

# **Intergenerational Coresidence in Developing Countries**

**Steven Ruggles and Misty Heggeness**

Steven Ruggles is Distinguished McKnight University Professor of History and Director of the Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota.

Misty Heggeness is a graduate student in Applied Economics, University of Minnesota.

## **Abstract**

We use newly-available census microdata from IPUMS-International to assess trends in intergenerational coresidence in 15 developing countries. Contrary to expectations, we find no general decline in intergenerational coresidence over the past several decades. There have been, however, significant changes in the *configuration* of intergenerational coresidence. Families in which the older generation is household head—a configuration consistent with traditional patriarchal forms in which the older generation retains authority—are becoming more common in most of the countries. Intergenerational families headed by the younger generation—the configuration one would expect if intergenerational coresidence were motivated by a need for old-age support—are on the decline in most of the countries. Multivariate analysis reveals that intergenerational families headed by the older generation are positively associated with measures of economic development. These findings are at variance with widely-accepted social theory. We hypothesize that housing shortage, economic stress in the younger generation, and old-age pensions may contribute to the change. More broadly, in some developing countries rising incomes may have allowed more people to achieve their preferred family structure of intergenerational coresidence following traditional family forms.

## Intergenerational Coresidence in Developing Countries

A sizeable literature suggests that coresidence of elderly persons with their children is on the decline in most developing countries. These studies draw on a long tradition of theories that postulate an inverse association of household complexity and economic development. This analysis uses new data and measures to assess changes in intergenerational coresidence in 15 developing countries.

We have three main objectives. First, we measure trends in intergenerational coresidence in developing countries from the perspective of both the younger generation and the older generation. Second, we assess trends in intergenerational coresidence by headship patterns. Finally, we carry out multivariate analyses to control for changes in population composition and assess the relationship of intergenerational coresidence to economic development.

The results indicate that there are no clear trends in intergenerational coresidence over the past several decades. In some countries, there were modest increases in coresidence; in other countries, there were modest declines. Even more intriguing, when we focus on intergenerational families headed by the older generation—the family configuration most closely associated with traditional stem-family and joint-family systems—we find significant *increases* in all but two of the countries examined. This suggests that traditional family forms are stable or increasing across much of the developing world. Moreover, multivariate analyses reveal that key measures of economic development are positively associated with intergenerational families headed by the older generation.

### **Theories of Coresidence and Development**

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Frédéric Le Play proposed that economic development was contributing to a decline of intergenerational coresidence. Traditionally, Le

Play argued, generations had been bound together by property. The younger generation remained in the ancestral home, providing labor as the family patriarch grew old and eventually inheriting the farm. With commercial and industrial growth in the nineteenth century, fewer families had property to hand down. As a consequence, Le Play contended, more and more of the aged began to reside separately from their children (Le Play 1884:3–28).

The idea that economic development is associated with simplification of the family and independent residence of the aged became widely accepted in the twentieth century. Mid-twentieth-century sociological literature highlighted the connection between industrialization and nuclear family structure (e.g., Parsons 1949; Nimkoff 1962). Intergenerational coresidence, it was said, was undermined by growing wage labor opportunities, which provided incentives for the younger generation to leave the farm and move to urban areas. Moreover, many theorists argued, small nuclear families were best adapted to urban societies with high geographic and social mobility (Wirth 1938; Parsons and Bales 1955; Burgess 1960).

By the 1960s, theorists began to argue that the processes of family change were occurring worldwide, and that ultimately nuclear families would prevail everywhere. Goode (1963), the most prominent advocate of this convergence theory, argued that although there is considerable variation in family systems across different societies, eventually the nuclear family will predominate worldwide.

Wherever the economic system expands through industrialization, family patterns change. Extended kinship ties weaken, lineage patterns dissolve, and a trend toward some form of the conjugal system generally begins to appear – that is, the nuclear family becomes a more independent kinship unit (Goode 1963: 6).

Most of the literature on this issue during the past four decades assumes that intergenerational coresidence is common in traditional agricultural societies and diminishes with industrialization, migration, and economic expansion (e.g. Burch 1967; Blumberg & Winch 1972; Cowgill 1986; Martin 1989; De Vos 1990; Mason 1992; McDonald 1993; Aykan and Wolf 2000; Bongaarts and Zimmer 2002). The views of these authors vary. They do not always see themselves as followers of the tradition that runs from Le Play to Goode. In many instances, analysts stress the importance of persistent cultural norms and focus on the costs and benefits of coresidence for each generation (e.g. Knodel and Chayoven 1997). Nevertheless, there is a general consensus that intergenerational coresidence is declining in most countries in the face of economic development. A minority of theorists, however, stress the cultural indelibility of family systems and suggest that traditional family forms are fundamental cultural structures that remain resilient to change (Huntington 1996, Therborn 2004; Kamo and Zhou 1994).

The patrilineal joint-family and stem-family systems described by Le Play and subsequent family theorists assume that wealth, property, and power are concentrated in the hands of older generation men (Le Play 1884; Goldschmidt and Kunkel 1971; Berkner 1972; Mason 1992; Ruggles 1994). In such traditional families, the younger generation is dependent on the older generation, relying on elders for housing, employment, and the prospect of eventual inheritance. Much of the literature on living arrangements of the aged in developing countries, by contrast, is motivated by concern about maintaining old-age support as populations age and family structure simplifies (e.g. Mason 1992; Chan 1997; Chen 1996; Knodel and Chayovan 1997; Natividad and Cruz 1997; Hermalin 2002). Many researchers implicitly or explicitly assume that elderly coresident parents in developing countries are typically dependent on their

children both for economic support and care (e.g. Bongaarts and Zimmer 2002; Clay and Vander Haar 1993; Knodel and Debavalya 1997; cf. Schröder-Butterfill 2004).

Which generation is dependent has important theoretical implications for the impact of economic development on the frequency of intergenerational coresidence. In particular, if the younger generation has expanded economic opportunities, we would expect a reduced frequency of coresidence in traditional patriarchal multigenerational families, since the alternatives to familial employment would become more attractive. At the same time, however, the rise of wage labor could contribute to an increase of landless elderly with no means of support, and increasing income of younger generation wage earners could actually increase their capacity to take in destitute parents. Thus, all things being equal, one would expect rising economic opportunity for the young to discourage traditional patriarchal coresidence, but perhaps to encourage coresidence associated with old-age support.

### **Demographic Change and Intergenerational Coresidence**

Many studies of intergenerational relations in the developing world are motivated by the implications of demographic change for old-age dependency ratios (Martin and Kinsella 1994; Zimmer and Kwong 2003; Knodel and Chayovan 1997; Chan 1997). Declining fertility and mortality is leading to aging of the population in almost every country of the world. An older population means that most countries will see growing numbers of elderly dependents with stagnant or even declining numbers of working-age adults available to provide support.

The implications of demographic change for intergenerational coresidence are not, however, confined to dependency ratios. Demographers have frequently observed that changing demographic conditions have a direct impact on the availability of kin for intergenerational coresidence (e.g., Levy 1965; Burch 1967; Kobrin 1976; Ruggles 1994; Uhlenberg 1996;

Schoeni 1998). The effects of demographic change vary dramatically depending on the perspective of the observer. In particular, the effect of declining fertility and mortality on intergenerational coresidence is different for the younger generation and the older generation.

For the younger generation, ongoing demographic changes *increase* the opportunities to reside with parents. Mortality decline increases the chances that an adult will have a surviving parent. Fertility decline, however, is even more important. A smaller group of adult children for each aged parent increases the chances that any particular child will coreside. If the parent has a farm and the coresident child will inherit, fewer siblings mean less competition. If the elderly parent is destitute and needs to move in with a child for care, fewer siblings means increased responsibility. Ruggles (1994) estimates that the number of surviving parents per 100 adults age 40-44 increased four-fold in the United States between 1880 and 1980. The same kinds of demographic changes that took place in the United States between 1880 and 1980 are now taking place in many developing countries. Thus, from the perspective of the younger generation, current demographic changes in developing countries are substantially increasing the potential for intergenerational coresidence.

The impact of demographic change on the potential for coresidence is the opposite for the older generation. Fertility decline means that the aged have fewer children with whom they can reside. Mortality decline increases the survival of children to adulthood, but this effect is generally small relative to the drop in births. All things being equal, one would expect that a drop in the number of available children would reduce the potential for coresidence, but there is some evidence that the impact is relatively small. In populations where coresidence of the aged is the norm, it appears to be relatively insensitive to additional numbers of surviving children (Knodel et al. 2000; Smith 1986; Ruggles 1994; see also Elman and Uhlenberg 1995).

