THE GENDERED CONTEXT OF CONFLICT: NORTHERN IRISH ATTITUDES TOWARD WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT AND FAMILY ROLES BEFORE AND AFTER THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT*

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* Address correspondence to Mick Cunningham, Department of Sociology, Western Washington University, 532 Arntzen Hall, 516 High Street, Bellingham, WA 98225-9081, U.S.A. E-mail: Mick.Cunningham@wwu.edu. The Family and Changing Sex Roles II and III surveys were fielded as part of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The data utilized in this research were documented and made available by the Zentralarchiv für Empirishe Sozialforschung, Koeln. The data for the ISSP were collected by independent institutions in each country. Neither the original data collectors nor the Zentralarchiv bear any responsibility for the analyses or conclusions presented here.

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ABSTRACT

Research into the relationship between gendered family roles and violent social conflict has led to differing conclusions. On the one hand, nationalist sentiment during conflict has been linked to gender conservatism. On the other hand, social disorganization resulting from violent conflict may open a space for gender relations to be redefined in ways that enhance women's status. The current study investigates this question by examining changing attitudes toward gendered family roles and women's employment in Northern Ireland as the region moved from a historical period of relatively intense conflict to one of reduced conflict intensity. In addition to examining change across time within Northern Ireland, the analyses also compare attitudes in Northern Ireland with those in eight neighboring countries within Europe. Data come from the 1994 and 2002 waves of the International Social Survey Program. The findings offer little evidence that individuals in Northern Ireland increased their support for women's non-domestic roles across the period in question. Results from multivariate regression models also suggest that change did not occur evenly for Catholics and Protestants. Although Catholics were more egalitarian than Protestants at both points in time, Catholic support for egalitarian family roles decreased between 1994 and 2002.

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Violent conflict between ethnic groups within national borders increased dramatically in the second half of the twentieth century (Gurr and Harff, 2004). Such conflicts result not only in death and displacement, but also in the restructuring of social relations. Recently, scholars across a range of disciplines have demonstrated how family life is shaped by political conflict in domains including childbearing (Agadjania and Prata, 2002; Caldwell, 2004; Lindstrom and Berhanu, 1999), marriage (Randall, 2005), domestic violence (McWilliams, 1998), and care of the elderly (Zimmer *et al.*, 2006). The current paper extends this research by investigating how conflict is linked to perceptions about appropriate roles for women and men in families and the labor market. Gender relations are likely to be transformed in a variety of ways during violent conflict. Men may be away from home fighting, imprisoned, or at a high risk of unemployment. Women may voluntarily or involuntarily find themselves in more visible roles within the local community, and may take on greater responsibility for the household economy as well. At the same time, ideological dimensions of conflict may reinforce gender inequalities by emphasizing links between women's roles as mothers and reproduction of the ethnic community or nation. This study examines change in perceptions of gendered work and family roles in Northern Ireland across an eight-year interval, providing new insights into the processes through which gender relations are shaped by violent conflict.

Several facets of the current research design are likely to enhance our understanding of the relationship between violent conflict and gender relations. First, the study provides an original examination of attitudes toward men and women's family roles and women's employment in Northern Ireland. Existing knowledge of gender relations in Northern Ireland is remarkably limited in comparison to other European regions. This gap in the literature is surprising in light of the relatively high quality of data that have been collected in the region since at least the early 1990s. In addition to

its descriptive value, however, the study also investigates attitude change across time and locates Northern Ireland within a broader European context. Further, the analyses consider differences in patterns of attitude change across the religiously-identified groups around which the conflict is defined. A central component of the study is its analysis of data across an historical interval that corresponds to substantial changes in the intensity of the Northern Irish conflict. The serendipitous association between political events and the time points of data collection provides a unique opportunity to understand social change as it occurs in a violently divided society. Because regions experiencing conflict tend to be chaotic and resource impoverished, the availability of high quality data based on probability sampling is rare in such populations. By leveraging both cross-national and longitudinal components of the data, the analysis is able to shed light on several previously untested hypotheses about the relationship between violent conflict and gender relations.

Research from a range of other countries suggests that attitudinal support for the male breadwinner, female homemaker family model has been declining for the past 30 years (Brooks and Bolzendahl, 2003; Scott *et al.*, 1996; Crompton *et al.*, 2005). This trend is significant in part because attitudes about gendered family roles have been causally linked to a wide range of factors including school attainment, independent living, the timing of union formation and childbirth, the quality of marital relationships, and, at the aggregate level, women's political representation (Amato and Booth, 1995; Cunningham *et al.*, 2005; Kaufman, 2000; Paxton and Kunovich, 2003). Investigation of the consequences of such attitudes is beyond the scope of the current analysis, but there is no reason to expect that gender-related attitudes do not exert similar influences in Northern Ireland.

THE NORTHERN IRISH CONTEXT

Northern Ireland is characterized by deep-seated sectarian divisions between religious- and politically-identified ethnic groups that have produced intervals of violence for several hundred years. The conflict originated in disputes over rights to land tenure and, later, over access to industrial employment that were granted to English and Scottish settlers. These settlers were distinguished from

the native Irish by their Protestant religion. The subsequent partitioning of Ireland in 1920 created the entity of Northern Ireland, as part of the United Kingdom, out of six of the nine counties of the Irish province of Ulster. Among the citizens of Northern Ireland, the opposing communities are commonly referred to as "Catholic" and "Protestant." Many scholars argue that the situation in Northern Ireland is most accurately characterized as ethnic or "ethno-national" conflict (Brewer, 2004; Bruce, 1994; McGarry and O'Leary, 2004), but the conflict has also been shaped by a historical legacy of British colonialism and military intervention in Ireland (see Miller, 1998). Although the categories do not neatly overlap, the two main parties to the conflict are defined on the one hand by ethnic identification with Ireland, political identification with Nationalism, and Catholic religious affiliation and on the other hand by ethnic identification with Great Britain, political identification with Unionism, and Protestant religious affiliation. The most recent period of violence, beginning in the 1960s, originated in Catholic protests over economic discrimination and political exclusion by the Protestant majority.

