences of China's market transition based on a survey that he conducted in Fujian province in the mid 1980s. In a series of papers, Nee outlined a theory that deals with formerly central planned economies that are now in the process of moving to a market-oriented economy (Nee, 1989, 1991, 1996). Nee's theory has two central elements: 1) with the emergence of a market, central distributors will lose power and direct producers will have more discretion over the terms of exchanges of goods and services; (2) there are greater incentives for individual effort in market transactions than in socialist economies and a market will reward productivity and credentials instead of political loyalty. Nee has tested his ideas using data from rural Fujian by examining self-employment and entrepreneurship for individuals.

There have been many studies testing Nee's theory in the context of urban China, but the results are inconclusive (Bian and Logan, 1996; Xie and Hannum, 1996; Zhou, 2000). Several recent studies focus on rural China (Guang and Zheng, 2005; Parish et al., 1995; Walder, 2002a; Walder 2002b). These studies in rural China examined whether positional power (as measured by rural cadre status) lost favor in the 1990s, as Nee's theory would imply. Walder's studies (2002a and 2002b) suggest rural cadre households continue to be advantaged in household income. In the context of internal migration in China, Guang and Zheng's research (2005) echoes the spirit from Walder's studies, that marketization does not take away the advantage of traditional power. In contrast, using the case of rural China in the early 1990s, Parish et al. (1995) found that the role of political power worked differently in different regions. Namely, while in less developed regions, political connections improve one's chance of obtaining non-farm employment, they do not matter in well-developed regions. They argue this is possible because of the abundant supply of non-farm employment opportunities in well-developed regions.

In sum, studies in rural China point out the continuing importance of rural cadre advantage but less so in well developed regions. To the extent that international migration often leads to socio-economic advancement for these immigrants, we will examine the role of cadre status in the process of international migration. We explore this issue in two ways. One is to investigate the extent to which people with positional power (such as villager leaders/cadres) are likely to migrate internationally. Second, we are interested in whether aspiring migrants from households with rural cadres will enjoy any advantage in the process of migration. Although international migration to the United States can be financially rewarding in the long run, it is not risk free. This is especially the case for undocumented migrants from Fujian. Some of the most notorious ill-fated trips have been widely reported by the mass media such as the 1993 Golden Venture trip and the tragic death of 58 migrants in a tomato truck in Dover of England in 2000 (Rosenthal, 2000). Any calculation of risks and benefits must be placed in the context of the individual's position in the migrant-sending community. Officially, the main role of village leaders is to implement the policies from the central government. In these migrant-sending villages, village cadres are responsible for many important decisions. For example, when donations from abroad come to the village, village leaders are responsible for making sure the money is appropriately spent as the donors intended. Village cadres (such as the village head (*cunzhang*) and the party secretary (*shuji*) often enjoy some fixed amount of stipend in these Fujian migrant villages (Lu, 2002, p.173). There are other benefits as well. Our fieldwork in migration-sending villages informs us that village leaders are often paid handsome amounts of money from people who plan to get married or from people whose family just lost loved ones, to

make sure the wedding ceremony or funeral proceedings run smoothly. Moreover, in these migrant villages, migrants abroad often require some documents (such as a birth certificate (*chusheng zheng*) or a non-marital status certificate (*weihun zheng*)). Village leaders are often given some money or gift to facilitate the process of getting the required documents in a timely manner.

In light of these advantages bestowed to village leaders, we do not expect that village cadres themselves are more eager to migrate internationally than others. However, individuals from households with village cadres are more likely to enjoy the advantages of international migration. Village cadres are often the first ones to know the information about any opportunities of going abroad. As the process of migration goes, it often involves many players: the boss of smuggling organization (who rarely shows up in local villages), the recruiters who go to villages to recruit potential migrants, and the potential migrants. In order to recruit migrants for a particular planned trip abroad, recruiters often need to get formal or informal permission from village leaders. This gives the village cadres a special advantage if it is perceived as a good opportunity for one of their household member. Moreover, because of the village cadres' role in providing crucial documents for going abroad (such as documents required for obtaining passports), recruiters have a lot of favors to ask of village cadres. Thus, village cadres are well positioned to bargain with recruiters regarding the fees for sending migrants abroad. In terms of internal migration, as Guang (2005) show that individuals with cadres in the households are less likely to make internal migration because cadres in the household can use their power to find non-farm work for household members. The above discussion leads to two additional hypotheses: (1) individuals from households with village cadres are more likely to migrate internationally than others; (2) individuals from households with village cadres are less likely to make internal migration than others.