In sum, if the propensity to coreside remained constant, we would expect fertility and mortality decline to lead to a substantial rise in the proportion of adults residing with parents. Such demographic change could also lead to a decline in the proportion of elderly persons residing with children, but we would expect this effect to be comparatively small.

### **Empirical Findings of Past Research**

Intergenerational coresidence has declined dramatically in every Western industrial country for which we have historical and contemporary data (e.g., Alter, Cliggett and Urbiel 1996; Andorka 1995; Dillon 1997; Guinnane 1996; Fauve-Chamoux 1996; Pampel 1992; Wall 1995; Ruggles 2007; Tomassini et al. 2004; United Nations 2005). There is also clear evidence of decline in coresidence in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the most developed East Asian countries (Martin 1990; Hiroshima 1997; Hermalin, Ofstedal and Chang, 1992; De Vos and Lee, 1993; Knodel and Debavalya 1997; Chattopadhyay and Marsh 1999; Yang 1999).

For less developed countries, however, direct evidence of change in residence patterns is surprisingly scarce. Most studies of intergenerational coresidence in developing countries examine a single point in time, sometimes inferring chronological change indirectly by comparing countries at different levels of economic development (e.g. Bongaarts 2001; Bongaarts and Zimmer 2002). Some studies of developing Asian countries have suggested that there has so far been little change in coresidence (Logan, Bian, and Bian 1998; Palloni 2001; Knodel and Ofstedal 2002). The most comprehensive analysis is the United Nations' *Living Arrangements of Older Persons Around the World* (New York, 2005). Based on analysis of data from 33 developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the study concludes:

Considering the whole group of countries, there is a trend towards independent forms of living arrangements—alone or with spouse only—at the expense of co-



residential forms of arrangements, especially those with children and other relatives (United Nations 2005: 49).

This result, however, could be an artifact of fertility decline. The United Nations analysis uses an age threshold of 60, and the measure of residence with children has no age control. Husbands tend to be a few years older than their wives in most countries, so when husbands reach the age of 60, their wives are in their 50s. In populations with minimal fertility limitation, women typically bear their last child around the age of 40 or higher. In such populations a substantial proportion of persons aged 60 or older still have a minor child present in the household. As women begin to limit their fertility, their age at the birth of their last child declines (Knodel 1977). Accordingly, the proportion of aged persons who have minor children will also go down. This effect is often compounded by a declining age gap between husbands and wives, which also reduces the frequency of elderly men with minor children (Lloyd 2005: 447). Thus, the findings of the United Nations study may reflect, in part, the effects of the dramatic declines in fertility and reduction in the age gap between husbands and wives that have taken place in most of the developing world.

### **Data and Measures of Coresidence**

Many comparative studies of changes in intergenerational coresidence in developing countries—including the United Nations study—are primarily based on data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). The DHS samples are the most broadly comparable sources available for analysis of living arrangements; in all, there are 200 surveys taken in 75 developing countries. There are two major liabilities to these data, however. First, the chronological depth is limited; in most countries, the available surveys span less than a decade. Second, sample sizes are limited, especially for the earlier DHS samples; the surveys taken before the mid-1990s usually have

between 3,000 to 9,000 cases altogether, and they often have just 150 to 300 respondents aged 65 or older.

To adequately assess change in the living arrangements of the aged across the developing world, we need large samples spanning multiple decades for multiple diverse countries. We turn to census microdata compiled by the IPUMS-International project (Minnesota Population Center 2007). IPUMS-International is preserving individual-level census data from around the world and making harmonized samples of these data available to researchers. At present, IPUMS-International has samples of 80 censuses from 26 countries taken between 1960 and 2002, providing information on over 200 million individuals. Over the next five years, the coverage and scope of the database is expected roughly to double.

We focused on developing countries—defined as low and middle income economies in the World Bank (2007) classification—with at least two available census years. These restrictions left us with data from 42 censuses of 15 countries, as described in Table 1.<sup>1</sup> The samples are large; most cover 10% of the population. In general, methodology and question wording is comparable from census to census. One key difference, however, is that many censuses employ a *de facto* enumeration rule, which includes in each household only those persons present on census day, but others adopt a *de jure* standard, which counts everyone at their usual residence. One might expect the *de facto* rule to produce lower estimates of coresidence; such enumerations can miss members of the younger generation temporarily absent for work or to attend school. Conversely, *de jure* enumerations sometimes count kin as

---

<sup>1</sup> The 2001 census of Ecuador was excluded from the analysis because of a problem with the family relationship variable.

coresident when they are merely visiting. We expect that the net effect of variation in enumeration rule is small.

The fourteen developing countries with available census microdata are not representative of the developing world as a whole. We have data for eight Latin American countries, four African countries, and just two Asian countries. Most of the world's population resides in Asia, and intergenerational coresidence is particularly high in that region. Accordingly, we cannot generalize about trends and differentials in the developing world as a whole; our results apply only to the fourteen countries for which we have data.

Our measures of intergenerational coresidence, summarized in Table 2, are modeled on those used by Ruggles (2007). They are significantly more restrictive than the measures used in most studies of intergenerational coresidence in developing countries. Most of these studies assess the percent of persons age 60 or older residing with a child. As noted, we are concerned that this measure risks conflating changes in fertility patterns with changes in residence decisions. In many cases, persons in their early 60s in populations that do not deliberately limit fertility may have children who are still too young to leave home. Accordingly, we focus on persons age 65 or older, since the great majority of their children would be old enough to leave home. In addition, families are considered intergenerational only if the younger generation is age 18 or older.

We also measure intergenerational coresidence from the perspective of the younger generation. Many investigators have observed that coresidence is determined as much—or more—by the younger generation as by the older generation (Aquilino 1990; Crimmins and Ingegneri 1990; Kotlikoff and Morris 1990; Ward et al. 1992; Choi 2003; Ruggles 2007; VanWey and Cebulko 2007; cf. Moehling 1995). We define the younger generation as 30 to 39

because those ages are beyond the usual ages of leaving home in all countries and yet are young enough that at least half of the persons in every country would still have a surviving parent with whom they could potentially reside (Uhlenberg 1996).

We subdivide intergenerational families into two categories, depending on which generation heads the household. As noted, under the traditional model of stem and joint families first described by Le Play, the older generation—especially the men—usually retain power and authority until advanced ages, usually though control over property. Many recent investigators, however, regard intergenerational coresidence chiefly as a means of old age support and assume that parents move into their children’s households, often helping with childcare and housework in exchange for economic support. We suggest that headship patterns may help us to distinguish between these two types of families.

Census enumeration instructions suggest that household headship is intended as an indicator of authority within the family. The census instructions do not, for the most part, give a precise definition of headship, but 34 of the censuses we used do provide some guidance to enumerators; these instructions are reproduced in Appendix A. The instructions generally assume that every household has a head and that there is little ambiguity about who that person is. They typically ask respondents to identify the person “recognized” as head or the person “responsible.” Sometimes the instructions explicitly identify the head as the person with most authority or the main decision-maker. When there is doubt about which person should be considered head, the instructions sometimes suggest other criteria, such as economic contribution or age.

It is likely that the meaning of headship varies across countries. In some countries, perhaps, age is the most important determinant of headship; in other countries, gender or

economic power might be more important. Moreover, headship could be affected by which person responds to the census taker. Even within countries, there may be a range of factors that influence which generation is labeled the household head.

Despite these caveats, we postulate that headship is often correlated with authority within the household (cf. Smith 1992; Ruggles and Brower 2003). Accordingly, we divide intergenerational families into two types: Elder-head families are defined as those headed by the older generation, and younger-head families are defined as families headed by the younger generation. We do not mean to imply that headship is a definitive indicator of authority or dependence; we do believe, however, that in elder-head families the older generation typically retains more authority than in younger-head families. Moreover, we hypothesize that elder-head families are often stem or joint families, whereas younger-head families are more often formed when a destitute or infirm elderly parent moves into a child's household for support.

### **Trends in Intergenerational Coresidence**

Figure 1 shows the overall trends in coresidence in fifteen countries for each generation. Panel A shows the percent of the younger generation—persons age 30 to 39—residing with at least one parent, and Panel B shows the percent of older generation—age 65 and older—residing with at least one child age 18 or older. The graphs give a visual summary of the entire group of countries; for trends in specific countries, the data are reproduced in tabular form in Appendix B.

In 10 of the 15 countries, the percent of the younger generation residing with their parents is on the rise. The exceptions to this pattern are three African countries (Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda), along with Ecuador and Vietnam. As described earlier, in countries with declining fertility and mortality there would be increased opportunity for the younger generation to reside

with parents; therefore, *ceteris paribus*, the demographic changes of most developing countries during the past four decades would tend to favor residence with parents.