Between the late 1960s and the landmark "Good Friday Agreement" of 1998 more than 3600 people died as a result of the conflict, and ten times that many were injured (Fay *et al.*, 2000). Throughout the years of "the Troubles," forms of violence ranged from relatively unorganized street protests to carefully orchestrated bombings and political assassinations. The violence has been perpetrated by a variety of individuals and groups, including police, paramilitary organizations, and military forces from Great Britain. The Good Friday Agreement was a watershed moment in the history of the conflict, producing an elected assembly for the first time in nearly 30 years. Paramilitary cease-fires were first declared in 1994, and have generally held since 1998. In August of 2005 the Irish Republican Army agreed to relinquish its weapons as well as its support for violence as a solution to political problems. Most recently, in May of 2007, a new government was formed between the two largest political parties (the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein). Although the violence in Northern Ireland reached its highest levels in the 1970s, the single most deadly event was the 1998 Omagh bombing.

The data for the current study were captured in 1994 and 2002. A key assumption of this analysis is that the intensity of conflict waned in a substantively meaningful way between the two survey years. McGarry and O'Leary (2004, p. 23) make this point cogently:

> In the seven years up to and including 1994, the year of the first IRA and loyalists cease fires, the total loss of life because of the conflict was 622 persons. In the seven subsequent years to 2001 the total loss of life because of the conflict was 140 persons. That is a fall in the death toll of nearly four-fifths, despite a major breakdown in the IRA ceasefire in 1996-7, and despite intermittent breakdowns in the loyalists' ceasefires . . . This is palpable evidence of a meaningful peace process.

Identifying dates defining periods of "conflict" and "post-conflict" in Northern Ireland is an ambiguous and contested exercise. Further, it would be naïve to argue that the conflict has disappeared. Manifestations of sectarian divisions and militarization remain in the context of what has been called a "cold peace" (Tonge, 2005). Everyday life in Northern Ireland continues to be marked by a degree of insecurity and the possibility of renewed violence, and sectarian conflict continues to shape the views of individuals in the region (see, for instance, Leonard, 2006). Northern Ireland retains a religiously-segregated school system and until recently experienced long intervals of economic stagnation. As the conflict has receded, economic growth in the region has been rapid, in part fueled by rapid economic expansion in the Republic of Ireland (see Bloom and Canning, forthcoming).

PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES

Numerous studies conducted in Europe and North America have highlighted major shifts in gender-related attitudes during the past three to five decades, with the vast majority suggesting decreasing support for gender differentiated family roles and increasing support for women's employment (Rindfuss *et al.*, 1996; Scott *et al.*, 1996; Thornton and Young De-Marco, 2001). In addition, women's participation in the labor market and men's participation in household work have increased in recent decades, though the pace of change has varied across countries (Hook 2006; Van der Lippe and Van Dijk 2001). Existing research and patterns of behavioral change suggest that in the absence of conflict, support for the male breadwinner, female homemaker family model would be

expected to decline between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s in most European countries. Similarly, support for women's employment would be expected to increase. A number of factors have been linked to gender-related attitudes in previous studies, including women's employment participation, education, religious attendance, and age (Brooks and Bolzendahl 2003; Cunningham *et al.* 2005; Mason and Lu 1988; Scott *et al.*, 1996). In order to isolate influences associated with conflict, the analyses account for these factors as thoroughly as possible.

A number of studies have examined the relationship between gender relations and violent conflict in other regions (see edited volumes by Lorentzen and Turpin, 1998; Meintjes *et al.*, 2001). One of the most direct investigations of the relationship between conflict and gender-related outcomes is due to Kunovich and Dietelbaum (2004). Based on data gathered in Croatia, they find that several conflict-related factors are linked with gender conservatism. Kunovich and Dietelbaum (2004) specifically argue that ethnic nationalism may foster gender-differentiated family roles as a result of its focus on shared ancestry and the past. This link between ethnic nationalism and gender "traditionalism" arises as a result of a strong emphasis on the importance of motherhood and women's role in child socialization (see also King, 2002; Milić, 1997). Kunovich and Dietelbaum argue, further, that high levels of in-group and out-group polarization created by nationalist sentiment lead to a generalized conservative outlook in all aspects of life. They write that "conflict leads to an increased need for a sense of safety and a return to the basics, fundamentals, and tradition" (2004, p. 1093). Research in the U.S. and Europe during the two World Wars also provides evidence of widespread emphases on patriotic motherhood during wartime, even under circumstances where women's participation in the labor force had risen (Higonnet *et al.,* 1987; May, 1988). In combination, this research suggests potential declines in support for gender egalitarianism and women's employment during times of conflict. Such a pattern, by inference, would be associated with increasing egalitarianism and support for women's employment in the aftermath of conflict.

There are reasons to expect a different relationship between conflict and perceptions of

appropriate roles for women and men. First, the study by Kunovich and Dietelbaum (2004) is limited to a single point in time and a single country. Even more important, not all of the study's findings support the central hypothesis that those living in a conflicted region are likely to hold more egalitarian attitudes about gender. Specifically, women who lived in war regions expressed significantly less "traditional gendered family role attitudes" (p. 1099) than did women living in geographic areas in Croatia that were exposed to lower levels of conflict. In addition, other studies suggest that conflict may destabilize existing gender arrangements in ways that may at least temporarily enhance women's standing in the community and the household. McKay (1998) claims that during periods of violent conflict, "women's roles are often radically altered because they are compelled to shed constraints of gendered traditions and respond to demands of profound social upheaval" (p. 348). Similarly, Manchanda (2001) argues that "conflict opens up intended and unintended spaces for empowering women, effecting structural social transformations and producing new social, economic and political realities that redefine gender . . . hierarchies" (p. 99). A corollary of this pattern of renegotiated roles for women during wartime is the increased marginalization of women in the aftermath of conflict. As men's wartime responsibilities diminish, women frequently resume previously defined roles centering on the household. Although such a pattern of gender retrenchment may be resisted by some women, it may be welcomed by others to the extent that the end of conflict signals a reestablishing of stability (MacDonald, 1987). Nonetheless, this latter body of research suggests that support for egalitarian gender relations and women's employment may decrease in the aftermath of conflict.

In view of these competing hypotheses about the relationship between conflict and attitudes toward gendered family roles, it is important to consider how other characteristics related to the conflict in Northern Ireland may be linked to variation in levels and rates of change in gender-related outcomes. Religious community membership, gender, and political identity are likely to be particularly salient.