The case of Fujian province, China and the Ethnosurvey

China provides a unique opportunity for the study of internal and international migrations because China saw a dramatic increase in both types of migration (Liang and Ma, 2004; Liang 2001, 2004). Our survey site is located in Fujian province (see maps 1 and 2, also see Liang et al. (2007) for detailed discussion of the survey). Essentially we model our study on the success of Mexican Migration Project directed by Douglas S. Massey and Jorge Durand. With a modified questionnaire, we implemented our survey in late 2002. The data provide rich information on internal and especially international migration along with other household and community level information.

Analytic Strategy

To test our hypotheses specified in the earlier sections, we created event history-type data. There are several advantages with the event history analysis method. One is that we can make clear causal inferences because timing order of events can be clearly specified. Second, time-varying covariates can be incorporated so that more precise information at different time points can be used to make predictions about individual behavior. Third, the event history method can

handle censoring issues so that no information on individuals who have not experienced the event (migration) will be wasted (Allison, 1984; 1995; Yamaguchi, 1991).

We estimated three sets of models. The first set of model is to model international migration while treating internal and international migration as competing events (Allison, 1995). Within such a framework, if we consider international migration, at the time of occurrence of internal migration, the case will be treated as censored (Allison, 1995). The second set of model is to model international migration using internal migration as a covariate. In other words, we try to understand the extent to which internal migration affects international migration (i.e. does internal migration provides an alternative to international migration; instead of going abroad, individuals will go to another location in the country). The third set of model is to model internal migration treating internal and international migration as competing events. In this case, international migration is considered to be censored.

Following earlier work by Massey et al. (1994), we calculated migration prevalence ratio at the village level for both internal and international migration. These ratios are calculated using every respondent's year of birth and the date of his or her first US trip (for international migration). The denominator of the ratio is the number of people 15 years old or older alive in a given year, and the numerator is the number of such people who have ever been to the United States up to that year. Similar measure has been calculated for internal migration (including both intra-provincial and interprovincial migrations).

Summary of Findings

Let us begin with some descriptive statistics. Table 1 compares basic socio-demographic for four groups of individuals: internal migrants, international migrants, individuals with both internal and international migration experience, and non-migrants. Results confirm some of the well-known findings on migration selectivity. Some interesting finding is that internal migrants seem to be better selected on education than international migrants (especially at the high end of education categories). Individuals with both internal and international migration experiences seem to have the best educational selectivity.

Table 2 shows results from event history model of international migration treating international and internal migration as competing events. Our results show that having a family member who migrated previously has a negative impact on the individual's propensity to migrate, a finding that contradicts most of the studies on international migration from Mexico to the United States. However, this finding must be placed in the Chinese context. The escalating smuggling fees makes it impossible for a family to send more than one person abroad in a short period of time. We also note the variable "number of years elapsed since the earliest family member migrated" has a positive sign. This suggests that it is not that migration networks are not important; it just takes time for this effect to emerge. Very likely what this means is that once a migrant pays off the debt, he/she will be in a position to bring another member from the family to the migration process.

Consistent with Massey et al. (1994b), the community/village emigration prevalence ratio has a very strong and positive impact on migration. In fact, for all the variables in the model, this is by far the most important variable in predicting the probability of international migration. As suggested by Massey et al. (1994b), the migration network ties between earlier migrants who came from the same village and potential migrants in these communities provide an important channel of information on potential migrant destinations and support for settlement at the destination. We also suggest that in the case of emigrants from Fujian, it is often the case that earlier immigrants from the same village (*tongxiang* or *laoxiang*) loan the money to the newly arrived individuals. Then the newly arrived immigrants will pay their loan back to the *tongxiang* over time. Borrowing money from hometown people often comes with low interest or in some cases bears no interest, which is a much better alternative than shark loans.

Table 3 reports results from discrete time event history model of international migration treating internal migration as a covariate. The basic idea is to examine whether internal migration experience “deters” international migration. In fact, for both intraprovincial and interprovincial migration, they have a negative impact on international migration. In other words, individuals who have internal migration experience are less likely to migrate internationally perhaps because domestic opportunities are already good enough for them.