When we turn to the living arrangements of the older generation, it is difficult to distinguish clear trends. In six countries (Colombia, Mexico, Romania, South Africa, Venezuela, and Vietnam), intergenerational coresidence of the older generation is increasing, and, in four countries, it is declining (Argentina, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda). In the remaining six countries, there have been small fluctuations but no clear trend in coresidence of the aged.

The period from the 1970s to the 2000s saw substantial demographic change and economic development across much of the developing world. Because the living arrangements of the older generation are less sensitive to changing demographic conditions than are the living arrangements of the younger generation, we believe Panel B provides the best measure of trends in residential preferences during this period of rapid demographic change. Given the rapid pace of economic development in many developing countries, the predominant theories of family change predict declining coresidence. Of the four countries that did see a decline in coresidence, however, two (Rwanda and Kenya) actually had a decline in GDP per capita, and a third, Argentina, had great economic instability and no net per capita economic growth for most of the period examined. Thus, the data on overall trends in family composition provides no evidence to support the theory of a decline in intergenerational coresidence linked to economic development.

Figure 2 divides intergenerational families into two categories. Elder-head families are defined as those in which the household is headed by the older generation, and younger-head families are those in which the household is headed by the younger generation. When we assess the trend from the perspective of the younger generation (Panel A), the percent of elder-head families is rising in 11 countries and declining in four (Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and Vietnam).

Measured from the perspective of the older generation (Panel B) there are just two of the 15 countries in which elder-head intergenerational coresidence is going down (Kenya and Rwanda).

The trends are just the opposite for the younger-head families. In every country, younger-head families are less common than elder-head families, and the differential is growing. Among the younger generation (Panel A), the frequency of younger-head families is increasing in South Africa and flat in Mexico but declining in every other country. Measured from the older generation (Panel B), younger-head intergenerational coresidence is going down in 12 countries and increasing in Mexico, South Africa, and Vietnam.

With a few exceptions—especially in Africa—we can broadly generalize about trends in intergenerational coresidence. Intergenerational families headed by the older generation—the form of coresidence we associate with traditional stem-family and joint-family systems—are becoming more common in most of the developing countries examined.

Recent scholarship on intergenerational coresidence in developing countries has highlighted the role of gender and marital status. In particular, researchers stress that the status and authority of the older generation within the family is contingent on gender, and, for women, on the survival of their spouse (e.g. Knodel and Ofstedal 2002; Yount 2005). Despite the clear importance of gender, however, the same basic trends in coresidence are found among elders of both sexes. We conducted additional analyses (not shown) and found that the rise in intergenerational coresidence of elders was broadly similar for unmarried men, unmarried women, and married couples.

Intergenerational families headed by the younger generation—the configuration, we hypothesize, most likely to signal old-age support—are, with a few exceptions, on the decline.

These trends are precisely the opposite of what one would expect if economic development undermines traditional family forms and creates a new need for old-age support.

### **Multivariate Analysis**

To describe the relationships between individual-level characteristics, indicators of economic development, and trends in intergenerational coresidence, we turn to a fixed-effects multinomial logit regression.<sup>2</sup> We estimate models of intergenerational coresidence for both the younger generation and the older generation, since the needs and resources of both generations can determine coresidence (Ruggles 2007). We use a model that compares younger-head coresidence and elder-head coresidence with non-intergenerational families (any other family type). We do not have sufficient information consistently available in the censuses to develop formal causal models of coresidence. Rather, our goal is to summarize and describe broad trends and differentials across fourteen countries, using the regression to control for variations in basic demographic characteristics and economic development indicators.

Table 3 describes the independent variables included in the analysis. We divide the censuses into four decades; because some countries hold their decennial censuses in the year before the decade change, we divide the decades 1969-1978, 1979-1988, and so on. Country-

---

<sup>2</sup> Because our analyses include independent variables measured at the country level, we also tested generalized estimating equation (GEE) models. GEE models are an extension of generalized linear models that account for within-group correlations (Hardin and Hilbe 2003). We fit population average GEE models accounting for clustering by country, and found that the results did not materially differ from the multinomial logit regression results presented in Tables 4 and 5. We also carried out appropriate tests for interaction among the independent variables, and found nothing that affected the patterns described below.



level fixed-effects variables allow us to control for variations across decades in the availability of census information. The Philippines and Rwanda lack key variables needed for the analysis, so we excluded those countries.<sup>3</sup> We include basic demographic characteristics—age, sex, and marital status—to control for the effects of compositional change.

The analysis includes two socioeconomic variables: educational attainment and employment status. Educational attainment is included as an indicator of socioeconomic status and earning potential. Employment status is an indicator of resources. We do not include employment status for the aged population; those with the most resources are among the most likely to retire, and this makes employment of elders difficult to interpret.

We include three country-level measures of economic and demographic conditions: gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2000 U.S. dollars, life expectancy at birth, and percent of the population living in an urban area.<sup>4</sup> The available data on urban residence are highly problematic. Each country defines urban residence differently. Urban residence is sometimes based on a population threshold, ranging from 1,000 persons in Venezuela to 5,000 persons in Uganda. In other instances, urban places are distinguished by unspecified indicators of urban character (Philippines) or availability of urban services (Chile), or they are “administratively determined” according to unspecified criteria (Rwanda). In Ecuador, urban places are defined simply as the capitals of provinces or cantons. Because of the wide variation in definitions, we are uneasy about comparing urban residence across countries. Urbanization is so theoretically

---

<sup>3</sup> The Philippines only asked about educational attainment in 1990, and Rwanda did not ask about educational attainment until 2002.

<sup>4</sup> The country-level measures of economic development are taken from World Bank (2007) and United Nations, various years.

important, however, that we felt that we should not ignore it. Accordingly, we have included in the models the percent of the population identified by each country as urban, as reported to the United Nations.<sup>5</sup>

The results are presented in the form of odds ratios. Table 4 presents results for the younger generation, and Table 5 shows the older generation. In each table, the dependent variable is family type where family type is defined as living in a younger-head intergenerational family, elder-head intergenerational family, or living in any other family type. In all regressions, living in any other family type is the excluded category.

The characteristics of persons residing in younger-head families differ substantially from those of elder-head families. For example, as shown in Table 4, models 1 and 2, younger-generation residence in younger-head intergenerational families is associated with being female, older, and widowed or unmarried. By contrast, residing in elder-head intergenerational families is associated with being male, younger, and separated/divorced or unmarried. As one would expect, members of the younger generation who head intergenerational families tend to be employed, whereas those living in households headed by the parent tend to be unemployed or out of the labor force.

The impact of education on coresidence is more complex. In models 1 and 2, intergenerational coresidence is positively associated with education, but the effect is considerably stronger for elder-head coresidence than for younger-head coresidence. If education is a proxy for economic resources, one might expect to find a stronger effect on younger-head

---

<sup>5</sup> The Minnesota Population Center intends to develop measures of urbanization that are more internationally compatible. When that work is complete, it will allow us to compare intergenerational coresidence in urban and rural areas across countries.

coresidence, since the members of the younger generation with the most resources would be best positioned to support dependent elderly parents. The meaning of education, however, may not be so straightforward. Although education of the younger generation is doubtless correlated with economic resources, it may reflect the resources of the elderly parents just as much as those of the younger generation. Parents who could afford to send their children to secondary school probably had substantial economic security. Such parents might also be likely to support dependent children later in life. In this light, the strong positive correlation of education to elder-head coresidence may make sense.

The three country-level measures of economic development have mixed effects on the coresidence of the younger generation with parents. Percent living in an urban area has little effect on younger-head coresidence, but encourages older-head coresidence. It could affect coresidence in two distinct ways. If the younger generation is attracted to jobs in the city and moves off the farm, this could directly reduce intergenerational coresidence. Moreover, compared with rural farmers, fewer urban elders can offer occupational succession to their children. Conversely, however, the rapid growth of cities has led to widespread housing shortages throughout the developing world, which may contribute to doubling up.

The other country-level measures—GDP per capita and life expectancy at birth—are inversely associated with younger-head families and positively associated with elder-head families. These relationships directly contradict our expectations that economic development

would discourage residence in traditional patriarchal families but could create new needs and resources for old-age support.<sup>6</sup>

In the models that do not control for economic development, the regressions suggest trends in coresidence similar to those shown in Figures 1 and 2: younger-head intergenerational families have declined, at least since the 1980s, and the elder-head families increase until 1990 and then decline in 2000. Controlling for economic development, however, there is a clear pattern of decline from decade to decade in both measures of coresidence since the 1980s compared to all other family types.