Although scholars disagree about its causal role in the conflict, religion constitutes a central

element of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Research suggests that religious identity is particularly important to individuals in Northern Ireland (Clayton, 1998; Mitchell, 2005). Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland attend religious services much more frequently than their co-religionists in Great Britain (Bruce and Alderdice, 1993). The Roman Catholic Church has maintained strong positions regarding the sanctity of the family. It has also cultivated a close relationship with the Irish state, and the centrality of women's role as mothers is enshrined in the founding documents of the Republic of Ireland. At the same time, despite theological differences among Ulster Protestants, a relatively large sub-set holds literal interpretations of the Bible and can be characterized as evangelical (Mitchell and Tilley, 2004). Further, a number of studies have linked religious affiliation and participation to gender-related attitudes in Europe and the U.S. (Christiano, 2000; Heineck, 2004; Hertel and Hughes, 1987; Morgan, 1987).

The few studies that have considered population-based measures of gendered family roles in Northern Ireland have been primarily descriptive (Greeley, 1999; Kremer, 1993; Kremer and Curry, 1987). It was common, however, for scholars in earlier decades to claim that Northern Ireland was a highly conservative region in terms of gender and family outcomes (Edgerton, 1986; Roulston, 1989). Such arguments were frequently based on the high levels of religious observance and the centrality of religiously-based identities to the conflict. During the 1970s and 1980s, women in Northern Ireland had lower rates of employment and lower rates of returning to work when their children reached school age than Great Britain (Cohen, 1991; Trewsdale, 1987). This body of research suggests that individuals in Northern Ireland may be more supportive of gender differentiated family roles than individuals in other countries.

It is also possible that levels and rates of change in gender ideologies differ across religious communities within Northern Ireland. The studies by Greeley (1999), Kremer (1993), and Kremer and Curry (1987) each found that Catholics were somewhat more egalitarian in their views of appropriate roles for men and women than Protestants in the 1980s and early 1990s. These studies did not,

however, control for other variables, report whether observed Catholic-Protestant differences were statistically significant, or identify mechanisms associated with differences across religious communities. Previous research provides support for the hypothesis that Catholics will be more egalitarian in their attitudes toward family roles and more supportive of women's employment than Protestants. It is also possible that there are differences in rates of attitude change across religious communities, although no existing studies offer guidance about specific expectations for the nature of change across religious groups in recent years.

Research consistently finds that women hold more egalitarian attitudes toward gendered family roles than do men (Brewster and Padavic, 2000; Mason and Lu, 1988). Levels and rates of attitude change across time may differ in important ways for women and men as conflict recedes. For instance, women might retain their support for work roles developed during wartime, while men might be more likely to support women's domestic responsibilities as conflict recedes. Accordingly, the analyses examine gender differences in rates of attitude change. In addition, it is possible that gender differences in rates of attitude change vary across religious community, and such a three way interaction between gender, religious affiliation, and change over time is also investigated.

A final factor that may be linked to gender-related attitudes in Northern Ireland is political identity. Several studies of the conflict suggest that nationalist and republican women were likely to have been exposed to liberationist ideologies that extended beyond the goal of political autonomy to ideas about gender equality (Arextaga, 1997; Sales, 1997; Sharoni, 2001). The following text from a recent platform statement of the nationalist party Sinn Fein reflects its stated support for gender equality: "Sinn Fein wants to build an Ireland of Equals and we recognise the vital need for . . . gender equality in the decision making process. We argue that women's inequality is a structural problem, stemming from a patriarchal society." (Women in an Ireland of Equals, 2002). Among unionists, the largest political party is the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and this party is closely associated with a conservative stream of

Protestantism. Ian Paisley, the head of the DUP and an active Protestant minister, has been outspoken in his opposition to issues such as rights for same-sex couples. The final hypothesis, then, suggests that a nationalist identity may be a mechanism producing greater egalitarianism among Catholics, while a unionist identity may foster gender conservatism among Protestants.

DATA AND METHODS

Data appropriate for investigating these hypotheses are available from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) archives. The ISSP consists of a coordinated group of studies that are designed to facilitate standardized comparisons of individuals from a large number of countries. The current study includes data from countries participating in the 1994 and 2002 waves, during which the second and third rounds of the "Gender and Family Roles" modules were administered. The resulting dataset for Northern Ireland represents approximately 1600 individuals, and the cross-national dataset adds an additional 25,500 respondents from 8 other countries or regions in Europe. Supplementary data with information about political identity in Northern Ireland was collected under the auspices of the Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Survey (1994) and the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (2002).

Measures

The analyses focus on two broad measures of attitudes. The first captures perceptions of the male breadwinner, female homemaker family model. It is composed of 5 separate items in which respondents state their level of agreement or disagreement with statements such as "A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works," and "A job is all right, but what most women want is a home and children" (see Appendix Table for text). These items are averaged into an index and coded so that a high score represents greater support for gender egalitarianism. These five items appear to measure a single underlying construct, with values for Cronbach's alpha ranging between .73 and .85 across countries (Table 1).

[Table 1 about here]

The second attitudinal measure captures respondents' views about the appropriate level of women's employment at different points in the maternal life course: before children, when children are not yet in school, after children enter school, and after the children leave home (see Appendix Table). Response categories include "stay at home," "work part-time," and "work full-time."

These attitudinal measures are assessed in Northern Ireland and 8 other European nations or regions including Austria, Great Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales), the Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of Ireland, Spain, Sweden, and Western Germany. These countries represent a wide variety of welfare regimes and are designed to provide a broad base for comparison within the European context.

For the analyses within Northern Ireland the key variable of interest indicates the year in which the survey was collected (1994 or 2002). For ease of interpretation, the values for survey year are set at 0 and 8, respectively, in the multivariate analyses. Religious affiliation is categorized into three groups—Protestant, Catholic, and no religious affiliation—and Protestants are treated as the reference category. The proportion of individuals in Northern Ireland expressing any other religious affiliation is very small, and these individuals are excluded from the analyses. Attendance at religious services is measured on a 6 category scale in which a high score indicates more frequent attendance. Education is measured with two variables capturing whether the respondent completed a secondary qualification or has any tertiary schooling. The reference category includes those who did not complete a secondary qualification. Marital status is captured with two variables assessing whether respondents have never married or have separated or divorced. The reference category includes married individuals. Employment status is measured with two variables indicating whether respondents are employed full-time or part-time, and the reference category includes individuals who are not employed. Finally, the analyses include measures of gender, age in years, and whether the respondent's mother ever worked for pay for as long as one year between the respondent's birth and age 14.