Table 4 shows the results from discrete time event history model of internal migration treating international migration as competing event. Several findings are worth mentioning. One is that consistent with the case of international migration, internal migration prevalence ratio at the village level shows extremely important impact, suggesting migration networks linking fellow village clearly operate effectively. However, at the family level, prior internal migrant in the family shows positive impact but is not statistically significant. Second, in the case of internal migration, education seems to play more important role than the case of international migration. All five categories of education show highly important impact. This suggests that education is a more important sorting mechanism for internal migrants but not that important for international migrants. Interestingly, age variable is not as important in the model of internal migration comparing to the case of international migration. We argue that because international migration from Fujian province is very costly (the current price is around \$65,000) than internal migration, younger age at migration would ensure maximum years of benefits of earning high wages. Third, having international migrants in the family deter individuals from making internal migration. If we consider migration as a family strategy (Stark, 1999), perhaps if international migration already provides comfortable level of safety net for the household, there is no longer strong incentive to migrate internally. Fourth, consistent with predictions from market transition theory and previous research (Guang, 2005), individuals from families with cadres are less likely to migrate internally.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics about the Fujian Survey Sample

Variables	Internal Migrant Only (%)	International Migrant Only (%)	Migrant of Both Types (%)	Non-Migrant (%)
Age				
15-19	3.39	3.68	3.57	6.76
20-24	11.86	16.36	10.71	10.15
25-29	11.02	22.70	7.14	10.00
30-34	12.71	19.22	21.43	11.47
35-39	15.25	16.77	25.00	9.85
40-44	7.63	5.93	3.57	9.71
45-49	10.17	7.57	10.71	13.53
50-54	7.63	3.27	3.57	9.71
55-59	8.47	1.64	7.14	5.44
60 +	11.86	2.86	7.14	13.38
Sex				
Male	52.54	64.83	92.86	36.32
Female	47.46	35.17	7.14	63.68
Marital status				
Ever married	85.59	72.84	85.71	83.51
Never married	14.41	27.16	14.29	16.49
Education				
No formal education	3.39	3.31	0	14.48
Elementary school	27.97	24.79	21.43	36.93
Junior high school	40.68	48.97	32.14	33.83
Senior high school	16.10	18.18	32.14	10.04
Vocational high school	5.93	1.86	7.14	2.07
College or above	5.93	2.89	7.14	2.66
Cadre				
Yes	11.97	1.65	0	7.84
No	88.03	98.35	100.00	92.16
Cadre in the family				
Yes	13.56	26.58	17.86	19.85
No	86.44	73.42	82.14	80.15
Prior internal migrant in the family				
Yes	18.64	20.86	21.43	27.21
No	81.36	79.14	78.57	72.79
Prior international migrant in the family				
Yes	74.58	52.15	32.14	85.74
No	25.42	47.85	67.86	14.26
Place of Origin				
Rural	93.22	93.05	92.86	95.15
Urban	6.78	6.95	7.14	4.85
Total	1315	489	28	680

Table 2. Coefficients from Discrete-Time Event-History Analysis Predicting First International Migration Trip

Independent Variables	Model A		Model B	
	<i>B</i>	SE	<i>B</i>	SE
Age				
15-19	1.9277 ***	0.5164	1.8829 ***	0.5141
20-24	2.4872 ***	0.4983	2.4606 ***	0.4961
25-29	2.1767 ***	0.4840	2.1319 ***	0.4818
30-34	2.0663 ***	0.4844	2.0178 ***	0.4822
35-39	1.7082 ***	0.4928	1.6885 ***	0.4910
40-44	1.4768 ***	0.5020	1.4802 ***	0.5008
45-49	-0.6021	0.7387	-0.6132	0.7382
50-54	0.8003	0.5795	0.7962	0.5787
55-59	-0.9457	1.0990	-0.9170	1.0988
60+ (reference)	----	----	----	----
Male	1.0449 ***	0.1036	1.0537 ***	0.1037
Ever married	0.0270	0.1727	0.00413	0.1728
Education				
No formal education (reference)	----	----	----	----
Elementary school	0.3164	0.2771	0.3376	0.2767
Junior high school	0.6307 **	0.2797	0.6768 **	0.2789
Senior high school	0.7912 ***	0.2949	0.9306 ***	0.2950
Vocational high school	0.2442	0.4426	0.4228	0.4426
College or above	0.0541	0.4106	0.1260	0.4127
Cadre	-0.8322 **	0.3960	-0.9126 **	0.3964
Cadre in the family	0.2841 **	0.1196	0.2945 **	0.1200
Prior internal migrant in the family	-0.0657	0.1241	0.0321	0.1250
Prior international migrant in the family	-0.0937	0.1288	-0.2468 *	0.1325
Number of years elapsed since the earliest emigrant family member left	0.0405 ***	0.0120	0.0238 *	0.0126
Rural community	-0.1508	0.1929	-0.1718	0.1936
International migration prevalence ratio at village level	----	----	4.0205 ***	0.6454
Year				
Before 1985 (reference)	----	----	----	----
1985	1.8743 ***	0.4570	1.7916 ***	0.4572
1986	0.9876	0.6320	0.8965	0.6321
1987	1.2656 **	0.5623	1.1519 **	0.5626
1988	1.7779 ***	0.4573	1.6066 ***	0.4582
1989	2.5529 ***	0.3649	2.3157 ***	0.3671
1990	2.7915 ***	0.3456	2.4666 ***	0.3500
1991	2.3983 ***	0.3795	1.9966 ***	0.3858