The results for the older generation are given in Table 5. For the older generation, residence in a family headed by an adult child is strongly associated with being female, older, and divorced, separated or widowed. Residence in an intergenerational family headed by the older generation is most often found among elders who are male, younger, and married or widowed. Educational attainment of the older generation is inversely associated with both categories of intergenerational coresidence. Once again, however, it may oversimplify to assume that the educational results mean that coresidence results from economic need. Educated elders may be more integrated into the urban wage-based economy, which could mean that they have accumulated savings that allow them to live independently. At the same time, however, they may tend to lack the landholdings that form the basis of traditional stem and joint family coresidence.

Among the older generation, percent living in an urban area is modestly associated with younger-head coresidence and has no effect on older-head coresidence. The other measures of

---

<sup>6</sup> Because life expectancy has a direct impact on the survival of parents, one would expect *ceteris paribus* that it would be positively associated with coresidence, so the inverse relationship of life expectancy to younger-headed coresidence is especially striking.

coresidence show the same patterns as among the younger generation: GDP per capita and life expectancy are inversely associated with younger-head coresidence and positively associated with older-head coresidence.

Trends in coresidence are best measured from the perspective of the older generation; as explained above, coresidence of the younger generation is highly sensitive to declines in fertility and mortality. When we control for changes in the composition of the population and the three measures of economic development, the chronological trends are essentially consistent with the basic descriptive statistics presented in Figure 2: younger-head coresidence has been going down since the 1980s, and elder-head coresidence has been going up since the 1970s.

## **Discussion**

The census data yield several unexpected results. We observed no general decline in intergenerational coresidence in developing countries. Most of the 15 countries examined show an increase in intergenerational coresidence or no clear trend. Four of the 15 countries examined did show declining coresidence of the aged with adult children, but they were not countries with substantial economic development over the period studied. When we turn to the configuration of intergenerational coresidence, the results are even more surprising. Families in which the older generation was household head—which we term elder-head intergenerational families—were much more common than were families headed by the younger generation in every country examined. Such a configuration is consistent with traditional patriarchal forms in which the older generation retains authority. Contrary to expectations, these elder-head intergenerational families are becoming *more* common in most of the countries. Younger-head families—the configuration one would expect if intergenerational coresidence were motivated by a need for old-age

support—are on the decline in most of the countries. The shift from younger-head to elder-head families appears most rapid in the countries with the most rapid economic growth.

Our multivariate analyses reinforce the conclusion that economic development is positively associated with elder-head intergenerational coresidence. GDP per capita and life expectancy were strongly associated with residence in an elder-head intergenerational family, but inversely associated with residence in a younger-head family. A third measure of development, percent living in an urban area, is positively related to elder-head coresidence among the younger generation.

These results should be interpreted cautiously. We examined only two countries in Asia, which is not only the most populous part of the world but also has the highest levels of intergenerational coresidence. We examined only four countries in Africa, and three of them are located in the same part of sub-Saharan East Africa, and probably are not representative of the continent as a whole. Despite these caveats, however, the rise of elder-head intergenerational coresidence and decline of younger-head coresidence is so widespread across the countries we examined that we suspect these trends are occurring through much of the developing world.

Why is elder-head intergenerational coresidence increasing in developing countries, and why is it strongly associated with economic growth? Part of the answer lies with housing shortage. The population of the countries examined here has more than doubled since the 1960s, and new housing construction has not kept pace with demand. Even when elders can no longer provide the prospect of agricultural inheritance, they often can offer a place to live. In many developing countries, there appears to be a significant positive relationship between intergenerational coresidence and the proportion of the population living in an urban area, despite the greater importance of agricultural inheritance in rural areas (Martin 1989; Logan,

Bian, and Bian 1988; De Vos and Lee 1993; Chamrathirong, Morgan, and Rindfuss 1998; Andrade and De Vos 2002). As shown in Table 4, percent living in an urban area is clearly associated with persons in their thirties residing in a household headed by their parents, and housing shortages probably contribute to this.

Other changes related to economic development may also encourage coresidence. With rising female labor-force participation in many countries, the demand for services that can be provided by elders—such as grandchild care and housework—may be on the rise in some areas (e.g. Morgan and Hiroshima 1983; Chamrathirong, Morgan, and Rindfuss 1998; Hirschman and Minh 2002; Sasaki 2002; for contrasting evidence, see Logan, Bian, and Bian 1988). Some developing countries have seen unstable or declining employment prospects for youth despite significant economic growth, and some have introduced pension programs for the aged; both of these factors may encourage the younger generation to remain in their parental homes after reaching adulthood (Keller 2004; Camarano 2002; De Vos and Andrade 2005; Duryea, Jaramillo, and Pagés 2003)

More broadly, it is possible that rising incomes—especially among the older generation—have allowed more people to achieve their preferred family structure. Goode (1963: 17) observed that “the lower strata in most societies live in small households.” Under the classic patriarchal model, stem and joint families are based on agricultural inheritance; if the older generation lacks sufficient land to support the next generation, it may be impossible for the younger generation to stay in the household. Historical studies of preindustrial Western families have found that intergenerational coresidence was strongly positively associated with economic resources (e.g. Berkner 1975; Ruggles 2003). Some investigations of less-developed countries have also found that intergenerational coresidence is most common among property owners and

other elderly with comparatively high socioeconomic status (Martin 1989; Chan and DaVanzo 1996; Agree 1993). Thus, intergenerational coresidence may be preferred by both generations, but may not be feasible for economic reasons (Milagros et al. 1995). The strong positive association between economic development and intergenerational coresidence therefore makes some sense: with rising incomes, more people may be able to achieve their preferred family form.

This interpretation suggests that the ideal family form may not have changed greatly but that economic growth has increased the opportunities for intergenerational coresidence. This does not mean, however, that family values are indelible; we have seen dramatic declines in coresidence in every Western country, and there is strong evidence of a similar change in the most developed countries of East Asia. The positive relationship we find between coresidence and development may eventually reverse, and the world may converge towards a conjugal family system just as Goode predicted. As yet, however, there is little sign that such convergence is taking place.



**Note**

Support for data collection was provided by National Science Foundation grant SES-0433654, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development grant R01 HD044154, and other grants. J. Michael Oakes provided invaluable advice on GEE models. We are also grateful to the following agencies for providing microdata: Argentina, National Institute of Statistics and Censuses; Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE); Chile, National Institute of Statistics; Colombia, National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE); Costa Rica, National Institute of Statistics and Censuses; Ecuador, National Institute of Statistics and Censuses; Kenya, National Bureau of Statistics; Mexico, National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics (INEGI); Philippines, National Statistics Office; Romania, National Institute of Statistics; Rwanda, National Institute of Statistics; Statistics South Africa; Uganda, Bureau of Statistics; Venezuela, National Institute of Statistics; and Vietnam, General Statistics Office.

## References

- Agree, Emily Miriam. 1993. "Effects of Demographic Change on the Living Arrangements of the Elderly in Brazil: 1960-1980." Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Sociology Department, Duke University.
- Alter, George, Lisa Cliggett and Alex Urbiel. 1996. "Household Patterns of the Elderly and the Proximity of Children in a Nineteenth Century City: Verviers, Belgium, 1831-1846." Pp. 30-42 in *Aging and Generational Relations over the Life Course: A Historical and Cross-Cultural Perspective*, edited by Tamara K. Hareven. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Andorka, Rudolf. 1995. "Household Systems and the Lives of the Old in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hungary." Pp. 129-155 in *Aging in the Past: Demography, Society and Old Age*, edited by David I. Kertzer and Peter Laslett. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Andrade, Flavia and Susan De Vos. 2002. "An Analysis of Living Arrangements Among Elderly Women in Brazil." Paper presented at the XIII Encontro da Associação de Estudos Populacioneais, Ouro Preto, Brazil.
- Aquilino, William S. 1990. "The Likelihood of Parent-Child Coresidence: Effects of Family Structure and Parental Characteristics." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 52: 405-19.
- Aykan, Hakan and Douglas A. Wolf. 2000. "Traditionality, Modernity, and Household Composition: Parent-Child Coresidence in Contemporary Turkey." *Research on Aging* 22: 395-421.
- Berkner, Lutz. 1972. "The Stem Family and the Developmental Cycle of the Peasant Household: An Eighteenth century Austrian Example." *American Historical Review* 77: 398-418.