Plan of Analysis

Assessing change in gender-related attitudes is accomplished in several ways. First, mean levels for the family roles index for Northern Ireland and the other European countries or regions are presented for 1994 and 2002. Next, a cohort decomposition of the gender egalitarianism index in Northern Ireland is presented. This approach facilitates assessment of net change within age groups and of change across synthetic cohorts. This is followed by descriptions of the distributions of each of the four items assessing levels of support for female employment across the life course for both years for Northern Ireland. The rank of Northern Ireland relative to the other 8 countries at each time point is also examined. Finally, the key hypotheses about change within Northern Ireland are tested with a series of regression equations that control for the variables outlined above. The analysis of the gender egalitarianism index relies on Ordinary Least Squares regression, and the analysis of attitudes toward women's employment across the life course is conducted using multinomial logistic regression.

The key focus of the regression analyses is on the influence associated with the variable representing survey year. With age included as a control variable, the parameter estimating the influence of survey year includes information about birth cohort and the historical period between the two surveys. Research conducted in other countries strongly suggests that those born in more recent cohorts are likely to hold more egalitarian attitudes than those born in older cohorts, and the cohort decomposition confirms this pattern in Northern Ireland. As a result, potential liberalizing influences associated with the younger birth cohorts in the later survey may complement, counterbalance, or outweigh evidence of within-individual change reflecting influences associated with historical period. In the case that cohort and period influences are moving in opposite directions, such an analytic strategy sets a high bar for documenting evidence of significant change over time.

RESULTS

Mean levels of the gender egalitarianism index are compared across the 9 nations in Table 1. This table facilitates evaluation of aggregate change between 1994 and 2002 in Northern Ireland, and also makes it possible to assess the relative level of gender egalitarianism in Northern Ireland

compared to its European neighbors. The countries are ordered according to the final column, which subtracts the mean value in 2002 from the mean in 1994 for each country. According to the values in the column labeled "1994 Mean," Northern Ireland was ranked in the exact middle of the countries in support for gender egalitarian family roles in 1994. This finding provides original evidence about the hypothesis of Northern Irish conservatism. During a period in which the intensity of conflict was still high, levels of gender egalitarianism were not notably low in Northern Ireland. In contrast, a ranking of the values in the column labeled "2002 Mean" suggests that only two countries had lower average levels of support for gender egalitarianism than Northern Ireland 8 years later. Spain and Austria were the two countries that remained less egalitarian than Northern Ireland in 2002, while West Germany and Ireland were the two countries that increased their rank relative to Northern Ireland. At minimum, the results from Table 1 suggest that Northern Ireland did not become comparatively egalitarian relative to its European neighbors during the years between 1994 and 2002. In addition, although the change is not statistically significant, Northern Ireland is the only region that experienced a net decline in average support for gender egalitarianism between 1994 and 2002. The findings in Table 1 suggest that individuals in Northern Ireland did not hold particularly conservative attitudes about gendered family roles in 1994, but that the pattern of change was different in Northern Ireland compared to most neighboring countries.

In order to obtain a more nuanced understanding of attitude change, Table 2 examines mean values on the gender egalitarianism index across 8-year birth cohorts for the total Northern Ireland sample and separately for Protestants and Catholics. Defining the age groups by the number of years between surveys facilitates an intuitive assessment of the pattern of change among synthetic cohorts. This is accomplished by comparing those who were of a particular age in one survey with those who were eight years older in the subsequent survey wave.

[Table 2 about here]

Focusing first on the upper panel labeled for the entire Northern Ireland sample, the generally

decreasing values observed by reading down the columns labeled "1994" and "2002" indicate substantial differences in attitudes by age. In general, older individuals hold less egalitarian attitudes than younger individuals. The column labeled Δ1 assesses the net change within each age group across the 8 year interval. The value associated with Δ1 can be thought of as the amount of change that occurs as older cohorts are replaced by younger ones. For the total sample this value is positive in all but two cases, suggesting a pattern whereby younger cohorts are generally more egalitarian than the cohorts that preceded them. The column labeled Δ2 represents an estimate of change within a synthetic cohort. This is accomplished by comparing those who are, for example, 18 to 25 in 1994 with those who are eight years older (26 to 33) in 2002. Data from a panel are preferable for understanding individual change over time, but many studies have relied on similarly structured data from repeated cross sections to estimate change (Mason and Lu, 1988; Scott *et al.*, 1996). The upper panel of Table 2 shows that mean values on the family role index in the Δ2 column declined for 5 of 6 cohorts. This suggests that support for egalitarian family roles within cohorts decreased among individuals over time. Such a pattern has not been observed in previous studies of other countries, and could indicate influences associated with either aging or time period. In either case, the pattern suggests that individuals in Northern Ireland have not become more gender egalitarian as the conflict has receded.

The second two panels of Table 2 present analogous cohort decompositions for Protestants and Catholics separately. Three main findings stand out. First, among Protestants the (weighted) averages of cross-cohort change and intra-cohort change are in the opposite direction and are nearly equal in size (compare .07 to -.108). Second, the pattern for Catholics suggests that not only are more recent cohorts less supportive of egalitarian arrangements between women and men than their predecessors, but also that attitudes have become consistently less egalitarian within each cohort. In addition, the magnitude of within cohort change is much larger among Catholics than Protestants. Finally, support for gender egalitarianism appears greater for Catholics than Protestants in each age group, and this is especially true in 1994.

Before turning to the multivariate models, the next set of analyses consider a different measure of attitudes toward gendered family roles. Specifically, Figure 1 presents percentage distributions for the four items tapping attitudes toward levels of women's employment across the life course in 1994 and 2002 for the Northern Ireland sample. There is little change in the distribution of attitudes toward women's employment levels among hypothetical women who have married but not had children, with roughly 88% supporting full-time employment in both years. In contrast, the measures asking about mothers with children at varying ages show greater evidence of change. Between 1994 and 2002, the primary change in Northern Irish attitudes toward the employment of women with pre-school children is a shift away from the "stay at home" response toward a preference for part-time work. In 1994, 31.6% asserted that mothers with young children should work part time, while that figure had risen to 39.3% in 2002. The percentage supporting full-time employment for mothers of young children remained relatively constant. In contrast, the item assessing women with school-aged children documents a shift away from support for part-time work toward a preference for mothers staying at home. While 12.5% recommended that mothers with school-aged children stay at home in 1994, 22.2% preferred this option in 2002. Support for full-time employment among mothers with school-aged children did not change. For the item measuring women's employment after children have left the home, the primary change is a shift away from full-time employment and toward staying at home. It is also important to note that although Figure 1 documents increasing preferences for part-time employment for mothers with pre-school aged children, more than half of respondents continued to support staying at home in 2002.