1992	3.1414 ***	0.3240	2.6302 ***	0.3357
1993	3.3848 ***	0.3134	2.7805 ***	0.3299
1994	3.2481 ***	0.3223	2.5588 ***	0.3433
1995	3.3073 ***	0.3216	2.5384 ***	0.3475
1996	3.6757 ***	0.3069	2.8071 ***	0.3408
1997	3.6855 ***	0.3086	2.7227 ***	0.3497
1998	3.5686 ***	0.3169	2.5209 ***	0.3641
1999	3.8556 ***	0.3095	2.7075 ***	0.3662
2000	3.7898 ***	0.3175	2.5326 ***	0.3823
2001	3.9628 ***	0.3192	2.6257 ***	0.3902
2002	3.4349 ***	0.3506	2.0588 ***	0.4199
Intercept	-9.5086 ***	0.6099	-9.5379 ***	0.6111
-2 Log Likelihood	3777.177		3736.988	
Chi-Square	932.0538 ***		972.2435 ***	
<i>df</i>	40		41	
Number of Person-Years	25501		25501	

Note: *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01

Table 3. Coefficients from Discrete-Time Event-History Model Predicting International Migration (treating internal migration as a covariate)

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Model A</u>		<u>Model B</u>	
	<u>B</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>SE</u>
Age				
15-19	1.6601 ***	0.4531	1.6285 ***	0.4509
20-24	2.1774 ***	0.4331	2.1650 ***	0.4309
25-29	1.9376 ***	0.4163	1.9069 ***	0.4140
30-34	1.7787 ***	0.4175	1.7410 ***	0.4153
35-39	1.4526 ***	0.4258	1.4387 ***	0.4239
40-44	1.1667 ***	0.4381	1.1818 ***	0.4370
45-49	-0.9685	0.6981	-0.9776	0.6976
50-54	0.3806	0.5270	0.3673	0.5263
55-59	-0.2615	0.6953	-0.2409	0.6952
60+ (reference)	----	----	----	----
Male	1.1046 ***	0.1021	1.1211 ***	0.1023
Ever married	0.0523	0.1693	0.0295	0.1695
Education				
No formal education (reference)	----	----	----	----
Elementary school	0.3600	0.2771	0.3787	0.2765
Junior high school	0.6784 **	0.2798	0.7174 **	0.2787
Senior high school	0.8853 ***	0.2932	1.0114 ***	0.2928
Vocational high school	0.3563	0.4197	0.5403	0.4191
College or above	0.0941	0.4006	0.1665	0.4020
Cadre	-0.9993 **	0.3936	-1.0715 ***	0.3938
Cadre in the family	0.2851 **	0.1168	0.3009 **	0.1172
Had internal migration experience				
None (reference)	----	----	----	----
Intraprovincial	-0.8334 ***	0.2412	-0.7894 ***	0.2417
Interprovincial	-0.8710 **	0.3927	-0.7713 **	0.3928
Prior internal migrant in the family	-0.0467	0.1205	0.0341	0.1212
Prior international migrant in the family	-0.1435	0.1255	-0.2922 **	0.1292
Number of years elapsed since the earliest emigrant family member left	0.0445 ***	0.0115	0.0287 **	0.0121
Rural community	-0.1493	0.1873	-0.1588	0.1879
International migration prevalence ratio at village level	----	----	3.8633 ***	0.6230
Year				
Before 1985 (reference)	----	----	----	----