- Blumberg, Rae Lesser, and Robert F. Winch. 1972. "Societal Complexity and Familial Complexity: Evidence for the Curvilinear Hypothesis." *The American Journal of Sociology* 77: 898-920.
- Bongaarts, John. 2001. "Household Size and Composition in the Developing World in the 1990s." *Population Studies* 55: 263-279.
- Bongaarts, John and Zachary Zimmer. 2002. "Living Arrangements of the Elderly in the Developing World: An Analysis of DHS Household Surveys." *Journal of Gerontology: Social Sciences* 57: S145-S157.
- Burch, Thomas K. 1967. "The Size and Structure of Families: A Comparative Analysis of Census Data." *American Sociological Review* 32: 347-363.
- Burgess, Ernest W. 1960. "Family Structure and Relationships." Pp. 271-298 in *Aging in Western Societies*, edited by Ernest W. Burgess. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Camarano, Ana Amelia. 2002. "Brazilian Population Ageing: A Demographic Contribution." Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), Working Paper No. 858.
- Chamrathirong, Aphichat, S. Philip Morgan, Ronald. R. Rindfuss. 1988. "High Costs of Housing, Childcare and Housework Assistance in Bangkok, Focus Group Participants: Living Arrangements and Family Formation." *Social Forces* 66: 926-950.
- Chan, Angelique. 1997. "An Overview of the Living Arrangements and Social Support Exchanges of Older Singaporeans." *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* 12:35-50.
- Chan, Angelique and Julie DaVanzo. 1996. "Ethnic Differences in Parents' Coresidence with Adult Children in Peninsular Malaysia." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology* 11:29-59.

- Chattopadhyay, Arpita and Robert Marsh. 1999. "Changes in Living Arrangement and Familial Support for the Elderly in Taiwan: 1963–1991." *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 30: 523–37.
- Chen, Chaonan. 1996. "Living Arrangements and Economic Support for the Elderly in Taiwan." *Journal of Population Studies* 17:59-81.
- Choi, Namkee G. 2003. "Coresidence between Unmarried Aging Parents and their Adult Children—Who Moved in with Whom and Why?" *Research on Aging* 25: 384-404.
- Clay, Daniel C. and Jane E. Vander Haar. 1993. "Patterns of Intergenerational Support and Childbearing in the Third World." *Population Studies* 47: 67-83.
- Cowgill, Donald O. 1986. *Aging Around the World*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Crimmins, Eileen M. and Dominique G. Ingegneri. 1990. "Interaction and Living Arrangements of Older Parents and their Children." *Research on Aging* 12:3–35.
- De Vos, Susan. 1990. "Extended Family Living Among older People in Six Latin American Countries." *Journal of Gerontology: Social Sciences* 45: 87–94.
- De Vos, Susan and Flavia Andrade. 2--5 "Race and Independent Living Among Elderly Brazilians Since 1980." *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, 36(4): 567-581.
- De Vos, Susan and Yean-Ju Lee. 1993. "Change in Extended Family Living Among Elderly People in South Korea, 1970-1980." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 41: 377-393.
- Dillon, Lisa Y. 1997. "Between Generations and Across Borders: Living Arrangements of the Elderly and their Children in Victorian Canada and the United States." Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, History Department, University of Minnesota.

- Duryea, Suzanne, Olga Jaramillo and Carmen Pages. 2003. "Latin American Labor Markets in the 1990s: Deciphering the Decade." Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper 486.
- Elman, Cheryl and Peter Uhlenberg. 1995. "Co-residence in the Early Twentieth Century: Elderly Women in the United States and their Children." *Population Studies* 49: 501-517.
- Fauve-Chamoux, Antoinette. 1996. "Aging in a Never-Empty Nest: The Elasticity of the Stem Family." Pp. 75-99 in *Aging and Generational Relations over the Life Course: A Historical and Cross-Cultural Perspective*, edited by Tamara K. Hareven. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Goldschmidt, Walter and Evalyn Jacobson Kunkel. 1971. "The Structure of the Peasant Family." *American Anthropologist: New Series* 73: 1058-1076.
- Goode, William J. 1963. *World Revolution and Family Patterns*. Glencoe Illinois: Free Press.
- Guinnane, Timothy W. 1996. "The Family, State Support, and Generational Relations in Rural Ireland at the Turn of the Twentieth Century." Pp. 100-119 in *Aging and Generational Relations over the Life Course: A Historical and Cross-Cultural Perspective*, edited by Tamara K. Hareven. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Hardin, James W. and Joseph M. Hilbe. 2003. *Generalized Estimating Equations*. New York: Chapman & Hall/CRC.
- Hermalin, Albert I, Mary Beth Ofstedal, and Ming-Cheng Chang. 1992. "Types of Supports for the Aged and Their Providers in Taiwan." Pp. 179-215 in *Aging and Generational Relations: Life-Course and Cross-Cultural Perspectives*, edited by Tamara K. Hareven. New York: Aldine DeGruyter.

- Hermalin, A.I. (editor). 2002. *The Wellbeing of the Elderly in Asia: A Four-Country Comparative Study*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Hirosima, K. 1997. "Projection of Living Arrangements of the Elderly in Japan: 1990-2010." *Genus* 53: 79-111.
- Hirschman, C. and Minh N. H. 2002. "Tradition and Change in Vietnamese Family Structure in the Red River Delta." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 64: 1063-1079.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Kamo, Yoshinori and Min Zhou. 1994. "Living Arrangements of Elderly Chinese and Japanese in the United States." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 56: 544-558.
- Keller, Sonja. 2004. "Household Formation, Poverty and Unemployment - The Case of Rural Households in South Africa." *The South African Journal of Economics* 72: 437-483.
- Kobrin, Frances E. 1976. "The Fall in Household Size and the Rise of the Primary Individual in the United States." *Demography* 13:127-38.
- Kotlikoff, Laurence J. and John N. Morris. 1990. "Why Don't the Elderly Live with Their Children? A New Look." Pp. 149-169 in *Issues in the Economics of Aging*, edited by D. A. Wise. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Knodel, John. 1977. "Family Limitation and the Fertility Transition: Evidence from the Age Patterns of Fertility in Europe and Asia." *Population Studies* 31: 219-249.
- Knodel John and Napaporn Chayovan. 1997. "Family Support and Living Arrangements of Thai Elderly." *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* 12:1-17.
- Knodel, John and Nibhon Debavalya. 1997. "Living Arrangements and Support among the Elderly in South-East Asia: An Introduction." *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* 12: 5-16.

- Knodel, John, Jed Friedman, Truong Si Anh, and Bui The Cuong. 2000. "Intergenerational Exchanges in Vietnam: Family Size, Sex Composition, and the Location of Children." *Population Studies* 54: 89-104.
- Knodel, John and Mary Beth Ofstedal. 2002. "Patterns and Determinants of Living Arrangements." Pp. 143–184 in *The Well-Being of the Elderly in Asia: A Four-Country Comparative Study*, edited by A. I. Hermalin. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Le Play, Frédéric. 1884. *L'organisation de la famille selon le vrai modèle signalé par l'histoire de toutes les races et de tous les temps*. Third edition. Tours: A. Mame.
- Levy, Marion. 1965. "Aspects of the Analysis of Family Structure." Pp. 1-63 in *Aspects of the Analysis of Family Structure*, by Ansley J. Coale, Lloyd J. Fallers, Marion J. Levy, Jr., David M. Schneider, and Silvan S. Tomkins. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lloyd, Cynthia B. (editor). 2005. "Growing Up Global: The Changing Transitions to Adulthood in Developing Countries." Panel on Transitions to Adulthood in Developing Countries, National Research Council. Pg. 447. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
- Logan, John R., Fuqin Bian, and Yanjie Bian. 1998. "Tradition and Change in the Urban Chinese Family: The Case of Living Arrangements." *Social Forces* 76:851–882.
- Martin Linda G. 1989. "Living Arrangements of the Elderly in Fiji, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines." *Demography* 26:627-643.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1990. "Changing Intergenerational Family Relations in East Asia." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 510: 102-114.
- Martin, Linda G. and Kevin Kinsella. 1994. "Research on the Demography of Aging in Developing Countries." Pp. 356-97 in *Demography of Aging*, edited by Linda G. Martin and Samuel H. Preston. Washington D. C.: National Academy Press.