[Figure 1 about here]

Additional insight into the relative position and pattern of change in Northern Ireland is provided in Table 3. The columns labeled "9 Country Average" report the average percentage giving each response to the four items tapping attitudes toward women's employment across the maternal life course. The columns labeled "Northern Ireland Rank" represent the relative position of Northern

Ireland with regard to the percentage giving each response to each of the same four items. The rankings are calculated by assigning the country with the lowest percentage for each response within a given year a score of 1 and assigning the country with the highest percentage a score of 9. To interpret these findings it is necessary first to recognize that a high rank in the stay at home category indicates relatively lower support for women's employment at each life course stage. In addition, only the middle two items represent points in the life course during which children reside in the household.

[Table 3 about here]

In terms of the averages across the 9 countries, the percentage supporting women's full-time employment before women have children is 87.6% in 2002, and the average percentage supporting women's full-time employment after children have left the parental home is 79.1% in 2002. In contrast, average support for full-time employment among hypothetical mothers with pre-school aged children is only 11% in 2002, and the corresponding value for mothers with school-aged children is 25%. Overall, Table 3 documents declining support for staying at home at all stages across survey years. For women with no children in the household (labeled "Before Children" and "Empty Nest"), there is growing support for full-time employment. For women with children in the home (labeled "Pre-school Children" and "School-aged Children") the largest increases are in support of part-time employment, though there are incremental increases in support for full-time employment as well.

In 1994, Northern Ireland fell near the middle of the distribution of 9 countries for the each hypothetical employment circumstance (ranking 7^{th}, 6^{th}, 5^{th}, and 5^{th}). This pattern had changed markedly by 2002. The percentage of individuals in Northern Ireland asserting that women should "stay at home" was either highest (rank 9) or second highest (rank 8) for all four items. Similarly, by 2002 Northern Ireland had the lowest percentage supporting part-time employment among mothers of pre-school aged children and the second lowest percentage supporting part-time employment among mothers with children in school. These patterns do not uniformly imply that support for women's employment declined across the 8-year interval in Northern Ireland. Rather, in the case of women with

pre-school children, the pattern indicates that support for part-time employment did not increase as rapidly in Northern Ireland as it did in other regions. In the case of women with school-aged or post-school-aged children, individuals in Northern Ireland decreased their support for any level of maternal employment while average support for maternal employment increased across all countries. Table 3 shows that Northern Ireland moved from average levels of support for mothers staying at home to notably high levels of support for maternal non-employment between 1994 and 2002. As with the analysis of the gender egalitarianism index, these findings offer little evidence for the hypothesis that support for women's non-domestic roles increased as the intensity of conflict declined.

The results presented to this point have not accounted for other factors likely to be associated with attitudes toward gendered family roles and women's employment. Tables 5 and 6 provide results from multivariate analyses of the Northern Ireland sample designed to test the key hypotheses about the relationship between conflict and attitude change. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for all variables in each year for Northern Ireland. The results in Table 5 examine change in the gender egalitarianism index in Northern Ireland. The first column in Table 5 demonstrates the influence of key predictor variables on the egalitarianism index based on a pooled sample of Northern Irish respondents in 1994 and 2002. In general, this model documents strong influences of age and gender on attitudes toward the male breadwinner, female homemaker family model. Model 2 tests the competing hypotheses regarding the direction of change in gender attitudes as the conflict receded. The non-significant coefficient on the variable labeled "Survey Year" suggests that once the relevant controls are included, there is no evidence of attitude change in either direction across the 8-year interval. Model 3 of Table 5 examines religious community differences in Northern Irish attitudes. This equation demonstrates that Catholics and those reporting no religious affiliation are more supportive of egalitarian family roles than are Protestants. This finding provides the strongest evidence to date about differences across the main religious communities in levels of gender egalitarianism. It is interesting to note, further, that the frequency of attendance at religious services is not related to gender

egalitarianism. This suggests that the amount of exposure to religious teachings is not responsible for the observed differences across religious groups.

[Table 4 about here]

[Table 5 about here]

Although Model 2 of Table 5 offered little evidence of attitude change across the two survey years, it is possible to further investigate this question by examining rates of change across religious groups. Model 4 of Table 5 adds an interaction between religious affiliation and survey year in order to ascertain the pattern of attitude change among Protestants, Catholics, and those with no religious affiliation. The negative and statistically significant coefficient representing the interaction of Catholic affiliation and survey year suggests that Catholics became less distinctive in their attitudes compared to Protestants (the reference group) across the 8-year interval. Figure 2 presents the predicted values on the egalitarianism index for Protestants, Catholics, and those with no religious affiliation in 1994 and 2002 based on the coefficients in Model 4. All control variables are held constant at their means. Figure 2 shows that, net of the control variables, Catholics were more supportive of egalitarian family roles in both years. The gap between Catholics and Protestants became much smaller across the 8-year interval, however, and the coefficient for the interaction term suggests that Catholics support for gender egalitarianism actually decreased during the interval. There is no evidence that the attitudes of men and women changed at a different rate (not shown). Further, a test of a 3-way interaction between gender, religious community, and change over time suggests that there were no significant differences in rates of change for women and men within each religious group (not shown).

[Figure 2 about here]

Model 5 of Table 5 tests the hypothesis that political identity is a mechanism producing religious community differences in attitudes by adding a measure assessing political identity. This variable takes a value of 1 when a Catholic respondent identifies as nationalist or when a Protestant identifies as unionist. Otherwise, this variable takes on a value of 0. There is no evidence that political

identity is linked to gender egalitarianism when the other variables in Model 5 are controlled. Further, the stability of the coefficient capturing the interaction of survey year and Catholic religious affiliation provides no evidence that political identity transmits the influence of religious affiliation on gender egalitarianism. Supplementary analyses within each religious group confirm that there is no independent influence of nationalist identity among Catholics or unionist identity among Protestants (not shown).