1985	1.8671 ***	0.4568	1.7908 ***	0.4570
1986	0.9829	0.6319	0.8992	0.6320
1987	1.2590 **	0.5621	1.1537 **	0.5624
1988	1.9039 ***	0.4371	1.7433 ***	0.4379
1989	2.6708 ***	0.3535	2.4483 ***	0.3556
1990	2.7803 ***	0.3451	2.4732 ***	0.3491
1991	2.4610 ***	0.3717	2.0816 ***	0.3774
1992	3.1321 ***	0.3233	2.6479 ***	0.3338
1993	3.4699 ***	0.3086	2.8955 ***	0.3238
1994	3.3146 ***	0.3178	2.6597 ***	0.3370
1995	3.2984 ***	0.3204	2.5685 ***	0.3440
1996	3.6640 ***	0.3056	2.8396 ***	0.3366
1997	3.7160 ***	0.3055	2.8014 ***	0.3433
1998	3.5785 ***	0.3141	2.5826 ***	0.3575
1999	3.9008 ***	0.3055	2.8091 ***	0.3580
2000	3.8965 ***	0.3110	2.6997 ***	0.3714
2001	4.0296 ***	0.3136	2.7564 ***	0.3798
2002	3.4827 ***	0.3434	2.1709 ***	0.4082
Intercept	-9.3712 ***	0.5606	-9.4266 ***	0.5624
-2 Log Likelihood	4012.304		3972.556	
Chi-Square	993.5997 ***		1033.3480 ***	
<i>df</i>	42		43	
Number of Person-Years	27932		27932	

Note: *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01


Table 4. Coefficients from Discrete-Time Event-History Model Predicting First Internal Migration (treating International migration as competing event)

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Model A</u>		<u>Model B</u>	
	<u>B</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>SE</u>
Age				
Age in years	0.0322	0.0822	0.0216	0.0822
Age in years squared	-0.00157	0.00134	-0.00143	0.00134
Male	0.4033 **	0.1887	0.4453 **	0.1876
Ever married	0.3593	0.2957	0.4146	0.2969
Education				
No formal education (reference)	----	----	----	----
Elementary school	1.1985 **	0.5357	1.0490 *	0.5359
Junior high school	1.8371 ***	0.5446	1.7544 ***	0.5424
Senior high school	2.1195 ***	0.5647	1.9319 ***	0.5629
Vocational high school	3.3725 ***	0.6389	3.2152 ***	0.6368
College or above	2.8966 ***	0.6489	2.9010 ***	0.6477
Cadre	-1.4426	1.0178	-1.3076	1.0190
Cadre in the family	-1.0429 ***	0.3956	-0.9767 **	0.3977
Prior internal migrant in the family	0.4860 **	0.2328	0.2640	0.2360
Prior international migrant in the family	-1.2849 ***	0.3221	-1.1261 ***	0.3211
Rural community	0.1530	0.3706	0.2447	0.3708
Internal migration prevalence ratio at village level	----	----	11.4665 ***	1.6502
Period				
Before 1960 (reference)	----	----	----	----
1960-1964	0.3536	0.5413	0.2623	0.5531
1965-1969	-0.5136	0.5936	-0.3713	0.6031
1970-1974	0.2521	0.4660	0.3764	0.4773
1975-1979	-0.9785 *	0.5707	-0.9106	0.5779
1980-1984	-0.4251	0.4824	-0.3585	0.4912
1985-1989	-0.0468	0.4520	-0.0305	0.4606
1990-1994	0.1176	0.4574	-0.0473	0.4626
1995-1999	-0.0624	0.4929	-0.4069	0.4966
2000-2002	0.8302	0.5329	0.3194	0.5339
Intercept	-6.7397 ***	1.2489	-7.4538 ***	1.2710
-2 Log Likelihood	1521.260		1480.653	
Chi-Square	159.5352 ***		200.1420 ***	
df	23		24	


Number of Person-Years	25163	25163
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Note: * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01


Map 1. Location of Fujian Province in China



Map 2. Major Immigrant-sending Regions in Fujian Province, China



Count of Internal Migration By Year



Count of International Migration by Year