- Mason, Karen Oppenheim. 1992. "Family Change and Support of the Elderly in Asia: What do We Know?" *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* 7:13–32.
- McDonald, Peter. 1993. "Convergence or Compromise in Historical Family Change?" in Elza Berquo and Peter Xenos eds., *Family Systems and Cultural Change*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Milagros, Maruja, B. Asis, Lita Domingo, John Knodel, And Kalyani Mehta. 1995. "Living Arrangements In Four Asian Countries: A Comparative Perspective." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology* 10: 145-162.
- Minnesota Population Center. 2007. *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series—International: Version 3.0*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. Available online at <http://ipums.org>, accessed 8/22/2007.
- Moehling, Carolyn. 1995. "Work and Family: Intergenerational Support in American Families, 1880-1920." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Economics Department, Northwestern University.
- Morgan, S. Philip and Kiyosi Hiroshima. 1983. "The Persistence of Extended Family Residence in Japan: Anachronism or Alternative Strategy?" *American Sociological Review* 48: 269-281.
- Natividad J. N. and G.T. Cruz. 1997. "Patterns in Living Arrangements and Familial Support for the Elderly in the Philippines." *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* 12:1-17.
- Nimkoff, Meyer F. 1962. "Changing Family Relationships of Older People in the United States During the Last Fifty Years." Pp. 405-414 in *Social and Psychological Aspects of Aging*, edited by Clark Tibbitts and Wilma Donahue. New York: Columbia University Press.



- Palloni, Alberto. 2001. "Living Arrangements of Older Persons." In *Living Arrangements of Older Persons: Critical Issues and Policy Responses*. Population Bulletin of the United Nations, Special Issue 43/43, Pg. 54-110. New York: United Nations.
- Pampel, Fred C. 1992. "Trends in Living Alone Among the Elderly in Europe." Pp. 97-117 in *Elderly Migration and Population Redistribution*, edited by Andrei Rogers, et al. London: Belhaven Press.
- Parsons, Talcott. 1949. "The Social Structure of the Family." Pp. 173-201 *The Family: Its Function and Destiny*, edited by Ruth N. Anshen. New York: Harper.
- Parsons, Talcott and Robert F. Bales. 1955. *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Ruggles, Steven. 1994. "The Transformation of American Family Structure," *American Historical Review* 99: 103-128.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2003. "Multigenerational Families in Nineteenth-Century America." *Continuity and Change* 18:1 (2003), 139-165.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 2007. "The Decline of Intergenerational Coresidence in the United States, 1850-2000." *American Sociological Review* 72: 962-989.
- Ruggles, Steven and Susan Brower. 2003. "The Measurement of Family and Household Composition in the United States, 1850-1999." *Population and Development Review* 29: 73-101.
- Sasaki, Masaru. 2002. "The Causal Effect of Family Structure on Labor Force Participation Among Japanese Married Women." *The Journal of Human Resources* 37: 429-440.
- Schoeni, Robert. 1998. "Reassessing the Decline in Parent-Child Old-Age Coresidence during the Twentieth Century," *Demography* 35: 307-313.

- Schröder-Butterfill, Elisabeth. 2004. "Inter-Generational Family Support Provided by Older People in Indonesia." *Ageing and Society* 24: 497-530.
- Smith, Daniel Scott. 1986. "Accounting for Change in the Families of the Elderly in the United States, 1900-present." Pp. 87-109 in *Old Age in a Bureaucratic Society: The Elderly, the Experts, and the State in American History*, edited by David Van Tassel and Peter N. Stearns. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1992. "The Meanings of Family and Household: Change and Continuity in the Mirror of the American Census." *Population and Development Review* 18: 421-456.
- Therborn, Göran. 2004. *Between Sex and Power: Family in the World, 1900-2000*. London; New York : Routledge.
- Tomassini, Cecilia , Karen Glaser, Douglas A. Wolf, Marjolein I. Broese van Groenou, and Emily Grundy. 2004. "Living Arrangements Among Older People: An Overview of Trends in Europe and the U.S.A." *Population Trends* 115: 24-35.
- Uhlenberg, Peter. 1996. "Mortality Decline in the Twentieth Century and the Supply of Kin over the Life Course." *The Gerontologist* 36: 681-685.
- United Nations. 2005. *Living Arrangements of Older Persons around the World*. New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Various years. *Demographic Yearbook—Annuaire démographique*. New York: United Nations. Available online at <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products>, accessed 8/22/2007.
- VanWey, Leah K. and Kara B. Cebulko. 2007. "Intergenerational Coresidence among Small Farmers in Rural Amazonia." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 69: 1257-1270.

- Wall, Richard. 1995. "Elderly Persons and Members of Their Households in England and Wales from Preindustrial Times to the Present." Pp. 81-106 in *Aging in the Past: Demography, Society and Old Age*, edited by David I. Kertzer and Peter Laslett. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ward, Russell, John Logan, and Glenna Spitze. 1992. "The Influence of Parent and Child Needs on Coresidence in Middle and Later Life." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 54: 209–21.
- Wirth, Louis. 1938. "Urbanism as a Way of Life." *American Journal of Sociology* 44: 1-24.
- World Bank. 2007. "World Development Indicators Online." Available online at <http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/>, accessed 8/22/2007.
- Yang, Chingli. 1999. "Living Arrangement of the Elderly in Taiwan." *Journal of Population Studies* 20: 167–83.
- Yount, Katheryn M. 2005. "The Patriarchal Bargain and Intergenerational Coresidence in Egypt." *Sociological Quarterly* 46: 137-164.
- Zimmer, Zachary and Julia Kwong. 2003. "Family Size and Support of Older Adults in Urban and Rural China: Current Effects and Future Implications." *Demography* 40: 23-44.

**Table 1. Characteristics of census samples included in the analysis**

Country/Year	Sample Density (%)	Enumeration rule	Persons age 30-39	Persons age 65+	Total Sample Size
Argentina					
1970	2.0	de facto	62,422	32,621	466,892
1980	10.0	de facto	353,482	218,139	2,667,714
1991	10.0	de facto	549,177	365,790	4,143,727
2001	10.0	de facto	459,256	358,683	3,626,103
Brazil					
1970	5.0	de jure and de facto	571,315	158,348	4,953,759
1980	5.0	de jure and de facto	691,936	236,252	5,870,467
1991	5.8	de jure	1,191,778	409,356	8,522,740
2000	6.0	de jure	1,508,425	591,795	10,136,022
Chile					
1970	10.0	de facto	103,604	45,020	890,481
1982	10.0	de facto	144,801	66,260	1,133,062
1992	10.0	de facto	206,929	87,830	1,335,055
2002	10.0	de facto	244,461	122,205	1,513,914
Colombia					
1973	10.0	de facto	209,064	62,450	1,988,831
1985	10.0	de jure	338,947	103,471	2,643,125
1993	10.0	de jure	478,487	144,743	3,213,657
Costa Rica					
1973	10.0	de jure	19,085	6,590	186,762
1984	10.0	de jure	29,818	10,762	241,220
2000	10.0	de jure	58,764	21,466	381,500
Ecuador					
1974	10.0	unknown	67,648	24,792	648,678
1982	10.0	de facto	89,030	32,163	806,834
1990	10.0	de facto	123,065	42,048	966,234
2001		de facto	163,609	80,334	1,213,725
Kenya					
1989	5.0	de facto	103,942	35,110	1,074,098
1999	5.0	de facto	154,531	46,550	1,407,547
Mexico					
1970	1.0	de jure	50,873	17,596	483,405
1990	10.0	de jure	999,754	338,870	8,118,242
2000	10.6	de jure	1,420,390	504,434	10,099,182
Philippines					
1990	10.0	de jure	764,923	204,270	6,013,913
1995	10.0	de jure	918,505	240,974	6,864,758
2000	10.0	de jure	1,011,769	284,488	7,417,810
Romania					
1992	10.0	de jure	323,267	250,384	2,238,578
2002	10.0	de jure	308,332	303,307	2,137,967
Rwanda					
1991	10.0	de facto	87,177	23,301	742,918
2002	10.0	de facto	85,598	24,164	843,392
Vietnam					
1989	5.0	de jure	324,428	126,644	2,626,985
1999	3.0	de jure	358,445	137,539	2,368,167
South Africa					
1996	10.0	de facto	510,791	173,096	3,621,164
2001	10.0	de facto	533,605	184,481	3,725,655
Uganda					
1991	10.0	de facto	152,434	52,622	1,548,460
2002	10.0	de facto	260,698	77,470	2,497,449
Venezuela					
1971	10.0	unknown	122,213	34,383	1,158,527
1981	10.0	de jure	170,531	50,678	1,441,266
1990	10.0	de jure	252,202	72,206	1,803,953

**Table 2. Definitions of intergenerational coresidence measures**

---

<b>Older-generation intergenerational</b>	Persons age 65 or older residing with at least one own child age 18 or older
<b>Younger-generation intergenerational</b>	Persons age 30 to 39 residing with at least one own parent
<b>Younger-head families</b>	Intergenerational families headed by the younger generation
<b>Elder-head families</b>	Intergenerational families headed by the older generation