The final set of analyses considers change in attitudes toward women's employment across the life course based on the four items examined in Figure 1 and Table 3. The models presented in Table 6 are based on a series of multinomial logistic regression equations in which each outcome is treated as an unordered categorical variable. The coefficients estimate the influence of each predictor variable on support for part-time employment and full-time employment compared to support for staying at home. The coefficients are exponentiated and presented as odds ratios. Numbers greater than 1 suggest a positive influence of the independent variable on the odds of working part-time or full-time, while numbers less than 1 suggest a negative influence of the predictor.

[Table 6 about here]

The findings in Table 6 provide some evidence that support for women's participation in the labor force declined across the 8 year interval. Specifically, statistically significant coefficients on the variable capturing survey year show that support for part-time employment when women have school aged children decreased relative to support for staying at home. Further, support for both part-time and full-time employment decreased relative to support for staying at home among hypothetical mothers whose children have left the parental home. The only evidence suggesting greater support for maternal employment is observed in the increase in support for part-time employment among mothers with pre-school children relative to support for staying at home. Taken in combination, Table 6 is generally consistent with the earlier finding that reductions in conflict are not associated with increases in support for women's employment.

In contrast to the findings for gender egalitarianism, the results in Table 6 offer scant evidence of differences in attitudes toward women's employment across religious communities. Although Catholics are more supportive of full-time work when young children are present, there are no other Protestant-Catholic differences. Those with no religious affiliation are more supportive of women's employment at all stages than are Protestants, but few of these coefficients attain statistical significance. It is also interesting to note that there are surprisingly few gender differences in preferences for levels of women's employment across the life course. Finally, there is no evidence of differences in rates of attitude change for Catholics and Protestants (not shown).

CONCLUSION

The political events in Northern Ireland over the past forty years offer a unique opportunity to understand the consequences of violent conflict for social life. The availability of high quality data captured at time points representing differing levels of conflict intensity make Northern Ireland a particularly valuable site for such an investigation. O'Dowd (1989) argues that studies of Northern Ireland have suffered from a tendency toward either an exclusive focus on the unique internal factors associated with the conflict or a failure to acknowledge the salience of the Protestant-Catholic divide. The current study held these factors in balance through a close investigation of within-country differences along with analyses that placed Northern Ireland in a broader European context. Unfortunately, the analysis was unable to include direct assessments of individuals' perceptions of the influence of conflict on their own ideas about appropriate gender relations. Nonetheless, by framing the available data within the political context of Northern Ireland at each survey wave, the research offers new insights into our understanding of processes of social change as they unfold in a context of violent conflict.

As a whole, the research supports previous qualitative and historical studies suggesting women's roles as mothers may be re-emphasized as conflict recedes. Writing in reference to the two World Wars, Higgonet and colleagues (1987) claim that "[i]nstead of allowing women to affirm their

newfound independence, postwar notions of femininity in propaganda and the popular media were restrictive and frustrating. In this way potentially progressive social transformations culminated for many in what might be termed reaction formations" (p. 13). The current study introduces complexity into this argument by demonstrating how patterns of change in attitudes toward gendered family roles and women's employment occurred unequally across the social lines along which the Northern Irish conflict is drawn. Specifically, the analyses show that within Northern Ireland, Catholics were somewhat more supportive of women's employment and egalitarian gender roles than Protestants in the mid-1990s, before the peace accords. In the ensuing eight years, attitudes toward gendered family roles converged, and this pattern was produced by general stability of Protestant attitudes combined with a decline in egalitarian sentiments among Catholics.

Although the pattern of change for Catholics was distinctive in the analyses of attitudes toward the male breadwinner, female homemaker family model, the analyses of attitudes toward women's employment across the maternal life course also suggested a more generalized decline in support for women's employment as the intensity of conflict waned. Support for part-time employment among mothers of school-aged children and support for both part- and full-time employment among mothers whose children had left home each declined relative to support for mothers in these circumstances staying at home. In addition, Northern Ireland moved from a middle rank in the cross-national comparisons on the items addressing levels of maternal employment to a point at or near the lowest levels of support for maternal employment. The ability of the analyses within Northern Ireland to control for a large number of factors related to attitudes about maternal employment in other research provides relatively strong grounds for the claim that Northern Ireland experienced declines in support for women's employment between 1994 and 2002. At a minimum, the findings offer little support for Kunovich and Dietelbaum's (2004) argument that conflict is related to gender conservatism. Although there is little doubt that the dynamics of conflict differ across cultural and temporal contexts (Randall 2004), the weight of evidence from this and other studies suggests that conflict is not uniformly

associated with declines in women's status.

There are several important questions raised by the findings. First, the analysis was unable to identify the mechanisms associated with declining support for gender egalitarianism among Catholics. There was no evidence, for instance, that levels of nationalist sentiment among Catholics was linked to patterns of attitude change. It seems possible that changing economic circumstances across the two main religious communities may have played a role. Economic conditions in the region improved during the study interval, and there is evidence of increases in economic equality between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (Breen, 2000). To the extent that Catholic families were better able to rely on men's earnings as the conflict intensity receded, a growing proportion of families may have been able to institute more conventionally gendered family arrangements. Supplementary analyses uncovered no evidence, however, that changing rates of unemployment among Catholics mediated the link between religious affiliation and gender egalitarianism (not shown). Some research suggests that the availability of child-care is particularly low in Northern Ireland, and this may have forced many women to emphasize their role as family caretakers (McWilliams, 1991). Future research using panel data may be able to verify the findings in this study and more effectively identify potential mechanisms responsible for the observed pattern.

Implicit in the current study is the claim that living in a violently divided society shapes the overall social context of individuals living in such conditions. It is also possible that individual experiences with conflict are associated with gender-related attitudes. Factors including exposure to discrimination, harm to family members, imprisonment, or perceptions of inter-group relations may be linked to individuals' attitudes about appropriately gendered roles. Although data demands for such an investigation would be high, analyses of more immediate consequences of conflict would be likely to significantly enhance our understanding of the processes at work.

Additional investigation into other countries experiencing declines in support for gender egalitarianism and women's employment might also shed light on the factors associated with attitude

stability and change. The analyses did not focus in detail on the patterns and predictors of attitude change in the comparison countries. The cross-national analyses suggested that although most countries could be characterized by increasing support for women's non-domestic pursuits, this was not a universal pattern. For instance, there is evidence of movement away from egalitarianism in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The pattern of change in these countries suggests that a degree of caution is in order when interpreting the underlying causes of change in Northern Ireland.