---

**Table 3. Independent variables included in the analysis**

Name	Ages 30 to 39		Ages 65 plus	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<b>Decade</b>				
1969-1978	0.07	0.26	0.06	0.24
1979-1988	0.18	0.39	0.17	0.38
1989-1998	0.46	0.50	0.44	0.50
1999-2005	0.39	0.49	0.42	0.49
<b>Country</b>				
Argentina	0.11	0.31	0.17	0.38
Brazil	0.30	0.46	0.25	0.44
Chile	0.05	0.23	0.06	0.24
Colombia	0.08	0.27	0.06	0.23
Costa Rica	0.01	0.08	0.01	0.08
Ecuador	0.02	0.14	0.02	0.13
Kenya	0.02	0.14	0.01	0.12
Mexico	0.18	0.38	0.16	0.37
Romania	0.05	0.21	0.10	0.30
South Africa	0.08	0.27	0.07	0.25
Uganda	0.03	0.17	0.02	0.15
Venezuela	0.03	0.17	0.02	0.15
Vietnam	0.05	0.23	0.04	0.21
<b>Gender (Male)</b>	0.49	0.50	0.44	0.50
<b>Age</b>	34.23	2.89	73.11	6.83
<b>Marital status</b>				
Single, never married	0.16	0.37	0.08	0.27
Married	0.78	0.41	0.53	0.50
Separated/divorced	0.04	0.19	0.03	0.18
Widowed	0.01	0.12	0.35	0.48
<b>Education</b>				
Less than primary	0.34	0.47	0.68	0.47
Primary, not secondary	0.36	0.48	0.21	0.41
Secondary or University	0.28	0.45	0.09	0.28
<b>Employment status</b>				
Employed	0.58	0.49	0.17	0.38
Unemployed	0.05	0.22	0.01	0.10
Not in labor force	0.25	0.43	0.70	0.46
<b>Economic development indicators</b>				
Percent of population urban	63.64	18.70	65.71	18.84
GDP per capita (thousands of U.S. 2000 dollars)	3.10	2.07	3.41	2.20
Life expectancy at birth	66.67	7.69	67.57	7.28

**Table 4. Multinomial logit regressions of intergenerational coresidence on selected characteristics (odds ratios): Persons aged 30-39 (younger-generation)**

	Regression 1		Regression 2	
	Younger-head vs. non-intergenerational	Elder-head vs. non-intergenerational	Younger-head vs. non-intergenerational	Elder-head vs. non-intergenerational
<b>Decade</b>				
1970 (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
1980	1.07	1.52	1.27	1.09
1990	0.76	1.55	<i>0.97</i>	0.92
2000	0.65	1.40	0.90	0.70
<b>Country</b>				
Argentina	1.65	0.90	1.79	0.79
Brazil	1.22	1.13	0.94	1.83
Chile	1.31	1.28	1.22	1.44
Colombia	1.36	1.39	<i>1.02</i>	2.75
Costa Rica	0.89	1.23	0.75	3.34
Ecuador	1.31	1.25	0.88	3.80
Kenya	0.72	0.79	0.30	6.14
Mexico	1.20	1.65	1.11	2.42
Romania	1.30	1.81	0.89	5.81
Vietnam	2.63	3.54	1.38	30.06
South Africa	0.96	0.66	0.49	2.46
Uganda	0.43	0.65	0.15	9.04
Venezuela (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
<b>Sex (male)</b>	0.94	1.35	0.94	1.35
<b>Age</b>	1.16	0.96	1.16	0.96
<b>Age squared</b>	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
<b>Marital status</b>				
Never married (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Married	0.82	0.03	0.82	0.03
Separated/divorced	0.88	0.39	0.88	0.39
Widowed	0.92	0.19	0.92	0.19
<b>Education</b>				
Less than primary (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Primary, not secondary	1.21	1.20	1.22	1.19
Secondary/University	1.21	1.44	1.21	1.44
<b>Employment status</b>				
Unemployed (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Employed	1.18	0.61	1.19	0.61
Not in labor force	1.04	0.83	1.05	0.83
<b>Urbanization</b>			1.00	1.03
<b>GDP per capita</b>			0.95	1.07
<b>Life expectancy</b>			0.98	1.01
<b>Nagelkerke R-square</b>	0.326	0.326	0.326	0.326
<b>Number of cases</b>	13,320,688	13,320,688	13,320,688	13,320,688

Note: Italicized coefficients are not significant. All other coefficients significant at  $p < .01$ .

**Table 5. Multinomial logit regressions of intergenerational coresidence on selected characteristics (odds ratios): Persons aged 65 or older (older-generation)**

	Regression 3		Regression 4	
	Younger-head vs. non-intergenerational	Elder-head vs. non-intergenerational	Younger-head vs. non-intergenerational	Elder-head vs. non-intergenerational
<b>Decade</b>				
1970 (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
1980	1.20	1.26	1.26	1.24
1990	0.88	1.32	0.92	1.30
2000	0.77	1.56	0.82	1.53
<b>Country</b>				
Argentina	0.67	0.47	0.68	0.45
Brazil	0.95	0.75	0.90	0.80
Chile	0.82	0.83	0.82	0.87
Colombia	1.24	1.24	1.24	1.34
Costa Rica	0.86	<i>0.97</i>	1.10	<i>0.96</i>
Ecuador	1.07	0.96	1.15	<i>1.02</i>
Kenya	0.54	0.52	0.50	0.56
Mexico	0.96	0.88	1.03	0.87
Romania	0.41	0.31	0.46	0.33
Vietnam	2.42	1.37	3.02	1.43
South Africa	0.60	0.80	0.50	0.85
Uganda	0.19	0.38	0.17	0.41
Venezuela (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
<b>Sex (male)</b>	0.57	1.22	0.57	1.22
<b>Age</b>	1.08	0.83	1.08	0.83
<b>Age squared</b>	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
<b>Marital status</b>				
Never married (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Married	1.06	7.19	1.07	7.19
Separated/divorced	4.21	3.33	4.22	3.33
Widowed	5.73	6.83	5.73	6.84
<b>Education</b>				
Less than primary (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Primary, not secondary	0.83	0.86	0.83	0.86
Secondary/University	0.47	0.61	0.47	0.61
<b>Urbanization</b>			1.01	1.00
<b>GDP per capita</b>			0.98	1.03
<b>Life expectancy</b>			0.98	1.00
<b>Nagelkerke R-square</b>	0.240	0.240	0.240	0.240
<b>Number of cases</b>	5,409,113	5,409,113	5,409,113	5,409,113

Note: Italicized coefficients are not significant. All other coefficients significant at  $p < .01$ .



Figure 1. Percent of persons residing in intergenerational families by generation: 15 developing countries, 1970-2002




Figure 2. Percent of persons residing in intergenerational families by generation and headship configuration: 15 developing countries, 1970-2002

A. Younger generation (aged 30-39)






Figure 2 (continued)

B. Older generation (aged 65+)



## Appendix A: Census instructions on household headship

**Argentina 1970** The head of the census household is the person recognized as such by the rest of the members of the household. To locate the head of the household, it is necessary that you find out who is the person [recognized] as such by the members of this household...even if existing in this household is a person who is older or has the same economic responsibility. Six students live in a census household - register as the head whomever is recognized as such. In the collective households..., [it's] the person with the greatest hierarchy.

**Argentina 1980** Each private dwelling should necessarily have a head, who is the person recognized as such by the rest of the members of the household. In the case of a group of non related persons someone should be recognized as head by the rest of the group. In the case of absence, the head of the household will not be enumerated in this household, another member should occupy their place (spouse, oldest child, sibling, etc.). The relationship of the rest of the members will be established with respect to the substitute.

**Brazil 1960-1970** Head - the person responsible for the household

**Brazil 1980** Head - person (man or woman) responsible for the household or family

**Brazil 1991 and 2000** Mark the box corresponding to the relationship existing between each person and the person responsible for the household.

**Chile 1960** ...the person recognized as the head of the family.

**Chile 1982** Each private household must necessarily have a head, who is the person recognized as such by the other members of the household. In the case of a group of unrelated people, who lodge and eat together, someone should be recognized by the group as the head. In a case where, because of absence, the head is not to be enumerated in that household, another member should take their place (wife, oldest son, brother, etc.).

**Colombia 1964** ...for cases of non-family groups the head will be written down in the first place, according to hierarchy and immediately the rest of the persons...

**Colombia 1985** Head. It is a person recognized as such by members of the dwelling, by reason of authority, age or economic role. The head of the dwelling can be a man or a woman, married or single. In each dwelling a head must exist.

**Colombia 1993** Head of household: It is a person recognized by the rest of the members of the household. It is generally a father or mother or the principle economic support of the household. If persons who form a census household do not recognize anyone as head (for example groups of students or workers who form a common household), choose any of them, who is older than 18 years, as head of the household.

**Costa Rica 1984** The head is the person considered as such by the rest of the members of the household, who is generally the one who supports the largest part of the economic resources of the household and has the most responsibility in making of decisions there. In non family groups whose members do not have any family relationship, the head will be the person who has the most authority, who carries out the administration, the one who has lived there the longest or the oldest. If the person lives alone, that person is the head. Before enumerating the head in the first two columns (first population form) find out who is the person considered as such. You should not accept as head a person who is not a resident in the household, even if they are the economic support of it and are being enumerated with the members of this household. Also do not write down as heads, persons under 15 years of age.

**Costa Rica 2000** The head (gender emphasized) is the person considered as such by the rest of the members of the home or who contributes the largest part of the economic resources of the home, or in the last instance, is the oldest. In non family groups the head can be one who has the most authority, the oldest person, the person who has resided in the dwelling the longest or the one who administers the place. For all cases, the head should be a usual resident older than 15 years.

**Ecuador 1962** ...when it is a non-family group, record as its head the highest ranking person who spent the night prior to the day of the Census in the dwelling...

**Ecuador 1982** ...in the case of collective dwellings, eliminate the first column corresponding to the head of household, using a vertical line.

**Ecuador 2001** ...if the dwelling is collective,...remember that in these dwellings there is no male or female head of household, and therefore there is no kinship relationship.

**Kenya 1989** ...where several persons who are not related by blood or marriage constitute a household, as in the case of urban areas, code one of them as 'head' (code 1) and the rest as 'non-relatives' (code 8).

**Kenya 1999** There are several persons who are not related by blood or marriage but constitute a household, mostly in urban areas. Without telling them code one of them as 'head,' (code 1) and the rest as 'non-relative' (code 8)...Sometimes it might happen that members of the household are away and cannot be reached even after three visits, and the most responsible person you meet is a house help or any other such person employed by the household. You must probe to establish the most senior member who will have spent the census night in the household. This person must be made the household head.

**Mexico 1960** Make an X on the line of the head of family, whoever they may be (father, mother, older brother, etc.)...

**Mexico 1970** Write the first and last name of the head of family, who can be a man or a woman...

**Mexico 1990** Remember that the head of household or group is a person who normally lives in the dwelling, and is known as the head of household by the members of the family or group.

**Mexico 2000** ...there should only be one head of family and that this person can be a man or a woman...

**Philippines 1990** You begin to ascertain the members of the household by asking the respondent: "Who is the head of this household?" Write the name of this person on the first line.

**Philippines 1995 and 2000** Begin by asking the respondent: "Who is the head of this household?" Write the name of this person on the first line.

**Romania 1992 and 2002** ...A person who has left the household for a long period of time...to work, study, or for other reasons..., is generally not considered to be the head of the household...when a person lives alone and is not included in any household, record this person as a code 01 - the head of the household, because it is considered as forming a one-person household.

**South Africa 1996** It depends upon respondents to nominate the head of the household and no guidelines were provided on the questionnaire as to who this should be. The interviewer's instructions defined head of household as "a male or a female who assumes responsibility for the household."

**South Africa 2001** The head was defined as the main decision-maker, or the person who owned or rented the dwelling, or the person who was the main breadwinner, or chosen by the household. The head could be either male or female. If two people were equal decision-makers, or in a household of totally unrelated persons, the older or oldest could be named as the household head.

**Uganda 1991** ...where several persons who are not related are living in a household, name one as head and describe the rest as "other."

**Uganda 2002** Ask, "who is the head of this household?"

**Venezuela 1971** Head of household: write down head for the person considered as such by the members of the household for reasons of relationship, age, authority, or respect.

**Venezuela 1981** Head of household: a member of the household, man or woman, who the other members of the household consider to be the head. This may be for reasons of dependence, relationship, age, authority, or respect. If no member of the household is considered the head, then choose the oldest...in the case of a dwelling made up entirely of persons not related to each other, the person considered to be the "head" is written down as such and the other residents are considered "non-relatives."

**Venezuela 1990** A member of the Household, man or woman, who the other members of the household consider the head. This may be for reasons of dependence, relationship, age, authority, or respect. If no member of the Household is considered the head then choose the oldest.

**Vietnam 1989** Household head is the person who represents a household and all of household members recognize that person as a head of household. (p174)...Household head or the person who is in charge of answering the census is recorded in line 1 of the household roster...Before filling out name of household head, the interviewer should check if the person who is in the line for "name of household head" is in the enumeration coverage. if that person is not in the enumeration coverage (already moved to other place, policeman, in army, etc), the oldest person in the household can be considered as a household head.

**Vietnam 1999** Head of household is the person who represents household and all other household member recognize. If a household has all children, their father and mother are policemen or in army (they are enumerated separately), household head is the oldest child. Students who live in dormitory or rent an apartment are enumerated as a single household unit. Head of household is the person who are recognized by other members in the apartment. Other members would have "other" relationship with the head.

---

Source: Minnesota Population Center (2007).

Appendix B. Percent of persons residing in intergenerational families, by generation and headship

Country/Year	Younger Generation (30-39)			Older Generation (65+)		
	All Intergenerational	Younger Head	Elder Head	All Intergenerational	Younger Head	Elder Head
<b>Argentina</b>						
1970	19.0	8.4	10.5	46.0	20.9	25.2
1980	18.9	7.6	11.3	41.7	17.8	23.9
1991	17.1	5.4	11.7	36.4	12.9	23.5
2001	19.5	4.3	15.2	37.5	11.5	26.0
<b>Brazil</b>						
1970	12.3	5.0	7.3	48.9	20.5	28.4
1980	13.9	5.0	8.8	51.6	18.8	32.8
1991	15.1	4.1	11.0	51.4	16.5	34.9
2000	16.5	3.0	13.6	50.0	12.7	37.3
<b>Chile</b>						
1970	17.2	7.0	10.3	45.4	16.5	28.9
1982	17.8	5.8	12.0	48.1	15.9	32.2
1992	18.7	3.8	14.8	58.1	14.0	35.3
2002	20.0	3.2	16.8	47.0	10.9	36.1
<b>Colombia</b>						
1973	16.5	6.7	9.8	54.8	22.2	32.6
1985	19.5	5.1	14.4	58.2	17.7	40.5
1993	20.3	4.0	16.3	58.1	15.6	42.6
<b>Costa Rica</b>						
1973	n/a	n/a	10.9	n/a	n/a	37.9
1984	16.0	4.4	11.6	55.5	17.4	38.2
2000	16.8	3.5	13.3	52.9	14.4	38.5
<b>Ecuador</b>						
1974	16.4	6.0	10.4	53.0	18.3	34.7
1982	15.7	5.2	10.5	51.9	17.1	34.8
1990	15.5	3.9	11.6	51.9	15.2	36.7
<b>Kenya</b>						
1989	10.1	3.0	7.2	42.4	9.7	32.7
1999	8.8	1.8	7.1	39.3	7.7	31.7
<b>Mexico</b>						
1970	n/a	n/a	7.3	n/a	n/a	29.0
1990	14.6	3.6	11.0	51.0	13.3	37.7
2000	17.4	3.6	13.8	55.8	14.1	41.7
<b>Philippines</b>						
1990	14.4	2.9	11.5	54.8	13.2	41.6
1995	15.2	2.7	12.4	56.9	12.7	44.3
2000	16.7	2.6	14.1	55.3	11.8	43.5
<b>Romania</b>						
1992	15.4	4.0	11.4	30.0	11.6	18.5
2002	22.9	4.0	18.9	32.0	7.9	24.2
<b>Rwanda</b>						
1991	8.4	0.9	7.5	46.6	3.1	43.5
2002	6.3	0.5	5.9	41.1	2.4	38.7
<b>South Africa</b>						
1996	18.4	2.6	15.9	43.5	7.6	35.9
2001	19.5	3.0	16.5	49.5	11.5	38.0
<b>Uganda</b>						
1991	9.0	2.6	6.3	33.1	7.3	25.8
2002	6.1	0.5	5.6	30.4	3.2	27.2
<b>Venezuela</b>						
1971	n/a	n/a	9.5	n/a	n/a	30.1
1981	16.8	5.4	11.4	52.9	21.4	31.6
1990	17.8	4.5	13.3	54.3	19.0	35.4
<b>Vietnam</b>						
1989	23.2	7.3	16.0	69.5	24.3	45.2
1999	20.5	7.5	13.0	71.2	24.7	46.5

\* "n/a" signifies the data is not available because parent of the head of household was not specifically identified in the data.