Finally, analyses of family change in Northern Ireland may contribute to debates over the causes of global family change. Some researchers have suggested that a relatively uniform set of family changes is occurring in many countries across the world, and that this package of changes can be characterized as a "Second Demographic Transition" (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 2007). Hypotheses based on the existence of such a universal transition allege that changes in marriage, divorce, and childbearing are driven by a combination of rising standards of living and an accompanying set of value changes. Central to this argument is the presence of increasing levels of security that facilitate a growing focus on higher-order needs such as personal fulfillment and self-actualization. Although previous research into the causes of the Second Demographic Transition has focused on the role of economic security, few analyses have considered the insecurity associated with political violence. The current study offered little evidence that increasing physical security was associated with increasing egalitarianism. Additional research on change in other family domains in conflicted regions may provide a new angle from which to investigate the relationship between security and value change.

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Table 1. Mean, Standard Deviation, and Cronbach's Alpha of Gender Egalitarianism Index, by Country and Year, Ranked by Mean Change, ISSP 1994 and 2002.

Country	N	1994 Mean	1994 Standard Deviation	1994 Alpha	2002 Mean	2002 Standard Deviation	2002 Alpha	1994-2002 Change
Northern Ireland	1,634	3.225	0.95	0.85	3.202	0.88	0.82	-0.023
Great Britain	2,944	3.299	0.89	0.76	3.320	0.90	0.78	0.021
Netherlands	3,217	3.269	0.87	0.82	3.299	0.84	0.79	0.031
Spain	4,965	2.955	0.92	0.73	3.143	0.90	0.77	0.188***
Sweden	2,352	3.453	0.94	0.8	3.654	0.84	0.77	0.201***
Austria	3,024	2.855	0.83	0.81	3.070	0.78	0.77	0.215***
Ireland	2,178	3.073	0.88	0.83	3.320	0.85	0.83	0.247***
Norway	3,562	3.309	0.86	0.81	3.555	0.88	0.83	0.247***
West Germany	3,260	2.974	0.83	0.76	3.348	0.80	0.74	0.374***
Average (unweighted)		3.142	0.89	0.80	3.294	0.86	0.79	0.166***

* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$

Table 2. Mean Gender Egalitarian Index, by 8-year Age Group and Religious Affiliation, Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Survey (1994) and Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (2002)

	1994	2002	Δ1	Δ2
	Total			
18-25	3.526	3.619	0.093	--
26-33	3.728	3.592	-0.136	0.066
34-41	3.423	3.498	0.076	-0.230
42-49	3.264	3.366	0.102	-0.057
50-57	3.088	3.142	0.054	-0.122
58-65	3.030	2.921	-0.109	-0.168
65+	2.608	2.676	0.068	-0.354
Average	3.225	3.202	0.034	-0.145
n	646	969		
	Protestants			
18-25	3.389	3.408	0.020	--
26-33	3.643	3.556	-0.088	0.167
34-41	3.349	3.438	0.088	-0.206
42-49	3.098	3.379	0.281	0.030
50-57	3.058	3.108	0.049	0.009
58-65	2.935	2.935	0.000	-0.123
65+	2.552	2.655	0.103	-0.280
Average	3.106	3.105	0.070	-0.108
n	357	470		
	Catholics			
18-25	3.644	3.636	-0.008	--
26-33	3.903	3.539	-0.364	-0.105
34-41	3.568	3.587	0.019	-0.316
42-49	3.548	3.346	-0.202	-0.222
50-57	3.194	3.103	-0.091	-0.446
58-65	3.153	2.929	-0.224	-0.265
65+	2.767	2.722	-0.044	-0.431
Average	3.408	3.243	-0.123	-0.273
n	219	387		

Table 3. 9 Country Average and Northern Ireland Rank of Percentage Agreeing with Each Response on Attitudes toward Women's Employment across the Life Course, ISSP 1994 and 2002.

	Before Children		Pre-school Children		School-aged Children		Empty Nest	
1994								
	9 Country Average	Northern Ireland Rank	9 Country Average	Northern Ireland Rank	9 Country Average	Northern Ireland Rank	9 Country Average	Northern Ireland Rank
Stay at home	4.2%	7	50.0%	6	16.0%	5	5.1%	5
Work part-time	13.5%	2	41.1%	2	62.0%	5	21.7%	6
Work full-time	82.3%	5	8.9%	6	22.1%	4	73.2%	6
2002								
Stay at home	2.4%	8	40.6%	8	11.6%	9	3.6%	8
Work part-time	10.1%	4	48.5%	1	63.1%	2	17.3%	8
Work full-time	87.6%	4	10.9%	4	25.3%	4	79.1%	1

Notes: A score of 1 indicates the percentage choosing that response is lowest among the 9 countries, while a ranking score of 9 indicates the highest percentage choosing that response. A high score on the "stay at home" response indicates relatively lower support for employment among women in each hypothetical condition of maternal employment, while a high score on the "work part-time" or "work full-time" responses indicates relatively greater support for women's part- or full-time employment in each condition of maternal employment.

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Northern Ireland Variables, Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Survey (1994) and Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (2002)

	1994		2002	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Breadwinner family attitudes	3.25	.88	3.22	.90
Women's employment timing				
Before children: Stay at home	.03	--	.04	--
Before children: Work part-time	.09	--	.10	--
Before children: Work full-time	.88	--	.86	--
Preschool children: Stay at home	.58	--	.50	--
Preschool children: Work part-time	.32	--	.41	--
Preschool children: Work full-time	.10	--	.91	--
School-aged children: Stay at home	.11	--	.21	--
School-aged children: Work part-time	.66	--	.56	--
School-aged children: Work full-time	.23	--	.23	--
Empty nest: Stay at home	.02	--	.07	--
Empty nest: Work part-time	.23	--	.24	--
Empty nest: Work full-time	.75	--	.69	--
Protestant	.56	--	.49	--
Catholic	.34	--	.41	--
None	.10	--	.10	--
Male	.47	--	.39	--
Female	.53	--	.61	--
Age	46.42	18.54	49.23	17.52
Married	.55	--	.49	--
Single (never married)	.23	--	.25	--
Post married	.22	--	.26	--
Employed full-time	.42	--	.34	--
Employed part-time	.08	--	.13	--
Not employed/not in labor force	.50	--	.53	--
Did not complete secondary qualification	.49	--	.46	--
Completed secondary qualification	.31	--	.36	--
Completed any tertiary schooling	.20	--	.18	--
Mother employed when respondent 14	.41	--	.32	--
Attendance at religious services	3.67	1.52	3.50	1.57

Notes: For women's employment timing, n= 543 in 1994 and n=759 in 2002; for all other items, n=605 in 1994; n=878 in 2002. Values for categorical variables are proportions.

Table 5. Unstandardized Coefficients from OLS Regression of Gender Egalitarianism Index on Survey Year, Religious Affiliation, and Controls, ISSP 1994 and 2002, Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Survey (1994), and Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (2002)

	1	2	3	4	5
Survey Year	--	0.005	0.004	0.012	0.012
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Catholic	--	--	0.152***	0.288***	0.292***
			(0.046)	(0.072)	(0.072)
No religious affiliation	--	--	0.256***	0.150	0.156
			(0.076)	(0.111)	(0.112)
Catholic * survey year	--	--	--	-0.027**	-0.028**
				(0.011)	(0.011)
No affiliation * survey year	--	--	--	0.022	0.022
				(0.018)	(0.018)
Unionist or Nationalist	--	--	--	--	0.021
					(0.044)
Female	0.191***	0.189***	0.197***	0.196***	0.197***
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Age	-0.017***	-0.017***	-0.016***	-0.016***	-0.016***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Single	-0.147***	-0.150***	-0.163***	-0.165***	-0.164***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Post-married	0.061	0.060	0.049	0.039	0.041
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Employed full-time	0.226***	0.226***	0.229***	0.234***	0.234***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Employed part-time	0.167**	0.161**	0.177**	0.181**	0.181**
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Secondary education	0.017	0.013	0.012	0.012	0.012
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Any tertiary education	0.129**	0.128**	0.127**	0.125**	0.127**
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Mother worked	0.187***	0.191***	0.199***	0.198***	0.199***
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Religious attendance	-0.007	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Constant	3.782***	3.762***	3.630***	3.595***	3.581***
	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.125)
R-squared	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.22	0.22

Note: n = 1568. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$

Table 6. Exponentiated Coefficents from Multinomial Logistic Regression of Timing of Women's Employment on Survey Year, Religious Community, and Controls, ISSP 1994 and 2002.

	Before Children		Pre-school Children		School-aged Children		Empty Nest	
	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time
Survey Year	1.014	1.007	1.076***	1.049	0.910***	0.951	0.845***	0.844***
	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Catholic	0.820	0.687	1.207	1.854**	0.887	1.208	1.265	1.184
	(0.33)	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.44)	(0.16)	(0.27)	(0.43)	(0.39)
No Religious Affiliation	1.138	1.622	1.908**	1.057	1.969	3.874**	1.701	3.162
	(1.03)	(1.32)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.87)	(1.80)	(1.87)	(3.40)
Female	1.015	1.750	1.398*	0.726	1.417*	1.336	0.576	0.867
	(0.38)	(0.59)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.19)	(0.28)
Age	0.967*	0.941***	0.963***	0.957***	0.974***	0.942***	0.958***	0.936***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.0048)	(0.0083)	(0.0060)	(0.0073)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Single	0.806	0.369*	0.709*	0.807	0.491***	0.473**	0.915	0.695
	(0.35)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.34)	(0.25)
Post-married	1.215	1.755	1.069	1.936*	0.768	1.208	3.193**	3.728***
	(0.58)	(0.75)	(0.19)	(0.58)	(0.16)	(0.32)	(1.28)	(1.45)
Employed full-time	0.975	1.178	1.281	1.905*	1.136	1.704*	1.204	1.624
	(0.53)	(0.58)	(0.21)	(0.48)	(0.25)	(0.43)	(0.59)	(0.77)
Employed part-time	1.553	1.365	1.517*	0.540	3.486**	1.753	4.908*	2.555
	(1.29)	(1.06)	(0.32)	(0.28)	(1.39)	(0.80)	(3.82)	(1.97)
Secondary education	0.560	1.391	0.840	0.857	1.168	1.060	1.351	1.520
	(0.27)	(0.59)	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.56)	(0.61)
Any tertiary education	0.822	1.909	0.846	1.567	0.902	1.119	1.001	1.101
	(0.52)	(1.08)	(0.16)	(0.44)	(0.22)	(0.32)	(0.46)	(0.49)
Mother worked	2.319	2.593	1.533**	1.661*	1.952**	2.572***	3.813*	5.938**
	(1.25)	(1.31)	(0.22)	(0.37)	(0.42)	(0.62)	(2.37)	(3.63)
Religious attendance	1.139	1.199	1.092	1.071	0.930	1.011	1.061	1.014
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.055)	(0.088)	(0.060)	(0.078)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Constant	12.82*	226.1***	1.335	0.419	24.18***	14.54***	92.31***	661.3***
	(14.6)	(236)	(0.49)	(0.25)	(12.2)	(8.54)	(101)	(704)
Log Likelihood	-536.2		-1084		-1090		-836.2	

Notes: n = 1302. Reference category for all regressions is "stay at home." Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure 1. Percentage Distribution of Attitudes toward Women's Employment across the Life Course in Northern Ireland, ISSP 1994 and 2002



Figure 2. Predicted Values on Gender Egalitarian Index by Religious Affiliation and Year, based on Model 4 of Table 5, ISSP 1994 and 2002.



Appendix Table. Text of Outcome Measures

	Gender Egalitarianism Index Items
	Response categories 1=Strongly agree 2=Agree 3=Neither agree nor disagree 4=Disagree 5= Strongly Disagree
1.	A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.†
2.	A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.
3.	All in all, family life suffers family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.
4.	A job is all right, but what most women want is a home and children.
5.	A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family.[a]
	Attitudes toward women's employment across the life course
	Response categories 1=Stay at home 2=Work part-time 3=Work full-time
1.	Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time, part-time, or not at all under these circumstances: After marrying and before there are children?
2.	When there is a child under school age?
3.	After the youngest child starts school?
4.	After the children leave home?

[a] 1994 wording: A *husband's* job is to earn money; a *wife's* job is to look after the home and family.

† Reverse coded